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The Polarity of Dynamics and Form
The Basic Tension in Paul Tillich’s Thinking
This study examines the idea of the polarity of dynamics and form in Tillich’s
thinking. The tension of the polarity of dynamics and form is the starting-
point of Tillich’s thinking, and the polarity has its ground in God. The
analysis shows that Tillich’s thinking can be interpreted with the three
functions of life: self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence.
Explicitly, the polarity of dynamics and form is the basis for the self-creation
of life but it can be found  also in the other functions of life.
Tillich’s ontology and description of the New Being are based on the idea
of self-integration: the ideal is the unity and balance of  dynamics and form,
and both of the elements are equally important. Form remains unbroken and
form is the essence of a thing. There are forms of the self-transcendence of
form: even if the form is transcended, this happens within the form.  This is
the way that Tillich unites the classical and the modern view of dynamics and
form.  If we are ready to accept Tillich’s system as coherent, we will have to
accept this kind of dialectical thinking. The first two volumes of Systematic
Theology emphasize the unity and balance of dynamics and form.
The situation changes when Tillich moves to the self-creation of life. In
self-creation, dynamics as vitality breaks through the form and creates new
forms. There is a moment of chaos between the old and the new form, and this
gives a possibility for creation or destruction. This view is different compared
to self-integration and the classical view of form: the modern view of
dynamics and form becomes dominant. The third function of life is self-
transcendence, and it can be used to interpret Tillich’s views of life and
history: the Spirit or the Spiritual Presence transcends the finite forms and
manifests itself in different forms. Self-creation and self-transcendence
sometimes blend with each other, because they both emphasize the dynamic
side of the polarity. Tillich wants to include the three functions of life in one
system, and this creates the basic tension and the conceptual problems in his
thinking.
In the ontological context, Tillich gives a classical definition of form: form
makes a thing what it is, it is its essence; this indicates self-integration. In the
self-creation of life, creation is always creation of form, and every new form
is made possible only by breaking through the old form. The element of form
4becomes static compared to the classical view of form. In self-transcendence,
the Spirit transcends the finite forms and manifests itself in different forms:
the connection between dynamics and form loosens, and the form element is
expressed in “finite forms”. In self-integration, dynamics is in unity and
balance with form; in self-creation, dynamics as the vitality of life breaks
through the form; in self-transcendence, the dynamic substance transcends the
forms.
Tillich uses the polarity of dynamics and form in a symbolic way to speak
about God. In the ontological context, the ideal is the unity and balance of the
elements. The power of being or the abyss or the ground of being express the
dynamic side of the polarity. The element of meaning and structure is logos,
which unites meaningful structure with creativity. God’s Spirit combines the
ontological elements: the Spirit is the unity of power and meaning. However,
the emphasis is different in the context of self-transcendence where the
Spiritual Presence is dynamic and transcends all the forms. 
There are three main symbols that Tillich uses to talk about God and they
can be interpreted using the three functions of life: God as “Being-Itself”
corresponds to the unity and balance of dynamics and form and to the self-
integration of life. God as “the Power of Being” corresponds to the self-
creation of life where dynamics breaks through the form. God as “the Spirit”
corresponds to the self-transcendence of life where the dynamic substance
transcends the forms.
The elements of the ontological polarities belong essentially together in an
unbroken unity, but in finitude, polarity becomes tension where the elements
draw away from one another. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ is
essential being under the conditions of existence. There are no traits of
existential estrangement in Jesus, and it becomes indirectly clear that the
balance of dynamics and form was not distorted in Jesus’ life. The perfect
balance of dynamics and form is achieved in the Kingdom of God.
Tillich’s thinking combines different influences.  There is a strong
Aristotelian strain in the classical definition of form and in the idea of self-
integration. The description of the essential and existential state of things
indicates the Platonic scheme of essence and existence and the views of
existentialism. The idea of self-creation and the modern view of dynamics and
form has been influenced by Schelling and the philosophy of life, and it is
near the views of process philosophy. The dynamic substance in self-
transcendence mirrors the idea of dynamis panton in Neo-Platonism, and
Tillich’s view of history also mirrors Hegelian views.
PREFACE
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of the outstanding interpretations of the Christian message in the last century.
In theology, we will have to go on with the questions he leaves us.
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criticism for my work. Professor Eeva Martikainen and Professor Tuomo
Mannermaa have read the text and given valuable comments. I am deeply
grateful that I have had the chance to meet Professor Langdon Gilkey and
Professor John Clayton who have helped me to understand Tillich’s thinking.
My English text has been corrected by Donald Smart.
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Relations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. I want to thank
everyone engaged in this pleasant and successful journey.
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9 Paul Tillich was born in Prussia in 1886. He became a Doctor of Philosophy in 19111
and obtained the highest academic degree available in theology in 1912. He worked in
Germany until 1933 when he was dismissed because he opposed the ideas of National
Socialism. After that he moved to the United States where he worked from1933-55 in the
Union Theological Seminary, and 1955-62 as a professor at Harvard University. After he
retired, he was invited to work at  the University of Chicago. Tillich died in 1965.
 Newport 1984, 16 refers to a study in 1977 where 554 North American systematic2
theologians were asked about which person they have affinity of thought and from whom
they have drawn significant insights; Tillich ranked in first place as the major influence
upon American theologians. Another study found Tillich’s Systematic Theology as the
most widely used textbook among North American systematic theologians. On the basis of
statistics of doctoral dissertations, Newport says that no other religious thinker has been
discussed as much as Paul Tillich.
 See e.g. Tracy 1985, 260-277.3
 Parrella 1995, xvi.4
 E.g. Randall 1952, 161 concludes after a detailed analysis of Tillich’s ontology:5
“Tillich is ... the philosopher, whose appeal lies in his mastery of reason and rational
argument. Paul Tillich seems to me not only the ablest Protestant theologian of the present
day, but also by far the most persuasive exponent of the philosophy of existentialism, and
what is more to the point, a real contributor to the present-day revival of metaphysical
inquiry. He is a first-rate philosophical mind.”
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The starting points for the examination
Paul Tillich  is no doubt one of the great theologians of the century. His1
influence has been great especially in America where he was ranked as the
major influence on systematic theologians two decades ago,  but the impulses2
given by his work have spread to other parts of the world as well. However,
no uniform school of thought has developed after him. Many theologians have
been inspired by his thoughts, but they have also interpreted and applied them
in  their own direction.  Frederick J. Parrella says that “Tillich’s greatest3
legacy may be visible not only in the depths of his own systematic thinking
but in the power of his thought to inspire others to seek answers to questions
unthinkable to Tillich during his life.”4
Tillich’s philosophical theology has evoked different kinds of responses,
both  critical and affirmative. There are very positive valuations of Tillich’s
thinking,  but the difficulties of Tillich’s  language have also evoked an5
ironical accusation that, in spite of Tillich’s importance to communication,
10
 See Hamilton 1963, 32-36. Hamilton thinks that Tillich is “an artist in words”. Randall6
1952, 161 mentions the problems of Tillich’s language in connection with the language of
existential philosophy. The philosophers of religion in the analytic tradition have only
been seldom interested in Tillich’s philosophical theology. The few who have expressed
their views about Tillich’s thinking have criticized it by saying that it is at best unclear, at
its worst confused. The same lack of interest has been seen in the attitude of language
philosophers. See Rowe 1989, 201.
 Hummel 1992, 12.7
 It has been claimed that Tillich’s thinking outside the system is different than within the8
system but we cannot go into the details of the problem here. An example of the problem
is Tillich’s last public lecture where he said: “There may be - and I stress this, there may
be - a central event in the history of religions”. Tillich’s  starting point for his Systematic
Theology is the centrality of the Christ event and yet he uses a conditional expression here
- and naturally this has a great effect on all parts of his thinking. Tillich’s lecture is The
Significance of the History of Religion for the Systematic Theologian, see MW 6, 433. For
more information see e.g. Lai 1994, 56. Thomas 1990, xx-xxi sees a great problem in
Tillich’s thinking, because there is, in his view, an apparent contradiction between what
Tillich writes within the system and what he says outside it: "Outside the system Tillich
appears to abandon much of what he would fast to within the system." The reason is, in
Thomas’ view, Tillich’s encounter with other religions. Schwarz 1998, 86-88 says that, in
the pressure of secularism and world religions, Tillich created a theology of the “roofless
church” which in its universality lost its roots and identity.
 See e.g. ST I, 3-4.9
 ST III, preface.10
there is no agreement about what he has in fact said.  In the Introduction to the6
Main Works, volume 6, Gerd Hummel explains Tillich’s basic motives in the
following way: "The real motive of Tillich's ontological theology hence is a
pastoral or even therapeutical one. Its truth is neither to be found in the
appropriate concepts nor in a self-contained system but in its offer to stand
anxiety. That is what makes it so eminently related to person and situation."7
Tillich has presented his views in a systematic form in the three volumes of
Systematic Theology.  Tillich wanted to interpret theologically the phenomena8
of his time and emphasized that theological work must always be connected to
the other areas of life.  It is not possible to build a permanent and stable9
theological system on this kind of base. Tillich emphasized this when he said
that a theological system is not only an end point but also a starting point; it is
like one station on an endless journey towards the truth.10
Tillich says that a theological system should fulfill two demands: to express
the truth of the Christian message and interpret this message to a new
generation. Theology moves between these two poles and works in a
correlation between them. One pole is the situation which is examined by the
“creative interpretation of existence”. It uses philosophy and other sciences,
and it has to take into consideration also literature, art, and the whole field of
human experience. The other pole is the Christian message, on the basis of
11
 About the method of correlation, see ST I, 3-4, 59-66. Tillich explains the motives of11
his correlative method in the following way: “Continuous thinking about the possibility of
uniting the religious power of so-called neo-orthodox theology with the duty of every
theology to address itself to the contemporary mind has resulted in the conception of a
’method of correlation’ - correlation, that is, between existential questions and theological
answers.” Beyond Religious Socialism (1949), 733 (MW 3, 528).
 Horton 1952, 46 describes Tillich in an empathic way: “When he stands ’on the12
boundary’ between two opposing views, he listens sympathetically to both parties, and the
conflict between them becomes a conflict in his own soul... It is a marvel that interests as
diverse as his can be united in one mind without pulling it apart. He has known deep
mental pain for the greater part of his life. Yet now that we begin to see the outlines of his
system, it is evident that despite all inward stresses and tensions, it actually does have the
tensile strength to hang together.”
 Calí 1996, 70. It is always difficult to say, how a thinker’s personal life is reflected in13
his or her work. However, I think that Crace Calí’s book, Paul Tillich First-hand (1996)
can help us understand  Tillich. Calí tells us about Tillich’s strong inner tensions, and at
times he was very depressed and dissatisfied with himself. He felt that people
misunderstood his theology, and pressures and tensions were bearing down from all sides.
Calí explains this with Tillich’s own thoughts: “...creativity and chaos are polar opposites,
yet they are interdependent. The succesfully creative person has learned to organize his
chaos into form while the unsuccesfully creative one, because of neurotic tendencies, or
other reasons, has allowed the chaos to split him apart.” In the footnote, Calí makes a
direct reference to the polarity of dynamics and form which can be used to explain
Tillich’s tensions and behaviour; it seems that Tillich’s main challenge was to find the
form for his inner creativity and chaos. In these tensions, Calí tells us,Tillich sees clearly
two sides in himself: “’You know, Paulus,’ I said hesitantly, ’I’ve often wondered how you
have kept from becoming schizophrenic.’ At my words, he bolted upright in his chair. ’But
that’s just it - I am!’” Calí says that he was certainly not clinically schizophrenic, but his
need to speak in the broadest terms underlined his despair. Calí  goes on to express her
own view of Tillich and the situation: “This feeling of being schizophrenic came as no real
surprise. There was a turbulent and secret side to Tillich that I had gradually become aware
of  -a side so alien to the one I knew daily that I deliberately chose to avoid acknowledging
its presence. But he knew that I knew. And there seemed to be an unspoken agreement
between us that I would not make him aware that I was aware.” For more information see
Calí 1996, 20-21.
which theology tries to answer the questions connected with the interpretation
of existence. Tillich calls his method the method of correlation.  11
According to Tillich’s own testimony, he was always “on the boundary”,
trying to combine different areas of life and thinking.  Crace Calí, Tillich’s12
secretary in the Harvard years, relates a very revealing incident about this.13
Tillich was asked to write a short description of himself. At first he dictates:
“Professor Tillich builds his theology on the method of correlation between
questions arising out of the human predicament and the answers given in the
classical symbols of Christianity.” Then he stops and asks to cross out
Christianity and write instead “answers given in the classical symbols of
12
  Calí tells that Tillich had a feeling of being two persons: “This Tillich they write14
about-it’s not really me. I am two persons. And the one has nothing to do with the other.”
Calí goes on: “Tillich further surprised me by disclosing that this feeling of being two
persons also was valid in relation to himself as a writer. The theologian and philosopher
was also a stranger! Truly, who is the real Tillich? I would guess that the clue is in the area
of personal relations. This might be his true self, from his point of view, but can the
reception of him by the world as a great thinker be completely negated in trying to present
the picture of the real Tillich?” For more information see Calí 1996, 59. 
Calí connects Tillich’s problem also to his personal life, his relation with women. After
Tillich’s wife Hannah published her book From Time to Time (1973), Tillich’s personal
life has also been discussed publically. Calí sees the matter in the following way: “His
dynamic personality attracted people to him from all quarters - but especially women. All
types, all ages found him irresistable. He found it difficult not to respond. In fact, the erotic
side of his nature seemed to demand some kind of continuous romantic involvement with
other women... His propensity for making intimate friendships with innumerable women
was a constant source of guilt and anxiety. For the sake of his other self, the more centered
Paul Tillich, he had to cover up these episodes. To face them openly was torture and a key
to his personal anguish and depressions. Only by an elaborate system of self-delusion
could he find it bearable to live with himself. The tragic figure he cut at these times of
despair troubled me greatly.” See Calí 1996, 21. See also René Tillich, My Father, Paul
Tillich (2001). Tillich’s close friend Rollo May writes: "Like the rest of us in the twentieth
century, he had to live Dionysian and think Apollonian, and he seemed to have been born
to do precisely that. These built-in conflicts kept him always psychologically open and
dynamic." See May 1973, 45. Alexander C. Irwin discusses Tillich’s theology of eros also
in connection with his personal life in Eros toward the World: Paul Tillich and the
Theology of the Erotic (1991), see e.g. pages 99-119. For the questions of Tillich’s
personal life see also Hannah Tillich, From Place to Place: Travels with Paul Tillich,
Travels without Paul Tillich (1976); Rollo May, Paulus: Reminiscences of a Friendship
(1973); Ann Belford Ulanov, Between Anxiety and Faith: the Role of the Feminine in
Tillich's Theological Thought (1989). See also Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin and Grace:
Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (1980).
 Pauck & Pauck 1976, 236.15
religion”. Calí mentions that it is a very significant change, and that Tillich
cannot be confined even to the category of Christianity. Tillich answers: “I am
always seeking the unifying thread that will tie it all together.”  14
Tillich’s biography by Wilhelm and Marion Pauck explains that Tillich had
real difficulty in writing the third volume of his system. Finally, he and his
assistant John Dillenberger worked backward beginning with part V, and then
moving to part IV. About part IV, “Life and the Spirit”, Tillich said that it
contained a philosophy of life for which Schelling was the teacher and he
merely the student. Tillich was reluctant to submit this section to the publisher
and he remained basically dissatisfied with it.  This indicates that there were15
some problems in bringing the system to fulfilment.
Tillich himself has made some critical remarks on the consistency of
Systematic Theology, for example in his text Autobiographical Reflections. He
13
 Autobiographical Reflections (1952), 15.16
 Clayton 1980, 17, 24.17
 Clayton 1987, 10.18
 Clayton 1987, 15.19
 Clayton 1980, 116: “His programme of a cultural theology, the symbol of which is the20
theonomous unity of faith and value, and his programme of a church theology, the symbol
of which is the correlation of existential questions and theological answers, would seem
to have different aims and serve different ends.” Clayton 1980, 153-249 talks about “two
models of a correlative relation”. In his introduction to Tillich’s writings on philosophy of
religion in the fourth part of the Main Works, Clayton puts forward briefly the view that
there seems to be two different models in Tillich’s thinking in relation to autonomy and
theonomy. See  Clayton 1987, 25-26.
 O’Connor 1964, 38-39 also speaks about Tillich using a parallel taken from art: "If he21
is a painter, then he is, like many modern philosophers, an impressionist... Nevertheless,
there are limits which may not  rightly be  exceeded even in the freedom of this literary
genre, and it may well be questioned whether it has any place in philosophy or theology."
Steinacker 1989, 61 interprets Tillich’s thoughts on the basis of another artistic view,
expressionism. He thinks that in the difficult formulations of Tillich there are empty
concepts, which nonetheless are not meaningless in the context of his system.
 Clayton 1985, 285 shows with examples how Tillich changed his texts and thoughts22
for example about the concept of kairos.
finds the inconsistency of terminology problematic: "There is even in a well
organized work such as my Systematic Theology a certain inconsistency and
indefiniteness of terminology; there is the influence of different, sometimes
competitive motives of thought, and there is a taking for granted of concepts
and arguments which have been dealt with in other places."16
Tillich scholars have noticed that his thinking was in constant movement.
When his writings were republished or translated from German to English or
vice versa, he made constant changes and clarifications to them. One of the
outstanding Tillich scholars, John Clayton, has observed that almost everyone
writing about Tillich criticizes the way he uses certain concepts; words have
different meanings in the early and in the subsequent writings. There is,
however, not enough reason to draw a sharp line between “young Tillich” and
“old Tillich”.  Clayton says that Tillich’s position develops sometimes17
unexpectedly as he “seeks ever afresh to rethink even his most basic
categories of thought”.  Clayton even claims that Tillich had “a tendency to18
rethink key concepts virtually each time he used them”.19
Clayton sees a difference between Tillich’s cultural theology and church
theology. Clayton asks, if Tillich’s vision is unified or does he perhaps “see
double”.   Clayton compares Tillich with a sculptor who uses parts of his old20
works of art as elements of his new artistic creations:  "Systematic Theology21
is no masterpiece, even if it should be judged by some to contain within itself
'many masterpieces.'"  Clayton makes this comment about the consistency of22
14
 Clayton 1980, 19. Thomas 1995, 33-34 thinks that the interpreters overemphasize23
Systematic Theology especially at the expense of later texts, but he says that "the three
volumes are a compact whole and internally consistent body of thinking". Hamilton 1963,
32-36 thinks that “Tillich’s system, when examined, shows itself to be a coherent
structure, overwhelmingly consistent in its own terms, and quite comprehensible”. In
Hamilton’s view, problems arise when an attempt is made to relate Tillich’s system to
Christian faith. He explains  that Tillich is being pulled in two directions by wanting to be
an ontological philosopher and a Christian thinker at the same time.
 Gilkey 1990, 13: “... to many readers the clearly dynamic, temporal, process emphasis24
of the third volume of Systematic Theology came as a surprise - to Tillicheans, a
vindication of their sense that Tillich was not the static thinker that both process
theologians and the later eschatological political theologians have maintained. These early
works which we have just reviewed show the error of the common interpretation: not only
is ’being’ for Tillich not at all static nor the dynamic a new element, but in fact the
dynamic elements of Tillich’s later thought ... represent only a mild reappearance of the
fundamental motifs of Tillich’s process or historical view of being.” See also Adams 1985,
9-10.
 Gilkey 1990, 169 says that the first and second volumes of Systematic Theology25
represent Tillich’s “neo-orthodox” side. In spite of the differences, Tillich belongs among
the “Krisis” or “neo-orthodox theologians. They have a common ultimate dependence on
revelation and a correlated emphasis on estrangement/sin. Barth was on the far right,
Tillich and Bultmann on the left, and Brunner, Aulén, and Nygren somewhere in the
middle. For more detail see Gilkey 1990, 20, 54, 102, 114, 141.
 Christopherson 1995, 2, 48 says that in Tillich’s early works, nonbeing, as ouk on, is26
in "oppositional" relation to being; later it has a more creative or positive role where
nonbeing, as me on, is in "polar" relation to being. However, the idea of an oppositional,
nonpolar view of nonbeing can be found  again especially in the third volume of
Systematic Theology. See Cristopherson 1995, 49, note 5.
Systematic Theology: "Tillich returns in the final volume of The Systematic
Theology to problems which he originally worked through before formulating
his method of correlation and to which he subsequently attempted to apply the
new method, with sometimes unsatisfactory results."23
Gilkey sees a change of thought between the first two and the third volume
of Systematic Theology; the third volume has a more dynamic view than the
first ones.  The dynamic elements of Tillich’s later thought “represent only a24
mild reappearance of the fundamental motifs of Tillich’s process or historical
view of being”. In other words, some of Tillich’s early fundamental motifs
reappear in the third volume of the system.  Christopherson finds a25
corresponding change in Tillich’s idea of nonbeing. 26
In his recent study, Pan-Chiu Lai makes the same kind of temporal division
of Tillich’s writings. He divides Tillich’s development into three major stages:
the pre-Christocentric stage in Tillich’s early years,  the Christocentric stage
reflected in the first two volumes of Systematic Theology, and the post-
Christocentric stage which is expressed in the third volume of Systematic
15
 Lai 1994, 53-54.27
 Lai 1994, 29-30.28
 Lai 1994, 170. “Our primary task is to investigate whether this pneumatological29
approach of doing theology will create tensions with his theology expounded in the first
two volumes. We will see that in Volume 3, the freedom and primacy of the Spirit is
stressed in a way that even the centrality of Christ seems threatened. This marks a subtle
but significant difference from the earlier volumes.” See Lai 1994, 117.
 Gilkey 1985, 314-315. Grigg 1985, 80 emphasizes also the dynamic element: "Tillich's30
discussion of life focuses on the dynamic element in being, the movement from potential
to actual. By concentrating on this dynamic element, Tillich uncovers not only a mixture
of essence and existence but also an aspect of the ontological structure not evident in the
previous parts of his investigation." See also Hammond 1965, 101: "Our analysis has
shown that Tillich's concept of being-itself contains a dynamic element, the overcoming of
nonbeing. We have further indicated his view that this dynamic element in being-itself is
essential in order to understand God as the living God who is the ground of being."
 See Gilkey 1990, 119.31
Theology. In the third stage, Tillich is trying to create a synthesis of the first
two stages.  Lai mentions a surprising fact about Tillich studies: "Tillich's27
dissatisfaction with his Systematic Theology, especially with the third
volume, is not a secret, but there is still very little investigation of the reasons
for this dissatisfaction.”   He thinks that Tillich's encounter with other28
religions may be one of the reasons. Lai is one of the few who takes seriously
the change in Tillich’s system and says that Systematic Theology “should not
be assumed uncritically as a coherent and consistent system”.29
Two recent interpretations look at Tillich’s thinking from different points
of view. Langdon Gilkey, a student, colleague, and friend of Paul Tillich,
emphasizes the dynamic nature of Tillich’s theology in Gilkey on Tillich
(1990):
... it has for some time been recognized that Tillich's theological
system represents a 'dynamic' ontology, an ontology in which process
and becoming are the central aspects of being, and so in which
historical passage, rather than timeless forms or static being,
constitutes the most fundamental notion. This point can be argued in
a number of ways: dynamic life, and not rest, is the basic symbol for
God; the Spirit is in turn more fundamental than is Logos, and so
on.30
Gilkey sees a “Greek side” and a “modern side” in Tillich’s thinking.31
Donald R. Ferrell represents another view of Tillich’s theology in his
Logos and Existence: The Relationship of Philosophy and Theology in the
Thought of Paul Tillich (1992). He gives credit to Gilkey’s “imaginative and
creative re-visioning” of Tillich’s thought which emphasizes its ”dynamic,
historical and dialectical character” but Ferrell himself wants to give a
contrasting interpretation emphasizing the more classical ontology, “the
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 Ferrell 1992, xiii.32
 Ferrell 1992, 178-179.33
 Ferrell 1992, 464.34
 Jahr 1989a, 10 describes the situation of Tillich studies: “Neben diesen beiden35
Extrempositionen gibt es in der Forschung vereinzelt auch Stimmen, die ein
Gleichgewicht des statischen und des dynamischen Elements in der Theologie Paul
Tillichs... annehmen.”
 “Es ist die Methode des Paradox, der ständigen Durchbrechung und Aushebung der36
Form zu Gunsten des Wirklichen in ihr. Nicht Formlosigkeit, nicht fremde Formherrschaft
darf die kritischen Form durchbrechen; das wäre Verzicht auf Methode, d.h. auf
Philosophie; sondern bei vollem Ja zur autonomen, kritischen Form soll der Gehalt des
Unbedingten hervorbrechen und zerbrechen, nicht formlos, sondern paradox. Leben in
dieser höchsten Spannung ist Leben aus Gott. Anschauen dieser unendlichen Paradoxie ist
Denken über Gott, und wenn es methodisch wird, Religionsphilosophie oder Theologie.”
Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie (1922), 467 (MW 4,
87). See also Annala 1985, 56-57.
 Morrison 1984, 59 describes the idea of “dialectical logic” in Tillich’s thinking: “The37
dialectical component of Tillich’s method involves the introduction of a
nonmethodological logic. Tillich distinguishes between formal logic that obeys the law of
essential Tillich”.   Ferrell says that the eternal Logos is the unconditioned32
and invariant “import” breaking through the concrete content. Thus, in
Tillich’s thinking, “the historicist element ... seems ultimately to be
subordinated to the eternal Logos and its ahistorical character”.  33
Ferrell says that Logos, which is the changeless rational structure of mind
and reality, is not static but dynamic in the sense that it manifests itself in the
historical process. Also, Ferrell sees problems in Tillich’s thinking: “Since
Tillich could not work out  of a consistently existentialist orientation, but
rather attempted to graft existentialist concerns into a substantially classical
structure of thought, his conception of philosophy, theology, and their
relationship to each other is plagued by an ultimately unsatisfying ambiguity
and inconsistency.”34
In terms of dynamics and form, these interpretations set forth different
views of Tillich’s thinking.  Gilkey is  expressing Tillich’s lifelong dynamic35
thinking which goes back to his early years and can be seen again in the third
volume of Systematic Theology. Ferrell starts with the “essential Tillich” of
the first two volumes of Systematic Theology. These interpretations raise
interesting questions concerning Tillich’s thinking and the polarity of
dynamics and form: is it possible to find a coherent interpretation that can
explain the different views?
It is important to keep in mind that already in his early lecture Tillich said
that living in God means living in the highest tension: “Leben in dieser
höchsten Spannung ist Leben aus Gott.”  When we talk about God, we have36
to use symbols and paradoxical statements.  However, in Systematic37
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noncontradiction and dialectical logic that precedes or transcends the law of
noncontradiction. He defended formal logic, but limited it to its ’legal use.’ He then argued
that God as a living God must be described in dialectical statements. Technically stated,
Tillich’s dialectical logic demands the de-absolutizing of the law of noncontradiction.
Dialectical logic then replaces formal logic in the foundations of reality.” Morrison
believes that Tillich’s highest hope was to achieve a world-wide acceptance for his
dialectical ontology that would reverse the situation so that the nonmethodological line of
Western thought would become dominant and the interpreter of the methodical line.
However, this acceptance did not occur.
 ST I, 56. “They want to express the conviction that God’s acting transcends all38
possible human expectations and all necessary human preparations. It transcends, but it
does not destroy, finite reason; for God acts through the Logos which is transcendent and
transcending source of the logos sturcture of thought and being. God does not annihilate
the expression of his own Logos... Paradox points to the fact that in God’s acting finite
reason is superseded but not annihilated; it expresses this fact in terms which are not
logically contradictory but which are supposed to point beyond the realm in which finite
reason is applicable.” ST I, 57.
 ST III, 30-32: “Thus, within the process of actualization of the potential, which is39
called life, we distinguish the three functions of life: self-integration under the principle of
centeredness, self-creation under the principle of growth, and self-transcendence under the
principle of sublimity. The basic structure of self-identity and self-alteration is effective in
each, and each is dependent on the basic polarities of being: self-integration on the polarity
of individualization and participation, self-creation on the polarity of dynamics and form,
self transcendence on the polarity of freedom and destiny. And the structure of self-identity
and self-alteration is rooted in the basic ontological self-world correlation.”
Theology Tillich also says that “theological dialectics does not violate the
principle of logical rationality”.  The same is true of the paradoxical38
statements in religion and theology. How is Tillich able to maintain logical
rationality when he discloses the tension and paradox in God? We shall deal
with the question during our examination.
Tillich unites three functions of life in his system: self-integration, self-
creativity, and self-transcendence.  He explains them in the beginning of the39
third volume of Systematic Theology. They are all based on self-identity, self-
alteration and return to one’s self. Self-integration means that life drives
toward centeredness in the circular movement from a center and back to this
center. Life also produces new centers in self-creation: life goes forward in
the horizontal direction. The self-transcendence of life means that the
actualization of the potential also goes in the vertical direction: life drives
beyond itself as finite life. These three functions are combined in life.
Explicitly, the polarity of dynamics and form is the basis for the self-creation
of life. 
The three functions of life provide a way to understand Tillich’s difficult
thought patterns about the polarity of dynamics and form. On the one hand,
self-integration tries to conserve the existence of every being, on the other
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 Love, Power, and Justice (1954), 54. -The German translation of Love, Power, and40
Justice was published in 1955 under the name of Liebe, Macht, Gerechtigkeit.
 The Word of God (1957), 123-124 (MW 4, 406).41
 “There are those called ’polarities’ (a solvent word) - for example, individualization42
and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny.” My Search for Absolutes
(1967), 76.
 Natur und Sakrament (1930), 154 (MW 6, 162).43
hand, self-creation tries to create new. They are in constant tension.  We can
interpret the same thing with the polarity of dynamics and form: form tries to
conserve the existence of every being while dynamics tries to break through
the limits of form and create new forms. The self-transcendence of life means
that life drives beyond itself as finite life. The Spirit transcends the forms. The
functions of life are combined but the beginning of Tillich’s system
emphasizes self-integration,  the middle of the system (in the beginning of
volume 3) emphasizes self-creativity, and the end of the system emphasizes
self-transcendence. This will be the framework of our study.
Tillich expresses self-integration by saying that there is a unity and balance
of dynamics and form; everything happens within a form. This comes close to
the classical view of dynamics and form. The idea that dynamics breaks
through the form implies the self-creativity of life. We shall call it the modern
view of dynamics and form. In the self-transcendence of life, the Spirit
transcends the forms. We can use the concepts of form and substance to
analyze these thoughts. It is easy to see that the three functions of life are in
tension with each other, and so are the definitions describing them. We shall
see, how Tillich succeeds in combining them in one system.
The examination of the polarity of dynamics and form can shed more light
on Tillich’s thinking, and it has not been properly done so far. We shall
analyse the concepts of dynamics and form and the way Tillich uses them in
his thinking. The analysis is supplemented by a systematic analysis which is
based on the view that a theological system forms a systematic whole, whose
structure and parts of which can be examined. Finding possible
inconsistencies is a part of the method.
The polarity of dynamics and form has an important role in the first two
volumes of Systematic Theology and still in the beginning of the third but not
before or after that. There are only a few mentions of the polarity of dynamics
and form outside Systematic Theology in the writings of the 1950's and 1960's.
It is mentioned in Love, Power, and Justice,  in the article The Word of40
God,  and in My Search for Absolutes.   It is possible to see a pre-stage of41 42
the polarity in the article Natur und Sakrament published in 1930 where
Tillich uses the expression  “formlose Dynamik”.  Tillich mentions that he43
has developed the ontological polarity in the first part of Systematic
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 The Courage to Be (1952), 86 (MW 5, 180-181).44
 The idea of polarity is apparent every now and then in his older texts, see e.g.45
Religionsphilosophie (1925), 785 (MW 4, 130); Biblical Religion and the Search for
Ultimate Reality (1955), 80 (MW 4, 386). 
 The bibliography of Tillich’s writings is in Gesammelte Werk XIV, 139-211; the list46
of the unpublished material is in GW XIV, 283-295. Systematic Theology Vol 1 was
published in 1951, Vol 2 in 1957 and Vol 3 in 1963. The German translation of the first
volume Systematische Theologie, Band I was published in 1956; Band II was published in
1958 and Band III in 1966.
 A new translation in English  by Garrett E. Paul in 1989 under the name The Demonic:47
A Study in the Interpretation  of History.
 More detailed bibliographic information of the “Main Works” is in the bibliography.48
 The bibliographic information of “Gesammelte Werk” is in the bibliography.49
 The abbreviations of Main Works and Gesammelte Werk will be  MW and GW in the50
following. Systematic Theology will be abbreviated to ST. The titles of the other books and
articles of Tillich will be mentioned in full, because the year of publication is not enough
to distinguish them from each other. With the other books there will be mention of the
author and the year of publication.
 The Irrelevance and Relevance of the Christian Message (1996); The Encounter of51
Religions and Quasi-Religions (1990); Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant
Theology (1967); A History of Christian Thought (1968); James B. Ashbrook (ed.), Paul
Tillich in Conversation (1988).  D. Mackenzie Brown’s book Ultimate Concern: Tillich in
Dialogue (1965) includes discussions in seminars where other professors and students ask
Tillich questions about his thinking.
 Theologian of the Boundaries (1991); Theology of Peace (1990); The Essential Tillich:52
an Anthology of the Writings of Paul Tillich (1987); The Meaning of Health (1984);
Political Expectation (1971). Tillich’s article Art and Ultimate Reality was included in
Theology.  Consequently, the more general idea of polarity is also not very44
central before Systematic Theology.45
Since the idea of the polarity of dynamics and form appears mainly in
Systematic Theology, special attention in this examination is focused on it.
However, attention is drawn to all Tillich’s writings that have a bearing on the
subject.  Tillich’s early thinking is well expressed in the article Das46
Dämonische: Ein Beitrag zur Sinndeutung der Geschichte (1926).47
Tillich’s thinking interests and is under discussion constantly, more than
110 years from his birth and more than 30 years after his death. His most
important writings have been published recently under the name Main
Works/Hauptwerke: the first volume was published in 1987 and the last one
in 1998.  The new edition is different from the previous Gesammelte Werk 48 49
in the respect that it has Tillich’s writings in the original languages and the
differences of the editions and translations have been presented in the
apparatus.  Also, many editions of Tillich’s last lectures and even discussions50
have been published,  and new collections of Tillich’s writings are still being51
published on many new topics.52
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Diane Apostolos-Cappadona (ed.), Art, Creativity, and the Sacred (1984). Many
collections of Tillich’s writings have been published over the years, for example Theology
of Culture (1959); What is Religion? (1969); The Protestant Era (1948) (the German
version Der Protestantismus was published in 1950); the German collection Die verlorene
Dimension (1962). Tillich’s sermons have been published in the collections The Shaking
of the Foundations (1948); The New Being (1955); The Eternal Now (1963). 
 The titles of the books are: God and Being: The Problem of Ontology in the53
Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich (1989); New Creation or Eternal Now: Is there an
Eschatology in Paul Tillich's Work (1991); Natural Theology versus Theology of Nature?
Tillich's Thinking as Impetus for a Discourse among Theology, Philosophy and Natural
Sciences (1994); The Theological Paradox: Interdisciplinary Reflections on the Centre of
Paul Tillich’s Thought. (1995); Truth and History : A Dialogue with Paul Tillich (1998).
 Frederick J. Parrella (ed.), Paul Tillich's Theological Legacy: Spirit and Community54
(1995).
 Already in 1983 Crossman classified 484 wrintings by Paul Tillich in English, 26855
dissertations and theses about or related to Paul Tillich in English, and 662 articles about
or related to Paul Tillich in English.
 Ford’s article Tillich's Tergiversation Toward the Power of Being (1975) deals with56
the ’power of being’ in connection with finite and infinite being. The polarity of dynamics
and form is mentioned on page 326: “This finite power of being is used to define the
ontological element of ’dynamics’, found in polar tension with form in every being.”
In 1986, Tillich scholars gathered for an international symposium to
commemorate Tillich’s 100th birthday. After this, the symposium has been
held every other year. Since the second symposium, the lectures have also
been published. All of them have been edited by Gert Hummel.  In 1993 the53
scholars gathered for an international Paul Tillich symposium in the USA, and
also its lectures have been published.54
There are very many examinations of Tillich’s thinking and it has been
studied from many points of view.  The large number of studies shows  that55
it is not easy to gain a consensus on Tillich’s ideas. Tillich’s theological
system is complex: he uses many concepts of his own also when studying
traditional themes and gives his own definition  to many familiar concepts.
Because of this it is not very easy to approach and understand his ideas.
In spite of the fact that there are very many studies about Tillich’s thoughts,
much attention has not been paid to the polarity of dynamics and form. It is
not possible to find a monograph on the subject, and it is the main subject
only in a  few articles. Lewis S. Ford’s article, The Appropriation of
Dynamics and Form for Tillich’s God (1975)  and Tom Faw Driver’s article56
Form and Energy: An Argument with Paul Tillich (1976) examine some
ontological questions connected with the polarity of dynamics and form but
21
  Trevor Williams, Form and Vitality in the World and God: A Christian Perspective57
(1985) is written in the spirit of Tillich but it is not a study of Tillich. Also Stuart
Drummond McLean, Elements of Dynamics and Form in the Thought of Karl Barth and
Jacques Maritain (1968) has been influenced by Tillich’s thoughts but it does not study his
thinking.
 Other books dealing with Tillich’s ontology are Alistair Macleod, Paul Tillich: An58
Essay on the Role of Ontology in his Philosophical Theology (1973); John Adam  Bash
Jr., The Nature of the Ontological and Theological Endeavors in the Thought of Paul
Tillich (1965). John Herman Randall Jr’s article The Ontology of Paul Tillich (1952) is a
short but a good presentation and criticism of Tillich’s ontology. The relation of Tillich’s
ontology with the Bible and Christology is treated for example in the following articles:
Reinhold Niebuhr, Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology
(1952); Christopher Kiesling, The Life of the New Being (1964); Charles Hartshorne,
Tillich's Doctrine of God (1952); Langdon Gilkey, The New Being and Christology
(1985).
  Other books about Tillich’s theology of culture are: James Luther Adams, Paul59
Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion (1965); Eberhard Amelung, Die
Gestalt der Liebe: Paul Tillichs Theologie der Kultur (1972); Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley
(ed.), Paul Tillich on Creativity (1989). In Finland, Pauli Annala has examined Tillich’s
theology of culture in his book, Autonomian tragiikka ja kulttuurin kriisi: Johdatus
Tillichin kulttuurinteologiaan (1985). Annala has written the book  Uuden olemisen
etiikka: Tillichin etiikan perusteemoja (1983) and translated into Finnish Tillich’s book
Morality and beyond (1964) under the name, Muuttuvan maailman moraali (1983).
Tillich’s texts have been published in Finnish also in Perustukset järkkyvät (1966) and
Rajalla (1973). From the Finnish point of view it is important that Tillich has written the
foreword to  Aarne Siirala’s book The Voice of Illness: A Study in Therapy and Prophecy
(1964).
 The second volume never appeared. About one  third of the intended text has been60
published in Wilhelm Pauck, From Luther to Tillich: The Reformers and Their Heirs
(1984) after the death of the writer. Also Renate Albrecht &, Werner Schüssler, Paul
Tillich: Sein Werk (1986) has been thought to substitute for the missing second volume.
they do not examine the connection of the theme to the whole of Tillich’s
thinking. 57
Different interpretations of Tillich are presented by the following books:
Adrian Thatcher, The Ontology of Paul Tillich (1978) is very critical towards
Tillich’s ontology in its detailed analysis;  Langdon Gilkey, Gilkey on Tillich58
(1990) is an appreciative interpretation, and the author calls himself a
“Tillichean”; John Powell Clayton, The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich
and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology (1980) finds two models of a
correlative relation in Tillich’s thinking and is not convinced by its
coherence.  The contents of these books and articles as well as the other59
writings connected to the subject will be examined later.
It is possible to get general information of Tillich’s life and background
from  Wilhelm & Marion Pauck, Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought, Volume
I: Life (1976).  Tillich has also written about his life for example in the60
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 Another basic work on Tillich’s thinking is The Thought of Paul Tillich (1985) edited61
by James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck and Roger Lincoln Shinn. Tillich’s thought has
been examined from the Catholic point of view in  Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought (1964)
edited by Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser, and in Paul Tillich: A New
Catholic Assessment (1994) edited by Raymond F. Bulman and Frederick J. Parrella. It is
possible to see a change to a much more positive attitude in the Catholic approach to
Tillich’s thinking between these volumes. Also the following can be mentioned: John J.
Carey (ed.), Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Tillich's Theology
(1978); John J. Carey (ed.), Theonomy and Autonomy: Studies in Paul Tillich's
Engagement with Modern Culture (1984); Hermann Fischer (Hrsg.), Paul Tillich: Studien
zu einer Theologie der Moderne (1989); Karl Henning (Hrsg.), Der Spannungsbogen:
Festgabe für Paul Tillich zum 75. Geburtstag (1961); Walter Leibrecht (ed.), Religion and
Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich (1959).
 Examples of the newer studies are the following: John Charles Cooper, The "Spiritual62
Presence" in the Theology of Paul Tillich: Tillich's Use of St. Paul (1997); Wolf Reinhard
Wrege, Die Rechtstheologie Paul Tillichs (1996); Roland Mugerauer, Versöhnung als
Überwindung der Entfremdung: Die Konzeption der Entfremdung und ihrer Überwindung
bei Paul Tillich in der Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Konzeptionen (1996); David H.
Nikkel, Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich: A Creative Synthesis (1995); Marc
Dumas, Die theologische Deutung der Erfahrung des Nichts im deutschen Werk Paul
Tillichs (1919-1930) (1993); Donald F. Dreisbach, Symbols & Salvation: Paul Tillich's
Doctrine of Religious Symbols and his Interpretation of the Symbols of the Christian
Tradition (1993); Hannelore Jahr, Theologie als Gestaltmetaphysik: Die Vermittlung von
Gott und Welt im Frühwerk Paul Tillichs (1989); Karin Schäfer, Die Theologie des
Politischen bei Paul Tillich unter besonderer Berücksichtung der Zeit von 1933 bis 1945
(1988); Norbert Ernst, Die Tiefe des Seins: Eine Untersuchung zum Ort des analogia entis
im Denken Paul Tillichs (1988);  Josef Mader, Kirche innerhalb und ausserhalb der
Kirchen: Der Kirchenbegriff in der Theologie Paul Tillichs (1987); Martin Repp, Die
Transzendierung des Theismus in der Religionsphilosophie Paul Tillichs (1986).
article Autobiographical Reflections, which was published in 1952 in The
Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W.
Bretall.  An introduction to Tillich studies is for example Richard C.61
Crossman, Paul Tillich: A Comprehensive Bibliography and Keyword index
of Primary and Secondary Writings in English (1983). A good introduction to
Tillich’s  life and thinking is John P. Newport, Makers of the Modern
Theological Mind: Paul Tillich (1984). New titles are added every year to the
international catalogues of academic dissertations and published studies.62
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 The following can be mentioned: Joachim Track, Der theologische Ansatz Paul63
Tillichs: Eine wissenschafstheoretische Untersuchung seiner "Systematische Theologie"
(1975);  Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich: A Review and
Analysis (1964);  David H. Kelsey, The fabric of Paul Tillich's theology (1967).  J.
Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich - An Appraisal (1963) was published even before the third
volume of Systematic Theology.
 Of these can be mentioned: David Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait (1968);64
James Luther  Adams, Introduction: The Storms of Our Times and Starry Night (1985);
Walter M. Horton, Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology (1952); George F. Thomas,
The Method and Structure of Tillich's Theology (1952); Gustave Weigel, The Theological
Significance of Paul Tillich (1964); Josef Schmitz, Die apologetische Theologie Paul
Tillichs (1966). Leonard F. Wheat sets forth in his book Tillich's dialectical humanism:
Unmasking the God above God (1970) a thesis that Tillich’s God is basically humanity.
Tillich hides his true intention from most of his audience and directs his message to a
small group. The book is sharp and analytical but the basic thesis is unconvincing. Another
very critical book, written after the first volume of Systematic Theology, is R. Allan
Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (1956). Giannini 1995, 147-148 finds
much in common with Tillich and Thomas Merton who gained fame in the 1950's and the
1960's. Giannini emphasizes the mystical element in Tillich’s thinking. Tillich said
theoretically what Merton brought forward as an ascetic: "Merton is a living example of
much of what Tillich expressed in his theology. He was a person who sought to experience
the ground of his being, and who sought to experience unity with God and with all creation
in that ground. He was one who sought to transcend the polarities Tillich elucidated. In
trying to be both an individual and a participant Merton found himself in the paradoxical
situation of a hermit who drank coffee with celebrities. In his attempt to unite dynamics
and form, he tried to express poetically that which he felt to be beyond the possibilities of
language. In his endeavor to balance the polarities of freedom and destiny, he sought his
own inner freedom within the limits of the structures which he had accepted as
representing his destiny."
 As examples the following can be mentioned: Wilhelm Pauck, To Be or Not to Be:65
Tillich on the Meaning of Life (1985); Robert P. Scharlemann, Tillich and the Religious
Interpretation of Art (1985); John E. Smith, The Impact of Tillich's Interpretation of
Religion (1985); Thomas Franklin O'Meara, Tillich and the Catholic Substance (1985);
Peter Schwanz, Relation und Substanz: Relation als Strukturer: Eine Auseinandersetzung
mit zentraler Tillichscher Terminologie (1972);  David E. Roberts, Tillich's Doctrine of
Man (1952); A. T. Mollegen, Christology and Biblical Critisism in Tillich (1952); Pauli
Annala, Transparency of Time: The Structure of Time-Consciousness in the Theology of
Paul Tillich (1982); Jari Ristiniemi, Experiential Dialectics: An Inquiry into the
Epistemological Status and the Methodological Role of the Experiential Core in Paul
Tillich's Systematic Thought (1987); Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul
Tillich (1963); Thomas Franklin O'Meara, Paul Tillich's Theology of God (1970); William
Wright Paul, Paul Tillich's Interpretation of History (1959); M. Francis Reeves, God and
history in the Thought of Paul Tillich (1967); Lowell Dean Streiker, The Mystical A
Many examinations study the theological system of Tillich.  Many scholars63
evaluate Tillich’s theology and place in the history of theology.  Tillich’s64
wide work has given impulses to many kinds of studies and articles. The
different parts of his theology have been studied from many points of view.65
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Priori: Paul Tillich´s Critical Phenomenology of Religion (1968); Barbara Bennett
Baumgarten, Paul Tillich and the Task of the Art Theologian (1995);  William L. Rowe,
Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich's Theology (1968); John
Jesse Carey, The Concept of History in the Thought of Paul Tillich (1965); Gerhard
Hammer, Profanisierung: Eine Untersuchung zur Frage der Säkularisierung in der
Theologie Paul Tillichs (1973); Neil Robert Luebke, Paul Tillich's Philosophy and
Theology of History; Ian E. Thompson, Being and Meaning: Paul Tillichs Theory of
Meaning, Truth and Logic (1981); Maurice B. Schepers, Paul Tillich on the Church
(1964); Otto Schnübbe, Paul Tillich und seine Bedeutung für den Protestantismus heute:
Das Prinzip der Rechtfertigung im theologischen, philosophischen und politischen Denken
Paul Tillichs (1985); André Gounelle, Tillich: A Vision of Protestantism for Today
(1995); Erdmann Sturm, Sein oder Werden: Paul Tillich und die Prozessenphilosophie
(1994).
 Of these can be mentioned: Robert J. Parker, "Scandalously particular?": Revelation66
and History in the Theologies of Ernst Troeltsch and Paul Tillich (1997); John Patrick
Dourley, Paul Tillich and Bonaventure: An Evaluation of Tillich's Claim to Stand in the
Augustinian-Franciscan Tradition (1971); Lewis S. Ford, Tillich and Thomas Aquinas:
The Analogy of Being (1966); George F. McLean, Symbol and Analogy: Tillich and
Thomas (1964); Donald J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich:
A Comparison of Systems (1971); Dale Edwin Arnink, Symbolic knowledge in Ernst
Cassirer and Paul Tillich (1971); Wolf Hertel, Existentieller Glaube: Eine Studie über den
Glaubensbegriff von Karl Jaspers und Paul Tillich (1971); Klaus Bümlein, Mündige und
schuldige Welt: Überlegungen zum christlichen Verständnis von Schuld und Mündigkeit
im Gespräch mit P. Tillich und K. Rahner (1974); Hans-Joachim Gerhards, Utopie als
innergeschichtlicher Aspekt  der Eschatologie: Die konkrete Utopie Ernst Blochs unter
dem eschatologischen Vorbehalt der Theologie Paul Tillichs (1973); Ralph William
Vunderink, The Nature of Being in the Thought of Paul Tillich and Martin Heidegger
(1969); Axel Horn, Verantwortung heute: Eine philosophisch-theologische
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Denken Martin Heideggers, Jean-Paul Sartres und Paul
Tillichs zur Frage nach Verantwortung und Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen (1980);
Wayne G. Johnson, Theological Method in Luther and Tillich: Law-Gospel and
Correlation (1981); Koloman N. Micskey, Die Axiom-Syntax des
evangelisch-dogmatischen Denkens: Strukturanalysen des Denkprozesses und des
Wahrheitsbegriffs in den Wissenschaftstheorien (Prologomena) zeitgenössischer
systematischer Theologen (1976); Ulrich Winkler, Vom Umgang mit Denkformen in der
Theologie: Ein Vergleich zwischen der Kirchlichen Dogmatik Karl Barths und der
Systematischen Theologie Paul Tillichs (1988).
 Of these can be mentioned: Stephan Peeck, Suizid und Seelsorge: Die Bedeutung der67
antropologischen Ansätze V. E. Frankls und P. Tillichs für Theorie und Praxis der
Seelsorge an suizidgefährdeten Menschen (1991); Stanley Terrance Sutphin, A Critique of
the Premises of the Premises of Rogerian Psychotherapy in the Light of Paul Tillich's
Doctrine of Man (1965); Granville Douglass Lewis, Psychotherapeutic Concepts and
Theological Categories: Some Problems in the Thought of Carl Rogers and Paul Tillich
(1966); John P. Dourley, Jung, Tillich, and Aspects of Western Christian Development
His thinking has been compared to many theologians and philosophers.  His66
thinking has given material also to studies dealing with the phenomena of
culture, art, pastoral care and psychotherapy.67
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(1990); Walter A. Weisskopf, Tillich and the Crisis of the West (1985); Nathan A. Scott
Jr., Tillich's Legacy and the New Scene in Literature (1985); Theodore M. Greene, Paul
Tillich and Our Secular Culture (1952); George F. McLean, Paul Tillich's Existential
Philosophy of Protestantism (1964); Craig L. Nessan, The Fall from Dreaming Innocence:
What Tillich Said Philosophically in Light of Evolutionary Science (1995).
 Nobis 1972, 302-303 claims that in the modern understanding of the word dynamics68
and its derivatives we can see the trend that started with late scholastics and the beginning
of the modern age, where Aristotle’s concept of dynamis was interpreted in the physical
direction. It is possible to differentiate both the kinetic and the ontological meaning in
Aristotle’s own vocabulary. See Plamböck 1972, 304.
 For Aristotle’s thinking see e.g. Jones 1970, 220-233.69
 Aristotle thought that there are several sources of motion, including soul and active70
qualities. He calls the receiver of forms primary matter but unlike Plato it is not in motion.
Matter is in combination with substantial form, and the composite they make together has
a nature. The source of action is the natural tendency of bodies to move. Behind the
movement of each sphere, there is an intelligent mover that could be compared to the
1.2. The concepts of dynamics and form and the idea of
their polarity in Tillich studies
The question of dynamics and form is one of the central ones in the history of
theology and philosophy, even though the expression ’polarity of dynamics
and form’ has not been common. The problem itself has been expressed also
with other terms. The roots of the concepts ’form’ and ’dynamics’ go back to
Plato and Aristotle, but the meaning of the concepts and their relation to each
other has changed in the course of time. The common feature in the classical
thinking of Plato and Aristotle is the emphasis on form; compared to that the
modern views emphasize the dynamic side of the polarity.
The English word dynamics has a broad field of meaning. Nowadays, it is
mostly connected with the natural sciences and means for example a branch of
mechanics which deals with forces and their connection to the movement of
particles, and more commonly the elements of change and growth. Dynamics
deals with the element of energy or force in a thing or a phenomenon. In the
modern views dynamics is not usually about potentiality but of actuality.68
Aristotle used dynamis to mean ability, power, possibility to do something
(in Latin potentia, potestas). Aristotle made the difference between possibility
and reality, potentiality and actuality. In Aristotle’s language the opposite of
dynamis is energeia which is deed and action or actuality  (in Latin actus).
Entelekheia is the active principle aiming at some definite goal, the ability to
make the possible real, and it is also identified with form which comes into
reality in matter.  The actual corresponds to the potential, and the69
actualization happens within the form.  In classical thinking, form is often70
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Platonic souls. Beyond everything, there is an absolute Prime Mover, which was identified
in medieval philosophy with the Christian God. See Collingwood 1967, 1131-1132.
 For a more precise treatment see Wallace & Collingwood 1967, 1013-1017. It is71
possible to separate quantitative, qualitative and intelligible form.
 Behind the word form there are the words eidos or idea  and morphe which meant72
originally the visible or the observable. Substantial form gives something its very being,
while accidental forms determine one or the other of the accidental modes of a thing in
question but do not characterize it fully.
 Wallace & Collingwood 1967, 1014.73
 Plato postulated the existence of a world of forms or ideas that subsist in themselves,74
while Aristotle directed attention towards the natural world and connected form to the
common features of these things. See Bormann, C.v. & Franzen W. & Krapiec, A. &
Oeing-Hanhoff, L. 1972, 979. For the problems of matter and form in the history of
philosophy, see pages  977-1030.
 For Plato’s thinking see e.g. Jones 1970, 124-146.75
 For more information about Plotinus and Neo-Platonism see Merlan 1967, 351-359.76
 For a more precise treatment see Lanczkowski 1972, 304; Collingwood 1967, 1131-77
1133; Fascher 1959, 415-458.
used as a synonym for essence or nature, it makes a thing what it is.  In71
theology the basic meaning of forma  is form, shape, form-giving principle.72
The concepts of matter and form are important in Aristotle’s thinking: an
active element of form (entelecheia) is connected to a non-active element of
matter. In the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas used the Aristotelian
distinction between matter and form and its more basic formulation of
potency and act. Substantial form was for him an act by which things actually
exist, the principle of activity. The substantial form of man is his soul by
virtue of which man exists.73
In Plato’s thinking, there is a difference between the apparent world and the
world of forms; the distinction between essence and existence is rooted in
Plato’s thinking.  The highest form is the “Form of the Good”. Plato’s forms74
are eternal and changeless.  The Platonists made the distinction between ouk75
on and me on. The former means nothing at all, and the latter that which does
not yet have being but can become being if it is united with forms. When
Augustine called evil “nonbeing”, he did not mean “nothing at all” but
something with no positive ontological standing. The Neo-Platonic thinking
is based on the idea of dynamis panton: the One is above being, absolutely
transcendental, and it gives life to everything else through emanation.  Tillich76
has chosen the concepts of dynamics and form which indicate from the outset
an active role to the element of dynamics.
The expression dynamism means a philosophical view which says that
power is the ultimate principle, or a primitive religious view that nature is
ruled by impersonal forces.  Modern dynamism contains the view that all77
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 It has been influenced by the scientific and philosophical work of Newton and Leibniz.78
For more information about Dynamism see fapek 1967, 444-447.
 For more detail see Randall 1952, 156.79
 See Schwinger 1972b, 975-977. In esthetics there is also a concept of inner form. For80
a more precise treatment see Schwinger 1972a, 974-975.  In philosophy there is also a
concept of logic form. For a more precise treatment see Stenius 1972, 975.
 We shall deal with the meaning of these words later.81
 Walter Bloch’s book Polarität (1972) examines the meaning of polarity in philosophy,82
physics, biology and psychology. The polarity of dynamics and form is not apparent.
Instead he deals with e.g. Apollonian and Dionysian (165-166), dynamic and static (176),
conscious and unconscious (200) and the polarity of yang and yin  (248-249). He mentions
the philosophers Herakleitos and Goethe (246-), and theologians Cusanus and John of the
Cross (269). Bloch says that the unity of the poles is vital, and it is not possible to
emphasize only one of the poles (272-273).
phenomena of nature are manifestations of force.  The dynamic view or78
reality was further developed by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson,
Whitehead and the so called “philosophy of life” (Lebensphilosophie).  For
many nineteenth-century thinkers “force” meant “energy”, and thus they
emphasized the creative energy at work in the process of life. Dynamics can
be described as the creative and animating principle that breaks through the
form and creates new forms; energy underlies the forms and directions of all
processes.
It is possible to see an expression of the dynamic side of the polarity in such
terms as the Ungrund (Böhme) or “meonic freedom” (from Greek me on, non-
being) which designate ultimate reality as dynamic, non-objective and
inderminate. Schelling thinks that the blind power principle and the principle
of form belong together. Böhme, Schelling, and Hegel located dialectical
negativity in God himself.79
In esthetics as well as in the art and literature studies since the 18th century,
the idea of form and contents has been important.  It is possible to focus one’s
interest either on the outside form or on the content and message.  The80
corresponding German words are  Form und Inhalt, Gestalt or Gehalt, which
Tillich uses in his German texts.  This is close to the distinction of form and81
substance, which Tillich uses in his English texts. One of our questions is,
how Tillich relates these pairs of concepts to the concepts of dynamics and
form.
The idea of polarity became more common in the English-speaking world
since the 17th century as a phenomenon connected with magnetism.  In the82
philosophy of nature of the German romanticism, the idea got a new meaning:
everything in nature was seen to be made in a polar way like a magnet. These
ideas were given a philosophical form most clearly by Schelling, who thought
that polarity and duality of nature is the first principle of nature philosophy.
28
 Probst 1989, 1026-1027. The idea of polarity got its expression also in the work of the83
philosopher and poet Goethe. The difference compared to Schelling was that he was
interested in the tension created by the polarity and did not so much try to find the identity
behind the opposites.
 For a more precise treatment see Probst 1989, 1027-1028.84
 Williams 1985 uses the polarity of form and vitality to analyse biblical material,85
doctrinal questions and issues of politics and other religions. For the definition of the
polarity see pages 2-3.
 Ford 1975, 44-45 thinks that they have both influenced Tillich’s views.86
 For Tillich’s philosophical background see e.g. Randall 1952, 132-134: Tillich is both87
as a theologian and as a philosopher in the Augustinian tradition, and thus in the central
Christian Platonistic tradition against Thomism and Aristotelism.  Other influences are the
philosophy that developed after Böhme, Schelling, reactions against  Hegel (e.g.
Feuerbach), early Marx, Nietzsche and the philosophy of life, existentialism, especially
Heidegger. Keefe 1971, 334-335 says: "In the course of fairly recent history, the dominant
theology of the Catholic Church in the West has been Thomist in some sense, while
Protestant theology has found the Augustinian point of view more sympathetic. This is
particularly true of the theology of Paul Tillich."  Pauck 1966, 25-26 mentions thinkers
that have affected Tillich’s thinking: Parmenides, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Eckhart,
Cusanus, Luther, of the German thinkers Schelling, Kant and Hegel, and of the newer ones
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud. Arthur C. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God
presents Tillich’s idea of being and the being of God along with such existentialists as
Sören Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. See also
Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (1963); Otto Schnübbe, Paul
Tillich und seine Bedeutung für den Protestantismus heute (1985).
 Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre88
Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien (1910). It was published in English in 1974 under the
name The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy: Its
Presuppositions and Principles. In his preface, the translator  Victor Nuovo presents
Schelling’s view of potency (pages 16-17) and maintains that it has influenced Tillich’s
ontology (pages 23-24): "In his Systematic Theology, the potencies appear as the
principles of Tillich's doctrine of being: in the self-world polarity, and the further
elaboration of this polarity in the concepts of individuality, dynamics and freedom on the
Polarity is a general law of nature according to Schelling. He tried to find the
identity behind the seeming opposites.83
Hegel adopted the idea of polarity from the nature philosophy of his time.
Schleiermacher adapted the idea of polarity on thinking, and he started the
adaptation of polarity to knowing and psychology. Later the idea of polarity
has been adapted in the philosophy of life.  The concept of polarity is not84
very common in theology.  It is possible to see a polar structure in the85
thought of Nicholas Cusanus in the union of the opposites  (complexio
oppositorum) and in the mysticism of Jacob Böhme.  In oriental thinking, the86
opposite pair yang and yin is very important.
Tillich’s philosophical and theological background is very wide.  He did87
both his doctoral dissertation of philosophy  and his theological thesis  on88 89
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one hand, and of participation, form, and destiny on the other... " Tillich examines
Schelling’s view of potency in pages 43-54.
 Mystik und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung (1912).89
 See Sommer 1960, 72-92. See also Jahr 1989b, 112-116.90
 Thatcher 1978, 66. Steinacker 1989, 46 says that Schelling’s threefold pattern “das91
Seinkönnende”, “das Seinmüssende”, and “das Seinsollende” has a resemblance in
Tillich’s thinking. The ontological expressions for the same are “das Sein”, “das
Nichtsein”, and “das Übersein”. In the anthropological context, the first element is “der
Wille” which is dynamic but blind. The second is “der Verstand” that gives form to the
aimless will. The third, uniting principle is “der Geist”.
 Reisz 1977, 174-178.92
the thinking of Schelling, so it is clear that he knew Schelling’s thoughts very
well. Many scholars think that Schelling had a crucial influence on the
starting-points of Tillich’s ontology: Schelling presented as the first
post-Hegelian philosopher a form-resisting principle which was with the form
principle; it means that which is formed by the form. In Schelling’s own time,
his thinking was rejected but later it has received a lot of support. The
Hegelian idealism which emphasized the pure forms of thought was followed
by the emphasis of the vitalistic principle which later on was presented in
Schopenhauer’s, Nietzsche’s and Bergson’s thinking. According to Schelling,
it is wrong to deny this “barbaric principle” or “the principle of darkness” for
without it the world would vanish.90
Schelling’s view of God has a vitalistic, non-determined principle and a
principle of form. Schelling’s first potency is an irrational element in God
which is balanced by a rational element of logos. Applied to God, the first
principle is a principle of darkness or a barbaric principle or a principle of
potentiality or a blind power principle; it is almost impossible to define what
it is. It is balanced and tamed by the logos principle that gives structure.   The91
first potency in Schelling is the primordial power of being and the basis in
God. It is the abyss element in God because it is also the basic power of
negation. The second potency is the affirmative motion out from the abyss
into existence. It is the basis of cultural world and it limits the first potency.
The third potency provides the bond between the Spirit and the world. It is the
potency of unity, and all existence is posited and fulfilled in it. 
Schelling also interprets the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of the
potencies: The potency of the Father, the first potency, is the primordial cause
which creates nature, and brings the external manifestation of being into
existence. The potency of the Son, the second potency, is the Logos which
gives form to the material of creation and indicates a tendency toward the
return into God the Father. The potency of the Spirit moves toward fulfilment
in existence, and in it existence is related to eternity.  Tillich has very similar92
thoughts in his system.
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 For more detail see Thatcher 1978, 65-66.93
 Ford 1975, 37 quotes Tillich’s answer which is published in Sydney and Beatrice94
Rome (eds.), Philosphical Interrogations (1964), 358.
 The answer did not change Ford’s view about Schelling’s impact on Tillich’s thinking;95
Ford thinks that Tillich adopted his polar thinking and all his polar pairs from Schelling’s
philosophy. Ford thinks that the polarity of dynamics and form is more emphasized in
Tillich than the other pairs. He sees that behind this polarity is Schelling’s distinction Das
Reale und das Ideale, which, according to Ford, was even more emphasized in Schelling
than in Tillich. The polarity of individualization and participation is comparable to
Schelling’s Selbstheit und Liebe and the polarity of freedom and destiny is comparable to
Freiheit und Notwendigkeit. See Ford 1975, 36-37.
 Pauck & Pauck 1976, 236.96
 See also Carey 1984, 12: “The ontological polarity, ’dynamics and form,’ contains a97
number of confusions that cannot be clarified in this essay. It is enough to say that it is not
simply a reiteration of the being/nonbeing dialectic rooted in Schelling’s two potencies,
but a new way of describing the metaphysical participation of the infinite in the finite.”
It has been argued that Tillich adopted the polarity of dynamics and form
under the influence of Schelling and that Schelling’s term Potenz had an
influence on Tillich’s term ’dynamics’.  However, Tillich denied Schelling’s93
influence on his ontological polarities when Ford asked him about the matter:
I have not been influenced by Schelling’s concept of polarity in my
doctrine of God and in my theory of religious symbols, not even in
my conception of the basic ontological polarities. Potencies in the
sense of Schelling are not polarities; the very term ’potency’ points
to a kind of hierarchy, while polarities lie on the same level. I
believe, but without a complete certainty, that the doctrine of
ontological polarities is rooted in the thought-experiences similar to
those which have led to the concept of complementary in physics: It
is impossible to grasp reality with one or two contrasting concepts,
e.g. freedom or destiny, contingency or necessity, dynamics or form,
vitality, or spirituality, etc. Both are needed and even more: The two
are dependent on each other in their validity - which, I believe, is a
step beyond the present understanding of complementarity.94
The answer provides us interesting information about Tillich’s thinking
behind the ontological polarities: it is not possible to grasp reality with one
concept; it has to be done with pairs of concepts which complement each
other. Tillich points to the ideas of modern physics, and this has probably
influenced his understanding of dynamics in the modern sense.  Elsewhere,95
Tillich says that Part IV of the system, “Life and the Spirit”, contains a
philosophy of life of which “Schelling was the teacher and he merely the
student”.  If that is the case, Tillich’s theology of culture is a direct96
application of Schelling’s thinking but in his ontological polarities Tillich has
developed Schelling’s thinking to a new direction.  The Schellingian97
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  Some books have ’dynamics’ in their title. Seward Hiltner, Theological Dynamics98
(1972) has been influenced by Tillich, but he says that there is a difference in the way he
uses the word ’dynamics’: Tillich began from an ontological perspective, and combined
dynamics with form. Hiltner’s main source is the dynamic psychology beginning with
Freud with some reference to dynamics in sociology. Hiltner defines the word ’dynamics’
by pointing to the Greek word for power, force, or energy; dynamics is a study of the
energy components. It includes the “conflicts among energy dimensions, the tensions and
counterbalances among forces, and the variety of equilibriums”. Dynamics is more than
not standing still, and,  it is more than a metaphysical contrast with form or shape. See
Hiltner 1972, 14, 182-183. Hiltner 1972, 182 mentions that he knows of “no other general
book in theology that has pursued dynamics as its principal method of clarifying the
teachings”. Neville A.C. Heuer, Interpretative Theological Dynamics: A Critical Analysis
of the Concept of Dynamics in the Thought of Paul Tillich, Siegmund Freud and Erich
Fromm, in Relation to Certain Aspects of the Etiology of Criminal Theory (1979) uses
Hiltner’s definitions to explain Tillich without taking into consideration the difference that
Hiltner made between Tillich and himself. See e.g. Heuer 1979, 1, 49. Heuer gives
valuable information about the relation of Tillich especially to Freud. He says that the
thinkers Tillich is referring to in his definition of the term dynamics - Böhme,
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Hartmann, Freud, Scheler and Jung - can be classified
under two general headings: 1. religious; and 2. psychoanalytical. Heuer includes
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson among the psychoanalysts because, as he mentions,
“Tillich equates psychoanalysts and existentialists in connection with this type of
dynamics”. Heuer 1979, 6-7. Roger Haight, Dynamics of Theology (1990) does not deal
with dynamics as its subject.
 Ford 1975, 39-40. Also Ferrell1992, 43-44 sees the polarity of dynamics and form as99
a highly problematic one. The problem with the concept of dynamics is that only that
which has being can be conceived and only that which has form has being. Yet, dynamics
is supposed to be the polar contrast to form.
 Ford 1975, 35. Track 1975, 32 defines dynamics in the same way: “Dynamik muss100
verstanden werden als Möglichkeit zum Sein, die mit der Schöpfung gegeben ist, aber
noch nicht verwirklicht ist. Dynamik ist der Ausdruck für die Potentialität des Seins.”
hierarchy of potencies can be found in Tillich’s theology of culture but in
Tillich’s ontology the polarities “lie on the same level”, they are equally
important.
As we have mentioned, it is not possible to find a monograph on the
polarity of dynamics and form,  and it is the main subject only in a few98
articles. The Appropriation of Dynamics and Form for Tillich's God by Lewis
S. Ford says that Tillich uses the concepts of dynamics and form
inconsistently. It is difficult to define dynamics because according to its nature
it resists all definitions. In order to be understandable it ought to have a form,
and dynamics is just the ontological element which is the polar opposite of
form in everything that is.  Ford says that “dynamics, in polar contrast with99
form, is the element of power and potentiality within every being”.100
According to Ford, “form may be defined as the structure which makes a
being what it is and which gives reason an opportunity for grasping and
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 Ford 1975, 39.101
 Ford 1975, 39.102
 Ford 1975, 40. Eugene Peters, Form, Unity and the Individual: A Study of the103
Concretely Real (1960) compares the views of Tillich and Whitehead but in spite of the
name, the concept of form is not under a special consideration.
 Ford 1975, 41. See also Track 1975, 32.104
 Driver 1976, 111: "...the phenomena we experience are not made up of 'tensions' but105
are 'actions'." Driver speaks about form and energy, even though Tillich does not use this
pair of concepts, and he combines dynamics and form in the discussion about the feminine
and masculine principle in theology. For more detail see Driver 1976, 103-105.
shaping it”.  Ford says that Tillich’s view of form is similar to Aristotle’s101
view of substantial form which is necessary for a certain actuality and which
is connected to the potentiality of growth of organic things. Form defines the
content of a thing by giving a defined structure where its dynamics or power
of being can actualize itself. Form both defines and individualizes.102
However, says Ford, Tillich’s view of dynamics and form emphasizes the
tension and the dialectical interaction of the polar elements. He sees this as a
typical emphasis of Tillich. He thinks that Tillich’s view of form is very much
the same as Aristotle’s but his view of potentiality has more tension with
form: in Aristotle, the potentiality tries to fulfill the substantial form even in
its most active state, while in Tillich, dynamics does not only fulfill the form
but also breaks and transcends it. Ford thinks that this is close to Whitehead’s
view of creativity according to which every created being and every stage of
development is transcended by the creative power.103
Ford says that there are all the time two opposing tendencies in Tillich’s
thought: dynamics tries constantly to transcend the limits of form and create
new forms while form tries to conserve the existence of every being. Both
tendencies belong together without separation but there is also a possibility of
contradiction in them.  As Ford mentions, the idea of form which tries to104
conserve the existence of every being is close to Aristotle’s view. We shall
use the expression ’classical view of dynamics and form’ to indicate cases
where form is trying to conserve the existence of every being. The idea that
dynamics tries to transcend the limits of form and create new forms can be
seen in many modern views. We shall use the expression ’modern view of
dynamics and form’ where dynamics transcends the form and creates new
forms.
Tom F. Driver, in his article Form and Energy: An Argument with Paul
Tillich, has a critical view about the “tension” of dynamics and form: he
thinks that the phenomena that we encounter are not made of a tension but are
actions;  there are no static or dynamic elements behind actions where they105
could be derived from. Driver has a critical attitude towards Tillich’s
ontological smodel which becomes complex as a result of an “ontological
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 Driver 1976, 106.106
 Driver 1976, 112. In the end, Driver’s criticism exceeds the boundaries of Tillich’s107
thinking: more important than building logical systems of concepts is listening to the
“music of the spheres” and experiencing like children. “There is a venerable tradition that
speaks of the sublime as ’the music of the spheres.’ I am suggesting that such a  metaphor
be taken much more seriously and, indeed, more literally than we are taught to do. If
perchance the heavens do resound with the music of the spheres, then we are but slow
children learning to attend to a performance. All our tendencies to reduce the performance
to a set of concepts in logical relation to each other would then be aspects of our fall from
an original grace in which we heard and danced better than we do now.” Driver 1976, 112.
 For example Clayton’s book, The Concept of Correlation deals in many  ways with108
the concepts of form and substance but does not mention the polarity of dynamics and
form. See e.g. Clayton 1980, 196-199. Hannelore Jahr examines in her article Der Begriff
der "Gestalt" als Schlüssel zur Metaphysik im Frühwerk Paul Tillichs (1989) largely the
concepts of Form and Gehalt in the early writings of Tillich but the polarity of dynamics
and form is not apparent. Richard 1995 examines Tillich’s view of history in the light of
Form and Gehalt but does not connect it to the polarity of dynamics and form. 
 For example, Rolinck 1976, 148-151 examines the polarity of dynamics and form109
from the point of view of historical self-creation and discusses the problems of Form and
Gehalt (footnote 22 on page 148) but does not examine the relation of the pairs of concepts
to each other. Wenz 1979 deals with Form und Gehalt (e.g. pages 122-123) and Dynamik
und Form (e.g. pages 242-247) but does not connect them to each other.
 It is possible to interpret the thought in Track 1975, 35 this way: “Das emotionale110
Element ist betont auf die besondere Form gerichtet, auf den Gehalt, auf das Dynamische.”
 See e.g. Scharlemann 1989, 104: "Das reine Sein ist der unbedingte Geghalt; es111
offenbart sich in den Sonderformen der Dinge, die die Wissenschaft ergreift." Reimer
1994, 117 presents the metalogical method (die metalogische Methode) in  Tillich’s
writings from 1920's. Tillich defines it as the unity of thought and being. According to the
method, thought represents the rational, forming and form-bearing element, being
represents irrational, vitalistic, unlimited, depth and creative power. Of these definitions
the first one is close to form and the other one is close to what Tillich earlier called Gehalt,
later dynamics. Tillich connects here the dynamic element to being, which is different
from his later writings where both dynamics and form are connected to being. Reimer
points to the English translation of Tillich’s Das System der Wissenschaften  (1923), The
System of the Sciences (1981), pages 40-41; in the original text it is on page 116 (MW 1,
217).
fall”. He thinks that a non-dynamic form or formless dynamics are not
conceivable.  Driver himself stresses becoming instead of being: “The form106
of my life is coming to be. For that reason, and only that, it now is.”107
The relation of dynamics and form to form and substance has been seldom
examined in Tillich studies.  Some studies examine separately the concepts108
of dynamics and form on one hand and form and substance on the other hand,
but they are not related to each other.  Sometimes dynamics and Gehalt are109
connected even though their relationship is not under consideration.110
Sometimes Gehalt has been connected also to being.  The dynamic111
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 Kodalle 1989, 313  talks about “dynamischer Gehalt” or “dynamische Substanz”. He112
says that “Tillich die Substanz, das tragende produktive Sein, gegenüber der Rationalität,
der Form, favorisiert”. He has a chapter titled “Die ontologische Priorität von
Substanz/Gehalt gegenüber Subjekt/Form”.
 Buchter 1975, 103-104.113
 Amelung 1972, 204-207.114
 Jahr 1989b, 109.115
substance has been given priority over the rational form.  Sometimes the112
relationship of Form and Gehalt is called the basic polarity  or  the dynamic113
polarity (die dynamische Polarität).  Tillich does not normally speak of114
polarities in connection with Form and Gehalt. Similarly rare is the expression
of ontological structure in connection with Form and Gehalt.  Here it is115
possible to see the influence of Tillich’s later ontological polarity on the study
of his older writings. The relation of dynamics and form to Form and Gehalt
(form and substance) needs further clarification.
We can see that some of the problems in Tillich’s thinking have been
expressed in the previous examinations, but many questions remain open. No
general treatment of the polarity of dynamics and form has been presented. I
believe that a careful examination of the subject can improve our
understanding of Tillich’s thinking and its problems.
35
 See Ford 1975, 37.1
 My Search for Absolutes (1967), 245.2
2. SELF-INTEGRATION: THE UNITY AND
BALANCE OF DYNAMICS AND FORM
2.1. The ontological unity and essential balance of
dynamics and form
In his answer to the question about the ontological polarities Tillich said that
it is impossible to grasp reality with one or two contrasting concepts; both are
needed and the two are dependent on each other in their validity.  We can use1
the phrase ’the unity and balance of dynamics and form’ to express this idea.
In the beginning of the system Tillich wanted to give equal significance to
both. This means that in the essential state of things, everything happens
within the form and the form is not broken. The emphasis is on the self-
integration of life, even though the other functions of life are also present:
even if the form is transcended, this happens within the form. Considering
Tillich’s whole system, this means more emphasis on form than in some other
places. Under the conditions of existence, the polar elements can draw away
from each other, and this is the consequence of estrangement. In the first two
volumes of Systematic Theology the ideal is the unity and balance of the
elements.
Tillich said in one of his last lectures that he has been asked if he was an
existential theologian, and his answer was short: fifty-fifty. To him,
essentialism and existentialism belong together: “It is impossible to be a pure
essentialist if one is personally on the human situation and not sitting on the
throne of God”.  On the other hand, also pure existentialism is impossible.2
Essentialism and existentialism belong together: 
Existentialism is possible only as an element in a larger whole, as an
element in a vision of the structure of being in its created goodness,
and then as a description of man's existence within that framework.
The conflicts between his essential goodness and his existential
estrangement cannot be seen at all without keeping essentialism and
existentialism together. Theology must see both sides, man's essential
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 My Search for Absolutes (1967), 245.3
 See Clayton 1987, 11-12.4
 ST I, 22. We shall deal with the question of being and God in more detail in the next5
chapter.
 See e.g. Autobigraphical Reflections, 14.6
 For more detail about Tillich’s relation to Heidegger see e.g. Thatcher 1978, 2-4, 13-18;7
Clayton 1980, 169-175; Gilkey 1990, 29, 82, 87; Randall 1952, 132, 152-154.
nature, wonderfully and symbolically expressed in the paradise story,
and man's existential condition, under sin, guilt, and death.3
A corresponding distinction can be seen in Tillich’s view of  the
“ontological” approach of the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition and the
“cosmological” approach of the Thomistic tradition: the ontological approach
is characterised by immediate “awareness” of God, not as a possible object of
experience, but as the prius in which all being is grounded; the cosmological
approach begins with our knowledge of the external world from which it tries
to draw inferences about the existence and nature of God. Tillich thinks that
the cosmological approach has significant contributions to make in the areas
of theology of nature and culture but the ontological approach is the necessary
foundation for any philosophy of religion that is worthy of being taken
seriously.4
Tillich’s ontological analysis gives a description of the polarity of dynamics
and form along with two other polarities. First, we shall examine their status
in Tillich’s ontology. According to Tillich, both philosophy and theology ask
the question of being, but they ask it from different perspectives: philosophy
deals with the structure of being in itself, theology deals with the meaning of
being for us.  The concept of being has a long history, starting with5
Parmenides, but the strongest influence on Tillich’s thinking comes from the
existential ontology of the twentieth century. Kant’s philosophy had proposed
to show the limits of reason, and after that many philosophers tried to
approach the ultimate through the existing self.  Tillich often speaks of the
influence that Martin Heidegger had on his thinking,  and for a short time they6
both taught at Marburg in 1924-25, even though they did not have any
personal relationship during that time. 
Heidegger approaches being through an analysis of human existence. The
task of philosophy is the clarification of the structure and meaning of being; it
is a task of existential, not traditional ontology. Man is the only self-conscious
being and thus can ask what it means “to be”; this existential analysis opens
up the way to  being-itself. Tillich’s ontological thinking is clearly on the
same line.  Existential analysis discloses that there is a distinction between7
subject and object in the human experience. Tillich follows Heidegger when
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 See Randall 1952, 153.8
 ”The interdependence of ego-self and world is the basic ontological structure and9
implies all the others.” ST I, 171.
 For a more precise treatment see  ST I, 170-171.10
 ST I, 174.11
 ST I, 192. See also Randall 1952, 158-159.12
 ST I, 192, 193. For more detail see Gilkey 1990, 88, 93-97, 103-105. For example,13
Randall 1952, 158-159 argues that existential ontology is an expression of the “age of
anxiety” and Tillich’s thinking expresses the feeling of Continental Europeans after the
World Wars; in a different culture and situation anxiety does not have such a central role:
“It takes a good German Romanticist like Heidegger to get really excited over the natural
conditions of human life.” This is certainly true up to a point, but existential questions
have to be met universally one way or the other.
 One could compare these positions with the roles of an actor and a spectator of a play:14
both deal with the same things but one is subjectively involved with the happenings while
he assumes without question that the epistemological subject-object
distinction is absolutely ultimate also for being.8
The first level of the ontological examination is the basic structure of being,
which is also the presupposition of the ontological question. This question
presupposes both the subject who asks and the object of which the question is
asked. In Tillich’s view, the basic ontological structure is “the
interdependence of ego-self and world”.  The starting point to deal with being,9
is an ego-self which has a world. This leads to a twofold situation where man
at the same time belongs to the world and is separated from it. The basic
structure of being is polar and this has to be accepted as a starting point.
Neither side can be derived from the other as philosophers have tried to do.10
When man asks what is behind the polarity, reason reaches its limits. In
Tillich’s view, the question can be answered only by revelation.  This shows11
that Tillich follows the Augustinian view of illumination.
The questions can be looked either from the outside or from the inside:
Here it must be said that there is no reason for preferring concepts
taken from “outside” to those taken from “inside.” According to the
self-world structure, both types are equally valid. The self being
aware of itself and the self looking at its world (including itself) are
equally significant for the description of the ontological structure.12
For example, Tillich deals with the category of time both “from the
outside” and “from the inside”, and the analysis creates a question of our own
temporality: the self-awareness of the finite self as finite is anxiety, which is
overcome by courage when the power of being appears in our existence.13
This division of “inside” and “outside” can lead to two different  positions
from which to look at questions: one is the “outside”, transcendent, essential
position; the other is the “inside”, existential, human position.  Scharlemann14
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the other is outside trying to see the whole picture. It is a different thing, for example, to
describe doubt and despair in the light of the Christian message and really to experience
them in one’s own life.
 Scharlemann 1969, 2215
 Scharlemann 1969, 28: “...I am deliberately excluding from consideration the self now16
engaged in thinking these things and am taking up the position, as it were, of a
metaphysical spectator, who sees before him a basic division of finite being into two
kinds, self and world.” However, a historically conscious thought raises the question about
the possibility of taking a metaphysical spectator’s position at all. Scharlemann 1969, 92:
“...my acting I is unconditionally subjectival - I can never get a look at it; and second, the
character of existence is such that I am split from my true self, and cannot, therefore, see
my actual self in my objectival self”. Instead of the categories of subject and object,
Scharlemann uses the categories of subjectival subject, subjectival object, and objectival
object. See Scharlemann 1969, x-xi. See also Lounibos 1976, 82. Also Wenz 1989, 19
brings forward two positions in Tillich’s analysis of self: "As a self-conscious 'I,' man
consequently not only belongs to the world, but is also separate from it. Tillich vigorously
strives to maintain both aspects, the world immanence and the world transcendence of
man."
 See Thatcher 1978, 64-65.17
 ST III, 32.18
has noticed that Tillich’s definition of self-world polarity leads to a double
usage of ’self’: on the one hand, it means ’self-relatedness’, the immediately
experienced “I” in such acts as “I think”; on the other hand, ’self’ refers to a
kind of being, namely, a self-reflective being, or any man, or a structure of
centeredness.  The experiencing self can become a “metaphysical15
spectator”.  Tillich’s intention was to keep the essential and the existential16
sides of his thinking in balance, but we can argue that in the beginning of the
system Tillich is more a “metaphysical spectator” that gives value to the form
element than in the end of the system.
On the next level of Tillich’s ontological analysis, there are  three pairs of
ontological elements which have the same polar nature as the basic structure.
These three polar pairs create the formal structure of being before it actualizes
itself in existence. The ontological basic structure presupposes the subject-
object structure of knowing and the ego-world structure of being.  These17
polar pairs are individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and
freedom and destiny. In the third volume of the system, three functions of life
are based upon them: the polarity of individualisation and participation is the
basis of self-integration, the polarity of dynamics and form is the basis of self-
creation, and the polarity of freedom and destiny is the basis of self-
transcendence.  Tillich emphasizes that each polar pair is a whole where one18
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 ”They share the polar character of the basic structure, and it is just their polarity that19
makes them principles by preventing them from becoming highest generic concepts.” ST
I, 165.
 ST I, 178.20
 ST I, 179.21
 Love, Power, and Justice (1954), 54.22
 ST I, 178.23
 See ST III, 32.24
 ST I, 178. Tillich deals with the question of the immortality of the soul with the25
distinction of matter and form, and says that it is possible to remove the contradiction
between the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body; the reasson is that
soul is the form of the life process and its immortality includes all elements which
constitute this process, though it includes them as essences. See ST III, 410.
 ST I, 178.26
side cannot be without the other. Their polar character makes them principles
and prevents them from becoming highest generic concepts.19
The elements of the ontological polarities belong essentially together in an
unbroken unity: the one is not without the other. Thus, also dynamics and
form belong together. Being something means having a form, and every form
gives form to something which Tillich calls dynamics. Thus he writes:
’Being something’ means having a form. ... Whatever loses its form
loses its being.  20
Every form forms something. The question is this: What is this
’something’? We have called it ’dynamics’, a very complex concept
with a rich history and many connotations and implications.21
According to the definition, dynamics and form do not exist without each
other: they are necessary ontological elements of everything that is and some
kind of combination of them can be found everywhere: "Actualized being of
life unites dynamics with form. Everything real has a form, be it an atom, be
it the human mind. That which has no form has no being."22
Tillich gives a short explanation of form: “according to the polarity of
individualization and participation, there are special and general forms, but in
actual being these never are separated”.  The polarity of individualization and23
participation is connected to the function of self-integration through the
principle of centeredness.  In a tree, form is what makes it a tree. It includes24
both the common nature of trees and the individual features of an individual
tree. In connection with culture, the relation of form and content is more
complicated: man can use the materials and things of nature to create new
products of culture. In the cultural sphere, it is not possible to separate form
and content.25
Tillich states that “the form which makes a thing what it is, is its content, its
essentia, its definite power of being”.  The definition sounds quite classical:26
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 Ferrell 1992, 42-44.27
 ST I, 279; see Ferrell 1992, 106.28
 ST I, 181.29
 ST I, 181.30
 ST I, 179.31
 See Thatcher 1978, 65.32
form is essentia, the essence of a thing; as the power of being it resists non-
being. Ferrell says that the polar elements of dynamics and form reveal
Tillich’s closest link with Aristotle and the medieval philosophy, although the
tradition undergoes significant transformations in his hands.27
The classical view emphasizes the element of form: form is essential to a
thing, and dynamics does not break the unity of the form. Tillich emphasizes
this kind of thought in his words about logos in the first volume of Systematic
Theology: “Nothing falls outside the logos structure of being. The dynamic
element cannot break the unity of the form; the abysmal quality cannot
swallow the rational quality of divine life.”  Everything tends to conserve its28
own form.  This indicates the idea of self-integration.29
However, at the same time “the dynamic character of being implies the
tendency of everything to transcend itself and to create new forms”.  This is30
caused by the dynamic side of the polarity. Tillich does not distinguish
between self-creation and self-transcendence: he says that there is a tendency
in the dynamic character of being “to transcend itself” and “to create new
forms”. This description combines self-creation and self-transcendence. Both
are caused by the dynamic side of the polarity.
Tillich says that ’dynamics’ is a very complex concept. In his view, the
problem is based on the fact that everything that can be conceptualized has to
have some kind of form of being. This is just the problem with dynamics:
Dynamics, therefore, cannot be thought as something that is; nor can
it be thought as something that is not. It is the me on, the potentiality
of being, which is nonbeing in contrast to things that have a form,
and the power of being in contrast to pure nonbeing.  31
According to this definition, dynamics is the potentiality of being; it cannot
be thought as something that is or something that is not; it is non-being
compared to things that have form, and the power of being in relation to pure
non-being.  Dynamics is nonbeing and the power of being at the same time.32
Tillich uses the Greek expression me on to describe dynamics. In another
context, he uses me on to describe the view of matter in the Greek philosophy;
at those instances me on is non-being which resists form:
The Greek doctrine of a matter (the me on, or nonbeing) which
resists form establishes two ontological ultimates, even though the
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 ST I, 232. Realism and Faith (1948), 70 (MW 4, 346): “Matter, although without form33
or essential being, has a negative, half-demonic power which cannot be overcome in the
material world.”
 Philosophy and Fate, 7 (MW 1, 323).34
  Thatcher 1978, 64-70 says that Schelling’s me on changes  the traditional expression35
unrecognizable: non-being has changed in Schelling’s thinking to the ground of all power
and life, although chaotic, unformed and undirected.
 Randall 1952, 154 thinks that dynamics is an unfortunate term, however he does not36
give any arguments for his view. Thatcher 1978, 64-70 thinks that the indefinite nature of
the principle makes it a difficult component for an ontological system. He does not think
that the polarity of dynamics and form is a good view at all. He maintains that Tillich uses
the concepts of dynamics and form unsuccessfully and, moreover, his thinking is not
coherent on the matter. Thatcher says that Tillich’s view of form is too static because it
needs a compensatory principle of dynamics or growth; form is a flexible concept which
is not destroyed by the process of growth. It is possible, for example, to say that the form
of man includes development and it does not need a concept of dynamics to complete it.
Even if one accepts Tillich’s static view of form, according to Thatcher, it is almost
impossible to unite it with Tillich’s view of form as essentia and power of being, because
just these express the change from potentiality to actuality. These features do not have
anything in common with the form that is in polar opposition with dynamics, they are on
the dynamic side of the polarity and are in polar opposition with form. Thatcher says that
Tillich’s thinking would be clearer if the opposites would be, like in Schelling, the blind
power principle which acts both creatively and destructively, and, as its pair, a static and
defined principle of form.
 Thatcher 1978, 64-70 thinks that  their combination is impossible. The absolute non-37
being and the non-being that is dialectically connected to being are so far from each other
that  they should not be given the same name. Thatcher is very critical towards Tillich’s
arguments: “It makes little sense to claim, as Tillich does, that dynamics is both ’non-
being in contrast to things that have form, and the power of being in contrast to pure non-
being’ (ST I.198). Dynamics is given the range of Schelling’s first potency with the result
second is described as that which has no ultimate ontological
standing.33
Just as the gods of Homer banished the demons into the underworld,
the philosophers relegated the intractable and resisting element of
existence into the realm of nonbeing, into the me on, into that which
is without any power of being. But this me on retained in its very
impotence the power to resist form and knowledge...34
Tillich’s view of me on unites the positive power of being and the negative
form-resisting principle. As Thatcher argues, Tillich tries to combine the
Augustinian me on and the Schellingian me on. The first one means non-
being, negative power of being and the latter positive power of being or the
blind power principle.  Tillich’s endeavour to combine both the negative35
power of being (traditional me on) and positive power of being (Schelling’s
me on) leads to problems with the concept of dynamics;  it also leads to36
different definitions of dynamics and form:  the negative power of being has37
42
that it takes upon itself contradictory connotations. Dynamics cannot be both the negative
power of being (the Augustinian me on) and the positive power of being (the Schellingian
me on) because non-being is what being-itself or the power of being actively resists and
overcomes.” Thatcher is critical of Tillich’s ontology and its consistency. He says that
Tillich tries to combine elements that are not possible to combine (for example Plato’s and
Böhme’s thinking), and uses ideas that are not possible, even after moulding, to place in a
theological  system (for example Schelling’s mystical and mythological style). Nörenberg
1966, 106 has a more positive attitude towards Tillich’s effort to avoid the dualism of
Greek thought and to try to find a place for matter or non-being in the depth of the divine
life. See also Track 1975, 361.
 Gilkey 1990, 90-91 says that Tillich saw difficulties arising, and left the matter38
“somewhat cloudy”. Gilkey gives a good description of the problems. He says that Tillich
begins the discussion “as a Greek”, but later also a modern view is to be found. In his
traditional view, Tillich identifies dynamics (“matter in process”) with potentiality of
being; it is formed or structured by form which can be identified with the actuality of
being. Thus, dynamics is said to be me on, relative nonbeing, that which is coming to be
and passing away; it cannot be clearly named but still it must be. Form is identified with
the defining essence, and form represents that which can be named. However, Tillich is
clearly not satisfied merely to reproduce the Greek world view. He is also aware of the
modern creative role of dynamics in the philosophies of process or life, in which process
overpowers and even subdues form. Consequently, vitality, life, or the creative drive of the
living substance represents the drive towards new form. It is the “secret essence of
intentionality or purpose”, it leads the living self into “transcending itself”. The ground for
the creation of new forms is dynamics as vitality. It is essential for the fulfilment of
meaning in being. In this case, “the more radical ontological contrast lies between settled
actuality in the past and possibility or novelty in the future, than it does between changing
matter and changeless form”.
as its pair a more positive and active form principle than the positive power of
being which is accompanied by a static form element.
Tillich’s starting point is the polar tension of the elements: in the essential
state they are in balance, in the existential state they are also in conflict with
each other. Both of the elements are active and both can be described as ’the
power of being’, both of the elements can have negative or positive features.
This tension shows also the tension between self-integration, self-creation,
and self-transcendence.  When we analyse Tillich’s ontological description we
can find features of the classical and the modern views. However, the relation
of dynamics and form to each other is very different in these two views. In the
classical view, form works actively giving meaning and essence to that which
is potential and deformed; dynamics fulfills itself within the form. In the
modern view, the active and purposive element is dynamics as vitality, and
this gives a static nature to the element of form; dynamics breaks through the
limits of form and creates new forms. On a conceptual level Tillich’s
description includes many problems.38
Tillich explains the creative role of dynamics with many ancient and
modern examples. He says that dynamics is not the philosophers’ invention,
43
 Carey 1984, 12-13 mentions the problems of this vitalistic thinking (expressed e.g. in39
Bergson’s élan vital) in connection to Tillich’s polarity of dynamics and form: “One
suspects that Tillich’s definition of the ’dynamic/form’ polarity would have been clearer
if he had acknowledged the limitations of Bergson’s philosophy for his own system. In the
context of Tillich’s speculative vision, the ’form/import’ polarity is more fitting.”
 ST I, 179. See also Spiegel 1995, 70-71.40
 ST I, 180. Ferrell 1992, 42-44 presents Tillich’s idea of vitality in man with the help of41
Bergson’s élan vital, which is the “creative thrust of the living substance toward new
forms”, but he does not consider the problems of the classical and the modern views of
dynamics. Bandy 1984, 3 says that Tillich has a “limited understanding” of Bergson’s
thoughts, for more detail see Bandy 1984, 3-17.
 Williams 1985 has been influenced by Tillich’s views but he uses the polarity of42
vitality and form  instead of Tillich’s dynamics and form. Williams is interested in the
questions of the evolutionary world: “...the polarity of form and vitality may be seen as
defining the field of evolutionary and historical play.” See Williams 1985, 2-3.
 ST I, 180.43
 Roberts 1952,117 unites vitality to the common potentiality of nature, and44
intentionality to laws working in nature: "Vitality must here be conceived as connected
with potentiality in nature generally. 'Potentiality,' in this sense, is not an existing
something, such as 'will' or 'the unconscious'; it is rather the power of being. By
'intentionality,' on the other hand, Tillich does not necessarily mean consciously conceived
purpose; but he does mean structures that can be grasped as universals. In other words,
when vitality becomes human it cannot be thought of as operating by necessity, or
chaotically, or without reference to objective structures." See also Rolinck 1976, 149.
but it can be found behind most mythologies, and it is apparent in the chaos,
darkness and emptiness which preceded creation. In metaphysical
speculations, its expressions are Urgrund  (Böhme), will (Schopenhauer), will
to power (Nietzsche), unconscious (Hartmann, Freud), élan vital (Bergson),
strife (Scheler, Jung).  All these point symbolically to that which cannot be39
named, and they should not be taken conceptually. They point to that which
“does not yet have being”.  The last examples connect dynamics to the40
modern views of Lebensphilosophie, which emphasize the vital nature of life.
Tillich defines élan vital as “the creative drive of the living substance in
everything that lives toward new forms”.  This indicates the idea of the self-41
creation of life and the modern view of dynamics and form.
The polarity of dynamics and form becomes known in man’s experience as
the polarity of vitality and intentionality.  In this idea Tillich utilizes the42
existential and psychoanalytical thinking of his time. Vitality is the power
which keeps a living being alive and growing. In its full sense, vitality is
connected to man, because man has also intentionality; man has the ability to
create a new world besides the given one.  Intentionality means that man can43
be in relationship with meaningful structures, use concepts, and understand
and change reality.  Tillich emphasizes the unity of vitality and intentionality:44
man’s dynamics or creative vitality is not without direction nor chaotic, but
44
 ”Therefore, we recommend the use of the term ’intentionality,’ which means being45
related to meaningful structures, living in universals, grasping and shaping reality... Man’s
dynamics, his creative vitality, is not undirected, chaotic, self-contained activity. It is
directed, formed; it transcends itself toward meaningful contents.” ST I, 180-181.
 The Courage to Be (1952), 84 (MW 5, 180).46
 ST I, 180.47
 ST I, 181.48
 ST I, 181. Thatcher 1978, 68 concludes that Tillich unites dynamics with becoming49
and form with being. This is not accurate because being unites dynamics and form. Tillich
tries to avoid the contradiction between being and becoming by saying  that becoming is
included in the dynamic nature of being. The opposites expressing the polarity of
dynamics and form are rest and movement, identity and alteration, preserving and change.
Sturm 1994, 194-195 thinks that Tillich’s views are close to process philosophy  (eine
directed and having a form.  This indicates the unity and balance of dynamics45
and form.
Tillich strongly criticizes the separation of vitalism from intentionalism: 
Vitalism, in the sense of a separation of the vital from the intentional,
necessarily re-establishes the barbarism as the ideal of courage.
Although this is done in the interest of science it expresses - usually
against the will of its naturalistic defenders - a pre-humanistic
attitude and can, if used by demagogues, produce the barbaric ideal
of courage as it appeared in Fascism and Nazism. 'Pure' vitality in
man is never pure but always distorted, because man's power of life
is his freedom and the spirituality in which vitality and intentionality
are united.46
Tillich also says that “spirituality means the unity of dynamics and form in
man’s moral and cultural acts”.  47
The dynamic nature of being includes the fact that it is not possible to talk
about being without talking of becoming:
The dynamic character of being implies the tendency of everything to
transcend itself and to create new forms. At the same time everything
tends to conserve its own form as the basis of its self-transcendence.
It tends to unite identity and difference, rest and movement,
conservation and change. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of
being without also speaking of becoming.48
Tillich talks about “the tendency of everything to transcend itself and to
create new forms” and the tendency “to conserve its form”. It is the tension
between self-integration and self-creation or self-transcendence. Identity and
difference, rest and movement, conservation and change belong together;
becoming is as vital for the structure of being as that which remains
unchanged. The danger of process philosophy is that it loses the identity of
that which changes. Then it loses the whole process.  In other words, process49
45
gewisse Nähe Tillichs zur Prozessphilosophie), and this can be seen in the views
concerning dynamics and form. Sturm thinks that Tillich leaves untreated the most central
question of process philosophy, the question of the relativity of the world and of the
process in which it gains unity (Einheit). As a reason for this, Sturm claims that Tillich’s
view of process has features of the traditional views of the philosophy of history, and this
is why Tillich thinks that the process is one whole, even though this is just what process
philosophy questions. About Tillich’s relation to process philosophy and theology, see also
David H. Nikkel, Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich: A Creative Synthesis (1995) and
Lewis S. Ford, Tillich, Whitehead and Creativity (1989).
 See Gilkey 1990, 90-91.50
 ST I, 181.51
philosophy prefers the idea of self-creativity or self-transcendence at the
expence of self-integration; that means also a preference for the modern view
of dynamics and form.
Instead of the traditional concepts of matter and form (which give room for
an active form element) Tillich has chosen the concepts of dynamics and form
(which emphasize the active role of dynamics from the outset). This shows
that he is also moving towards the modern position compared to the classical
view.  However, Tillich did not want to move entirely in the direction of50
process philosophy, and so he combined features of  the classical view and the
modern view in his ontology.
In this context, Tillich mentions “the tendency of everything to transcend
itself”; usually, the idea of self-transcendence is connected to human beings:
Self-transcendence and self-conservation are experienced
immediately by man in man himself. Just as the self on the subhuman
level is imperfect and in correlation with an environment, while on
the human level the self is perfect and in correlation with a world, so
self-transcendece on the subhuman level is limited by a constellation
of conditions, while self-transcendence on the human level is limited
only by the structure which makes man what he is - a complete self
which has a world. On the basis of achieving self-conservation (the
preservation of his humanity), man can transcend any given situation.
He can transcend himself without limits in all directions just because
of this basis... Man is able to create a new world of technical tools
and a world of cultural forms.51
There is a tension between self-conservation and self-transcendence in man;
it is the same kind of tension as that with self-integration and self-creativity,
but in self-transcendence man has even more freedom from the forms. On the
human level self-transcendence is limited only by the structure which makes
man what he is, while  on the subhuman level it is limited by many conditions.
Man can transcend any given situation and create a new world with its tools
and cultural forms. Man’s cultural creativity is endless, he uses the material
46
 ”Man uses material given by nature to create technical forms which transcend nature,52
and he creates cultural forms which have validity and meaning. Living in these forms, he
transforms himself, while originating them. He is not only a tool for their creation; he is at
the same time their bearer and the result of their transforming effect upon him. His self-
trascendence in this direction is indefinite, while the biological self-transcendence has
reached its limits in him... ’Super-man,’ in a biological sense, would be less than man, for
man has freedom, and freedom cannot be trespassed biologically.”  ST I, 182.
 ST I, 181.53
 ST III, 50.54
 “Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude. Nonbeing appears as the ’not yet’ of being55
and as the ’no more’ of being. It confronts that which is with a definite end (finish). ..
However, everything which participates in the power of being is ’mixed’ with nonbeing.
It is being in process of coming from and going toward nonbeing. It is finite.” ST I, 189.
 ST I, 198.56
given by nature and turns it into technical tools or cultural products which
have meaning and value. Man also bears their meaning and is at the same time
the result of their influence. In this direction the self-transcendence of man is
endless, but on the biological level, self-transcendence has reached its limits.52
The growth of an individual is an example of self-transcendence which is
based on self-preservation. The new that is brought with the growth gradually
destroys that which does not change. Growth that goes in a wrong direction
transcends itself without preserving itself, and thus destroys itself. Biological
evolution is an example of something totally new: life forms develop from
less developed ones.  The example of growth shows that in his ontology53
Tillich has not clearly made the distinction between self-creation and self-
transcendence; later he connects growth to self-creation: “The second polarity
in the structure of being is that of dynamics and form. It is effective in the
function of life which we have called self-creativity, and it is effective in the
principle of growth.”54
Tillich’s analysis of the existential position brings a new element to the
polarities:  in finitude, polarity becomes tension where the elements draw55
away from one another. It means the possibility to lose one’s ontological
structure and with it oneself:
Finitude is actual not only in the categories but also in the ontological
elements. Their polar character opens them to the threat of nonbeing.
In every polarity each pole is limited as well as sustained by the other
one. A complete balance between them presupposes a balanced
whole. But such a whole is not given. There are special structures in
which, under the impact of finitude, polarity becomes tension.
Tension refers to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw
away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite directions.56
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 ST I, 199-200.57
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If this is applicable to all the polarities, dynamics and form are drawn away
from one another and attempt to move in opposite directions. What does this
mean? If dynamics is the negative power of being, it resists form and can
remain without form; if dynamics is the positive power of being, it breaks
through the rigid forms and can produce chaos.
Tillich explains the threat of a possible break in the following way:
Finitude also transforms the polarity of dynamics and form into a
tension which produces the threat of a possible break and anxiety
about this threat. Dynamics drives toward form, in which being is
actual and has the power of resisting nonbeing. But at the same time
dynamics is threatened because it may lose itself in rigid forms, and,
if it tries to break through them, the result may be chaos, which is the
loss of both dynamics and form.  57
Positive and negative features are connected to both elements: being is
actual in form in which it has the power of resisting nonbeing, but forms can
become “rigid forms”; dynamics drives toward form and is threatened by the
rigid forms, but if it tries to break through them, the result may be chaos. The
description combines features of the classical and the modern views.
There is a possibility of tension in vitality and intentionality in the same
way as in dynamics and form in general:
Human vitality tends to embody itself in cultural creations, forms,
and institutions through the exercise of creative intentionality. But
every embodiment endangers the vital power precisely by giving it
actual being. Man is anxious about the threat of a final form in which
his vitality will be lost, and he is anxious about the threat of a chaotic
formlessness in which both vitality and intentionality will be lost.58
Man’s vitality expresses itself in the forms of culture and in institutions, but
every formed creation is a threat to man’s vitality. The tension expresses itself
in the fear of a final form, which annihilates man’s vitality or as the fear of
chaotic formlessness which annihilates both vitality and intentionality.
This tension can be seen in literature from Greek tragedies to the present
day, but it has not been taken enough into consideration in philosophy nor in
theology. The exceptions are the philosophy of life and some Protestant
mystics. Philosophy has stressed the rational structure of things but it has
forgotten how things are born. Theology, for its part, has stressed the divine
law and mixed creative vitality into the separation of vitality from
intentionality which has destructive effects. In this way philosophical
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 ST I, 200.59
 ST I, 199. Kiesling 1964, 262 describes finity in the following way: "The ambiguities60
of life are rooted ultimately in the tensions and threats to dissolution which are inherent in
the polar structural elements of finite being - essence and existence, potentiality and
actuality, self and world, subject and object, individualization and participation in the
universal, dynamics (motion) and form, freedom and destiny. Precisely because of the
composite ontological character of finite being, finite life is marked by tensions and
forever threatened with dissolution: the functions of such life are necessarily ambiguous.
But God is being-itself. In him essence and existence are identical. All the structural
elements of finite being have their analogous counterpart in God as the ground and abyss
of being; but in God, their opposition, tensions, threats of dissolution are transcended."
 See e.g. ST II, 64.61
rationalism and theological legalism are the reason for the fact that the tension
of dynamics and form has not gained enough attention.59
Tillich says that the polar elements and the polarity can be lost:
Our own ontological tension comes to awareness in the anxiety of
losing our ontological structure through losing one or another polar
element and, consequently, the polarity to which it belongs... It is the
anxiety of not being what we essentially are. It is anxiety about
disintegrating and falling into nonbeing through existential
disruption.60
Tillich describes the anxiety of losing our ontological structure, but what
does it mean that man loses one or the other polar element?  According to the
definition, dynamics and form do not exist without each other: if you lose one,
you lose the other and the whole ontological structure. However, Tillich
clearly wants to use the polarity to explain different phenomena in life, and
elsewhere he gives examples of their distorted appearances in life.61
Tillich uses the phrase: “not being what we essentially are”. This indicates
some essential state of things which does not actualize itself in life because of
“existential disruption”. This includes a twofold idea: on the one hand,
dynamics and form are necessary ontological elements of everything that is
and some kind of combination of them can be found everywhere; on the other
hand, Tillich uses the polarity of dynamics and form as  a basis for value
judgements, in which case there is a right essential balance of dynamics and
form and a possibility of existential disruption. Then we have to ask, what is
the right balance of the elements and how do we know it. These questions take
us to Tillich’s analysis of essence and existence and the New Being in Jesus as
the Christ. Before that we shall examine how Tillich uses the polarity of
dynamics and form to talk about God.
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 In practice, the relation of theology and philosophy is not so simple in Tillich’s work;62
both are needed on the questioning side and on the answering side. See Gilkey 1990, 73-
76.
 ”The being of God is being-itself.” ST I, 235.63
 In the introduction to the second volume of Systematic Theology, Tillich says that a64
non-symbolic assertion about God is that “everything we say about God is symbolic”. “If
we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being-itself, we speak rationally
and ecstatically at the same time. These terms precisely designate the boundary line at
which both the symbolic and non-symbolic coincide.” He seems to have changed his view
or at least he is emphasizing the matter in a different way. See ST II, 9-10.
 ST I, 156.65
2.2. The polarity of dynamics and form in God
In Tillich’s view, the basic question of theology is the question of God, which
is united inseparably with the question of being. In the previous chapter we
have analysed the structure of being and now we can proceed to Tillich’s view
of God. Tillich applies his basic view of correlation to philosophy and
theology by saying that philosophy formulates the question to which theology
gives the answer based on the Christian message.  Man can ask what it means62
“to be”, because he is the only self-conscious being. The existential analysis
opens up the way to  being-itself. In Tillich’s system the question of being
receives a theological answer that God is being-itself.  This is the only thing63
that can be said about God directly, without symbols. Everything that is added
is symbolic speech.  Tillich maintains that everything we say about God has64
to be understood symbolically.  Otherwise, God becomes a finite being.
Symbolically speaking, the polarity of dynamics and form has its ground in
God; without God there is no polarity of dynamics and form.
Tillich talks about God by using both the polarity of dynamics and form
and the scheme of form and ground/depth/abyss/substance. In the polarity, the
elements “lie on the same level” while the scheme of form and substance
indicates the Schellingian hierarchy of the potencies. Tillich’s basic view of
God combines the idea of depth with form; the view resembles the idea of
form and substance:
The divine life is the dynamic unity of depth and form. In mystical
language the depth of the divine life, its inexhaustible and ineffable
character, is called ’Abyss.’ In philosophical language the form, the
meaning and structure element of the divine life, is called ’Logos.’ In
religious language the dynamic unity of both elements is called
’Spirit.’  Theologians must use all three terms in order to point to the
ground of revelation.65
In a Schellingian way Tillich says that God as depth is the inexhaustible
and ineffable Abyss which at the same time is the ground of being. If taken
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 ST I, 238.66
 Annala 2000, 8 uses the distinction to analyse mystical experience.67
 ”In contrast to causality, substance points to something underlying the flux of68
appearances, something which is relatively static and self-contained. There is no substance
without accidents. The accidents receive their ontological power from the substance to
which they belong. But the substance is nothing beyond the accidents in which it expresses
itself.” ST I, 197. See also ST III, 314, 321-326.
 ST I, 179-180. Gilkey 1990, 92 feels there are two polar streams at work in Tillich’s69
thinking: “One, the classical stream (both Greek and Patristic), stresses the clear
opposition of being and nonbeing. The other (the more modern stream of nineteenth-
century Lebensphilosophie, of modern dynamic ontologies, of existentialism, possibly of
Buddhism, and even some of the implications of the New Testament), seems to see being,
whether in finitude or in God, as a polarity of being and of nonbeing.” See also Gilkey
1990, 108-113. Cristopherson 1995, 179-180 says about me on (the relative non-being)
and ouk on (the absolute non-being): "Generally, one finds that when God is the subject of
a sentence in Tillich’s writing, nonbeing is addressed as me on.  However, when
humankind is the subject, then ouk on comes storming into the picture." From the “vantage
point” of God, nonbeing is seen as me on, from the “ground level” of the humanity, it is
seen as ouk on. About the meaning of non-being to Tillich’s view of religion and religious
experience, see Petit 1989, 221-229.
 See ST I, 71-81.70
 Randall 1952, 143: “Reason, in other words, points to something that is one step71
beyond the intelligible structures it actually finds. This further step is the Source or the
One of Neo-Platonism, the Imprinter of the seal, the Original of the copy, of Augustinian
symbolically, the ideas of prima causa and ultima substantia can be used to
designate God: both mean that he is the “creative and abysmal ground of
being”.  However, this does not mean a substance that is completely66
expressed by its accidents: “It is an underlying in which substance and
accidents preserve their freedom.” It is possible to explain this idea with the
distinction of potentia dei absoluta - potentia dei ordinata in nominalism:
God has created the form and structure of the world but his potentiality, his
absolute power has not been exhausted by that.  However, in another context,67
Tillich says that “there is no substance without accidents” and that “substance
is nothing beyond the accidents in which it expresses itself”.68
The abysmal character of the divine life makes revelation mysterious;
Tillich also says that theology has tried to find a place for non-being “in the
depth of the divine life”.  The logical character of the divine life makes69
revelation of the mystery possible. The form element is called Logos which is
the meaning and structure element of the divine life. The dynamic unity of
both elements is called Spirit which creates the correlation of miracle and
ecstasy in which revelation can be received.
Tillich’s idea of the depth of reason and the structure of reason can be seen
in a similar way.  The depth of reason can be connected to the Neo-Platonic70
One.  For the Platonic tradition this stands one step “above” intellect; Tillich71
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thought.”
 ”The symbols provided by the ontological elements present a great number of72
problems for the doctrine of God. In every special case it is necessary to distinguish
between the proper sense of the concepts and their symbolic sense. And it is equally
necessary to balance one side of the ontological polarity against the other without reducing
the symbolic power of either of them.” ST I, 244. Nörenberger 1966, 105-106 points
briefly to the polarity of dynamics and form when he deals with the relation of symbolic
expressions to the material they use.
 ST I, 245-246.73
 ST I, 247.74
follows Böhme and Schelling, and locates it one step “below”, in the
“depths”.
According to Tillich it is not possible to grasp God directly, we have to use
symbols. When Tillich uses the ontological polarities to talk about God, he
emphasizes that this is also symbolic speech. It is always important to balance
one polar element with the other without reducing the symbolic power of
either of them.  Some important symbols about God are based on the polarity72
of dynamics and form:
The polarity of dynamics and form supplies the material basis for a
group of symbols which are central for any present-day doctrine of
God. Potentiality, vitality, and self-transcendence are indicated in the
term ’dynamics,’ while the term ’form’ embraces actuality,
intentionality, and self-preservation.73
God’s potentiality, vitality and self-transcendence are based on dynamics,
God’s actuality, intentionality and self-preservation are based on form. We
can see here  both self-integration and self-creativity or self-transcendence. In
Tillich’s concept of God these both are present or included.
Tillich claims that in theology we should create a balance between the
emphasis on dynamics and the emphasis on form: he wants to maintain the
unity and balance of the ontological elements in God:
If the element of form in the dynamics-form polarity is applied
symbolically to the divine life, it expresses the actualization of its
potentialities. The divine life inescapably unites possibility with
fulfilment. Neither side threatens the other, nor is there a threat of
disruption. In terms of self-preservation one could say that God
cannot cease to be God. His going-out from himself does not
diminish or destroy his divinity. It is united with eternal ’resting in
himself.’74
The symbolic use of the form element expresses that God’s coming out
from himself is united with eternal rest in himself. In God, possibility is united
with fulfilment without either side threatening the other. This sounds quite
classical.
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 ST I, 235-236. See also ST I, 189, 196, 203, 230-231, 233, 251, 272-273.75
 Annala 1983, 50 emphasizes God as the power of being in Tillich’s thinking. He calls76
Tillich’s view of being as “ vitalistic-dynamistic-existential”, see Annala 1983, 51.
 Thatcher 1978, 68-69 pays attention to the contradiction that Tillich sometimes77
identifies being and the power of being and thinks that this raises doubt about the
consistency of the whole system. 
 Ford 1975, 48. Ford concludes that in Tillich power takes precedence over structure.78
He thinks that the finity attached to form prevents it from being identified with being-
itself. Dynamics is not finite or limited, and it can be identified with God who is the power
of being. “It is the finitude and exclusiveness inherent in form which precludes the
identification of form with being-itself. Pure dynamics, however, is neither finite nor
exclusive, and can be properly identified with God as the power of being.” Ford 1975, 50.
Referring to Plato, Tillich equates being with the power of being:
Many confusions in the doctrine of God and many apologetic
weaknesses could be avoided if God were understood first of all as
being-itself or as the ground of being. The power of being is another
way of expressing the same thing in a circumscribing phrase. Ever
since the time of Plato it has been known... that the concept of being
as being, or being itself, points to the power inherent in everything,
the power of resisting nonbeing. Therefore, instead of saying that
God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is the power
of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of
being.75
Accordingly, God  who is being-itself, is the power of being.76
This definition includes conceptual problems for Tillich.  We have seen77
that he describes both dynamics and form with the expression ’the power of
being’. Now he identifies also being and the power of being. The conceptual
problem can be seen when we ask what is the relationship between the power
of being and form: if the power of being is the source of form, it can be
identified with being, and in that case the power of being differs from
dynamics which is the polar pair of form; if the power of being is not the
source of form, it can be connected to dynamics as “divine dynamics”, but
then it cannot be identified with being. Ford says that there is a systematic
ambiguity in Tillich’s thinking: sometimes he identifies the power of being
with being-itself or God, sometimes he identifies it with the element of
dynamics.  The idea of God as being-itself indicates the unity and balance of78
dynamics and form, the idea of God as the power of being indicates an
emphasis on the dynamic side of the polarity.
Tillich wants to maintain the balance of the polar elements, and soon after
the previous quotation he gives a new definition:
Since God is the ground of being, he is the ground of the structure of
being. He is not subject to this structure; the structure is grounded in
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 ST I, 238.79
 Randall 1952, 160 says that Tillich seems to identify “the structure of being” with “the80
ground of being”, and both with “the power of being”, but “ontologically speaking, these
seem to be three very different concepts, and surprisingly enough, Tillich never attempts
to distinguish or clarify them... But a structure is hardly in itself a power.” Randall would
take “the power of being” as a polar element.
 See e.g. Schwarz 1989, 183.81
 Tillich claims that the Greek philosophers emphasize the identity of rationality and82
inner power, see Realism and Faith (1948), 69 (MW 4, 345): "But for the Greek
philosophers from Parmenides to Plotinus, the rationality and the inner power of things are
identical, which is clearly expressed in their belief that the highest goal of reason is, at the
same time, the highest goal of the movement of every life."
 ”Life is the process in which potential being becomes actual being. It is the83
actualization of the structural elements of being in their unity and in their tension... If we
call God the ”living God”, we deny that he is a pure identity of being as being; and we also
deny that there is a definite separation of being from being in him. We assert that he is the
eternal process in which separation is posited and is overcome by reunion.” ST I, 242.
him. He is this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him
except in terms of this structure.79
On the one hand, Tillich says that God is the power of being, on the other
hand, he says that God is the ground of the structure of being or he is this
structure.  It is possible to understand these definitions in the light of the80
polarity of dynamics and form. The power of being and the structure of being
belong together without separation;  always, when one side is mentioned, the81
other side is also included.  However, it seems that Tillich is not always82
consistent in using both sides of the polarity to talk about God: we shall see
that in the subsequent parts of the system his view moves to a more dynamic
direction.
Tillich maintains that being also includes becoming. Life is a process,
where potential being becomes actual. This indicates that the polar elements
actualize themselves with each other and in tension with each other. Life ends
if there is separation without unity or unity without separation. Because God
is being-itself, he is alive. He is the eternal process, in which unity frequently
conquers  separation.  However, Tillich rejects the view of process theology83
that God is ’becoming’ because it disrupts the balance between dynamics and
form:
These assertions include a rejection of a nonsymbolic, ontological
doctrine of God as becoming. If we say that being is actual as life,
the element of self-transcendence is obviously and emphatically
included. But it is included as a symbolic element in balance with
form. Being is not in balance with becoming. Being comprises
becoming and rest, becoming as an implication of dynamics and rest
as an implication of form. If we say that God is being-itself, this
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 ST I, 247.84
 ST I, 247.85
 ST I, 246.86
 See ST I, 246.87
includes both rest and becoming, both the static and the dynamic
elements. However, to speak of a ’becoming’ God disrupts the
balance between dynamics and form...84
Tillich’s view of being-itself includes both the static and dynamic elements:
becoming is an implication of dynamics and rest is the implication of form.
Also the idea of self-transcendence has to be balanced with form. To speak of
God as becoming disrupts this balance. Tillich combines, on one hand,
dynamics, self-transcendence and becoming, on the other hand, form, rest and
being static. All of these express the polarity that Tillich mainly describes
with the concepts of dynamics and form, but which comes forward also with
other concepts. Once again, we can see self-integration and self-creativity or
self-transcendence which indicate the classical and the modern view of
dynamics and form.  In Tillich’s view, the expression that God is being-itself
includes both sides of the polarity in balance: becoming and rest, or the static
and dynamic elements. To talk about God only as becoming shatters the
balance between dynamics and form.
In like manner, Tillich criticizes the view of God that emphasizes too much
form; he thinks that it is the old Catholic view.  In Tillich’s view, the idea of85
God as actus purus has meant the disappearance of the dynamic side from the
view of God:
Potentiality and actuality appear in classical theology in the famous
formula that God is actus purus, the pure form in which everything
potential is actual, and which is the eternal self-intuition of the divine
fulness (pleroma). In this formula the dynamic side in the dynamics-
form polarity is swallowed by the form side... Life includes the
separation of potentiality and actuality. The nature of life is
actualization, not actuality. The God who is actus purus is not the
living God.  86
Once again, Tillich wants to keep both sides of the polarity. In this context,
his view of form is static because the pure form in which everything potential
is actual means the absence of the dynamic side. Pure actuality is not life, and
the God who is actus purus is not the living God.  This idea is based on87
existential philosophy and Schelling’s view of God.
McLean criticizes Tillich’s view from the Catholic point of view by saying
that Thomas’ God is not static but on the contrary very dynamic: following
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 McLean 1964, 78.  Dourley 1995, 130 presents Tillich’s view in a positive light:  "To88
follow this line of thought one step further, just as ousia is alive with the life of the divine,
so also does Tillich consider the divine to be an intensely living power far removed from
the static rest of that Aristotelian God who is pure act... On the contrary, God for Tillich is
a seething unity of opposites constantly enlivened by the battle between its polarities for
that blessedness the Spirit eternally confers in their resolution."
 Thatcher 1978, 67. Thatcher thinks that the difference between Tillich and Thomism89
is partly terminological: “For Aquinas, God, angels and creatures exist alike. They are. But
Tillich’s concept of existence is drawn, not from Thomas or the Scholastics, but from the
modern existentialists. That is the reason why, in his ontology, it cannot be applied to God,
because it signifies estrangement and non-being and because it has fallen from essence.”
See Thatcher 1978, 75. Thatcher says that Tillich’s notion of existence of God would have
been entirely foreign to Thomas; Thomas’ idea of existence is preserved in Tillich’s view
of the power of being. Tillich’s God does not exist because existence is synonymous with
estrangement. However, Tillich has overlooked the fact that Thomists and ordinary
Christians alike do not say “God exists” in the existential sense. Usually, the meaning is
the same as Tillich’s phrase “God is”. For more detail see Thatcher 1978, 71-78.
 See ST I, 246.90
the Aristotelian tradition, form is active in Thomism.  The mistake is based,88
in his view, on the habit of modern philosophy to interpret form passively in
a Platonic way. Thatcher thinks that it is a major mistake that Tillich unites
actus purus with a fixed and static form: “Wrongly assuming that actus means
actuality rather than activity, Tillich places it on the fixed, static form side of
the polarity. We shall see that the Greek concept underlying the actus purus is
energeia, and that as the English word ’energy’ suggests, it is dynamic in
character.”89
Tillich says that many theologians have tried to unite the notion of actus
purus to the dynamic view of God by distinguishing two elements in God
which are in constant tension with each other. Tillich sees it as an attempt to
prevent God’s vitality from becoming pure actuality. In Tillich’s view, the
dynamic side has been brought forward by the Old Testament and the
experience of the Christians, and this has happened especially under Luther’s
influence. As representatives of such duality, Tillich names Böhme, Schelling,
Schopenhauer, Berdyaev and Hartshorne. Tillich thinks that all these
individuals have tried to express what he calls dynamics.90
Also the Protestant mystics tried to bring back the dynamic element in God
with the help of the thoughts of Duns Scotus and Luther. In the last century,
the dynamic element has been emphasized in God, and in this respect, Tillich
maintains that the late romanticism, philosophy of life, existentialism and
process philosophy are in agreement. In Tillich’s view, an ontology which
depreciates the dynamic element of being is incapable of explaining the
process of life and to speak meaningfully about divine life. Tillich thinks that
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 ST I, 179-180.91
 ”They point symbolically to a quality of the divine life which is analogous to what92
appears as dynamics in the ontological structure. The divine creativity, God’s participation
in history, his outgoing character, are based on this dynamic element. It includes a ’not yet’
which is, however, always balanced by an ’already’ within the divine life. It is not an
absolute ’not yet,’ which would make it a divine-demonic power, nor is the ’already’ an
absolute already. It also can be expressed as the negative element in the ground of being
which is overcome as negative in the process on being-itself. As such it is the basis of the
negative element in the creature, in which it is not overcome but is effective as a theat and
a potential disruption.” ST I, 246-247.
 For more information see ST I, 247. About the relation of Tillich and Thomas93
Aquinas, see Keefe 1971, 212-215; Ford 1966, 248-258. 
 For a more detailed account see ST I, 249.94
 ST I, 249.95
 ”Spirit is not a ’part’, nor is it a special function. It is the all-embracing function in96
which all elements of the structure of being participate.” ST I, 250.
the danger of these views is that the divine loses its divinity.  This talk about91
God points symbolically to something which is analogical to dynamics in the
ontological structure. God’s creativity and involvement in history are based on
this dynamic element. It includes “not yet” and “already now”. Neither of
them is absolute but they express the negative element of the ground of being
which expresses itself in a creature as a threat and potential disruption.92
The divine form must be conceived in analogy with intentionality which is
balanced by vitality on the human level. This polarity of dynamics and form
appears in theology as the question of will and intellect in God. Thomas
Aquinas submitted will to intellect and Duns Scotus raised will above
intellect. In Tillich’s view, it was not a question of metaphysical psychology,
but of how to use the polarity of dynamics and form and the psychological
concepts based on them to talk about God. This question of God is
analogically the same as the question of vitality and intentionality in man.93
According to Tillich, both sides of the polarity are equally important.
Moreover, when we talk about God’s Spirit, we apply symbolically features
of the human spirit; the treatment of the Spirit is preceded by the analysis of
the human spirit.  Tillich defines spirit in the following way:94
Spirit is the unity of the ontological elements and the telos of life.
Actualized as life, being-itself is fulfilled as spirit.95
Spirit combines the ontological elements and the telos of life, and all the
elements of being participate in spirit. In a Hegelian way Tillich says that
being actualizes itself as life and comes into fulfilment in spirit. Spirit is not in
contradiction with body, and it transcends the distinctions of mind and body
or body, soul and mind.96
57
 “In terms of both sides of the three polarities one can say that spirit is the unity of97
power and meaning. On the side of power it includes centered personality, self
transcending vitality, and freedom of self-determination. On the side of meaning it
includes universal participation, forms and structures of reality, and limiting and directing
destiny.” ST I, 249-250.
 For Tillich’s view of the Spirit see Gilkey 1995, 174-178.98
 ST I, 249-250.99
 ST I, 250.100
Tillich uses the three polar pairs to define spirit as the unity of power and
meaning:  power includes centered personality (individualization), self97
transcending vitality (dynamics in the modern sense) and freedom of self-
determination. Meaning includes universal participation, forms and structures
of reality (form) and limiting and directing destiny.  Dynamics and form are98
included with the other polar pairs as elements in the concepts of power and
meaning, which also become a polar pair of concepts. Tillich interprets
dynamics in the modern sense as self transcending vitality and combines
forms and structures. Dynamics is connected with power and form with
meaning. The consequence  is that Tillich’s views concerning power and
meaning attach themselves indirectly to dynamics and form. Accordingly,
spirit is the unity of power and meaning and implicitly includes also dynamics
and form.
Both sides of the polarity are once again important:
Life fulfilled as spirit embraces passion as much as truth, libido as
much as surrender, will to power as much as justice. If one of these
sides is absorbed by its correlate, either abstract law or choatic [it
should be chaotic] movement remains.99
Passion, libido and will to power can be connected to dynamics; truth,
surrender, and justice to form. Totally separated from their counterparts the
different sides lead to abstract law (form) or chaotic movement (dynamics). 
It is impossible to understand the meaning of Spirit (with a capital S) unless
the meaning of spirit is understood. The Spirit is the symbolic application of
spirit to the divine life. Tillich uses the polar pairs to talk about the Spirit:
The statement that God is Spirit means that life as spirit is the
inclusive symbol for the divine life. It contains all the ontological
elements. God is not nearer to one ’part’ of being or to a special
function of being than he is to another. As spirit he is as near to the
creative darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical light of
cognitive reason. Spirit is the power through which meaning lives,
and it is the meaning which gives direction to power. God as Spirit is
the ultimate unity of both power and meaning.100
Spirit is the unity of power and meaning. Both sides of the polarity are
equally important. Spirit includes all the ontological elements and life comes
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 Reisz 1978, 307 emphasizes these two sides of the Spirit from the point of view of101
dynamics and form: "God as Spirit is not just Life-power, the dynamic pole, but also
Life-in-meanings, the formal pole." Reisz thinks that Tillich’s view of God as Spirit gives
a basis for a dialog with the theology of liberation and a possibility to create liberating
theology. See Reisz 1978, 300-313. Dourley 1995, 132 summarizes Tillich’s view as
follows: "Summarily put, he is arguing that all of life consists of the succesful unification
or syntheses of the many conflictual polarities that make life up. Essentially life, the life of
God, unites these polarities through the Spirit from eternity. These potentially disruptive
opposites are rooted in the divine life as the basis of their working in human life but are
there in divine life as overcome in the Spirit."
 ST I, 250. 102
 ST I, 251.103
into fulfilment in spirit. That is why Spirit is the all embracing symbol about
God. God who is Spirit gives power to meaning and direction to power.  In101
this context, Tillich gives a description of Spirit using the polar pairs; in his
cultural theology, the approach is different and we shall return to the view of
Spirit especially in the part dealing with self-transcendence.
When Tillich examines the presuppositions of the doctrine of the Trinity, he
says that it is impossible to make a doctrine of the living God and creation
without making the distinction between divine ground and form. Human
intuition has always made the difference between the divine depth and the
fullness of its content:
God’s life is life as spirit, and the Trinitarian principles are moments
within the process of the divine life. Human intuition of the divine
always has distinguished between the abyss of the divine (the
element of power) and the fullness of its content (the element of
meaning), between the divine depth and the divine logos.102
Here, Tillich connects depth and abyss to the element of power, the fullness
of content to the element of meaning and to the divine logos. As we have
seen, Tillich defines power and meaning in Spirit also with the ontological
polarities: dynamics is connected to power and form to meaning. These
definitions connect dynamics and depth closely to each other and form can be
connected to the divine logos in both descriptions.
The first element in God is the basis of the divine majesty: it is the power of
being which resists non-being and gives the power of being to everything that
is. Tillich says that the best name for the element of meaning and structure is
the classical term logos, which “unites meaningful structure with creativity”.
In this context, the second element is as important as the first one. Without the
latter element the first one would be chaos and burning fire, but not a creative
basis. God would be demonic and separated from everything else.  103
Tillich thinks that it is better to deal with the presuppositions of the Trinity
starting with the Spirit rather than with Logos; the actual formation of the
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 See also Schwarz 1989, 185-186.104
 See ST III, 288.105
 The Word of God (1957), 123-124 (MW 4, 406).106
 See ST III, 29. See also Philosophy and Theology (1941), 28 (MW 4, 284).107
 See ST III, 22-24. See also ST III, 335, 367.108
 ”The last example for the development of the christological symbols is that109
conceptual symbol which became the main tool for the christological work of the church,
’the Logos.’ ... It unites rational structure and creative power.” ST II, 111. See also ST I,
251. About the concept of Logos in the formation of the Christological dogma, see ST II,
138-142; About the combining of Logos with Jesus, see ST III, 289-290.
 ST I, 251.110
 In another context, Tillich gives a wide field of meaning to the concept of logos:111
“Heraclitus, in his words about the logos, the law which determines the movement of the
kosmos, applies the concept of the logos both to the laws of nature and to the laws of the
city. According to Plato, justice is the uniting function in the individual man and in the
social group. It is the embracing form in both cases. Their power of being depends on it.
In Stoicism it is the same logos which works as physical law in nature and as moral law in
the human mind. It judges as the principle of justice all positive laws. It gave the Roman
doctrine of the Trinity has to be started with the confession that Jesus is the
Christ.  But also, apart from the Christological question, some kind of104
doctrine of Logos is needed.  Logos is the inner word which God speaks to105
himself, “the Word of God”: 
’Word of God’ can be and has been understood as the inner word
which God speaks to himself, and in which he becomes manifest to
himself. Such a statement is highly symbolic, but it can be
understood in terms of the Parmenidian sentence that where being is,
there is also the logos of being, the "word" in which being grasps
itself. This is the basis for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which
also describes in symbolic terms the outgoing of God from himself
and the reunion of God with himself. It is a description of life in its
duality of dynamics and form... It means, in the most simple terms,
that being is not only hidden but also manifest, and that it is first of
all manifest to itself. The “Word of God" in this sense is the symbolic
expression of that element in the ground of being which breaks its
eternal silence and makes life and history possible.  106
Tillich also says that the structure of reality defined by Logos is the basis of
values.  Spirit is more than reason, but without the logos structure it could107
not express anything. Logos is the principle of form according to which reality
is structured.  Tillich says that the expression Logos used by the early church108
of Jesus combines rational structure and creative power;  Tillich’s view of109
logos “unites meaningful structure and creativity”:  it indicates the classical110
view of form. Tillich connects logos with form and gives a broad field of
meaning to both.111
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Stoics criteria for the formulation and administration of the Roman law.” Love, Power,
and Justice (1954),  55 (MW 3, 608-609).
The Word of God (1957), 123-124 (MW 4, 406). Ford 1975, 47 thinks that Tillich’s112
view of Trinity which is based on the polarity of two elements is not a good solution.
 ST I, 251.113
 ”This consideration brought us to the distinction of God as ground, God as form, and114
God as act, a pretrinitarian formula which makes trinitarian thinking meaningful.” ST III,
284.
 For the ontological concepts, see ST I, 164-168.115
Spirit as the third principle is the actualization of divine power and
meaning: what is potential in the divine ground and manifested in the divine
logos becomes actual in Spirit.  Trinitarian principles come forward always112
when someone wants to speak of a living God.  Tillich calls these three sides113
of God also God as ground, God as form, and God as act.  It is also possible114
to interpret the three functions of life in a Trinitarian way, even though Tillich
has not done so directly. Self-creation can be connected to “the Father”, the
first person of the Trinity; self-integration to “the Son”, the second person of
the Trinity; and self-transcendence to “the Spirit”, the third person of the
Trinity.
2.3. Dynamics and form in existence and in the New
Being in Jesus as the Christ
The center of Tillich’s theological system is called “Existence and the Christ”.
It is the largest of the five parts of the system and is published as a separate
volume. In his ontology, Tillich makes a difference between being and
existing and deals with them at four different levels:  The first level is the115
self-world stucture which is the basic ontological polarity. The second level
deals with the three polar pairs (individualization and participation, dynamics
and form, freedom and destiny). The third level deals with existence and
61
 The difference between essence and existence has been one of the most important116
questions in the history of philosophy. The concepts of essence and existence have been
given different meanings and different values at different times. For example, essence can
be defined as that which makes a thing what it is. It is also possible to make value
judgements about essence and existence: in that case essence can be held as the real state
of things and existence as the fall. Randall 1952, 157 says that “essence is an ambiguous
term: its meaning oscillates between an empirical and a valuational sense, between the
actual logical nature of the thing, and its ’true’ and undistorted nature, that from which
being has ’fallen’”. Existence is likewise ambiguous: “Whatever exists is more than it is
in the state of mere potentiality and less than it could be in the power of its ’essential’
nature.” The contrast between essence and existence has been the contrast between idea
and fact, and the contrast of value between the ideal and the actual.
 See ST II, 20-21. Track 1975, 361 sees that this duality in Tillich’s thinking gives117
reality its dynamic nature: “Der Mensch vermag negative Urteile zu setzen, weil er
gleichzeitig am Sein und am Nichtsein partizipiert. Gerade die dialektische Beziehung
zum Sein, die unsere Wirklichkeit bestimmt, und der dialektische Charakter des Nichtseins
als me on (Potentialität) und als ouk on (reines Nichts) sind es, die unserer Wirklichkeit
ihre Dynamik und ihre umkehrbare Richtung auf das Ende hin geben.” Tillich makes a
difference between existential and existentialist philosophy, see ST II, 26. About the
relation of Christianity to existentialism, see ST II, 21-28.
 In Tillich’s view, Plato has a negative view of existence; to him the real being is118
essential being. On the other side Ockham thinks of existence positively; to him essence
is just the reflection of the human mind. Aristotle is between the two. From Renaissance
and Enlightenment on existence is not falling, but the fulfilment of potentialities. Hegel’s
philosophical system takes into completion this essentialistic view. Tillich says that the
birth of existentialism is in many ways a protest against Hegel’s views. See Theology of
Culture, 80-91; ST I, 202-204; ST II, 23-26.
 ST II, 22.119
brings forward the difference between essential and existential being.  The116
fourth level deals with the categories of being and knowing.
Etymologically, existing means ’standing out’. In Tillich’s view, it is
standing out of non-being; it combines the Greek absolute non-being  (ouk on)
and the relative non-being (me on). The one who exists stands out from non-
being and stands into finite being, which is a mixture of being and non-
being. Some features of Tillich’s view can be derived from his analysis of117
Plato and Aristotle. Tillich says that only in Plato does the contrast between
the existential and the essential become an ontological and ethical problem.118
For Plato, true being is essential being, and existence is the realm of error and
evil. Man must rise above existence in order to reach essential being from
which he fell. Man’s existence is a fall from what he essentially is: “The
potential is the essential, and to exist, i.e., to stand out of potentiality, is the
loss of true essentiality.”  Tillich says that Aristotle tried to close the gap119
between essence and existence through the doctrine of the “dynamic
interdependence of form and matter in everything” but his protest could not
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 See ST II, 22.120
 ST II, 27.121
 ST II, 27-28.122
 See Annala 1983, 27.123
 For more about estrangement see ST II, 44-59. See also Thietmar Wernsdörfer, Die124
entfremdete Welt: Eine Untersuchung zur Theologie Paul Tillichs (1968), 275-278.
 ST II, 44. Tillich thinks that the polarity of freedom and destiny can solve the problem125
of divine determinism and biblical personalism: "A divine determinism often seems to
conquer biblical personalism, and in men like Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin this
determinism reaches its sharpest expression. But at no point do these men and the biblical
writers allow their emphasis on the divine activity to destroy the divine-human reciprocity.
This can be understood only through the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny and
through a distinction between the levels of being, namely, between the ground of being,
which transcends all polarities, and finite being, which is subjected to them." Biblical
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (1955), 80 (MW 4, 386).
 ST II, 29-30.126
 See ST I, 165.127
succeed.  We can draw the conclusion that Tillich is following the line of120
Plato in his thinking.
Tillich also values the ideas of existentialism. He says that it analyses the
situation of the “old aeon”, in biblical language, man and world in the state of
estrangement. The term “the Christ” points to the “new aeon”, new reality.  In
this respect, existentialism is a natural ally of Christianity; it is the “good
luck” of theology.  With the help of existential analysis and depth121
psychology, it is possible to reinterpret the Christian view of sin and
condemnation, which have lost their expressive power, but not their truth
value.122
According to Tillich, man’s essence is determined by creation and he
cannot determine the nature of existence himself.  Creation is good in its123
essential nature, but as actualized it falls into universal estrangement:  to live124
under the conditions of existence inevitably means losing and corrupting
essence. Tillich unites the Christian view of the fall  to transition from essence
to existence and identifies the actualized creation and estranged existence.
Referring to Plato, he says that the transition to existence is not an essential
necessity; otherwise, existence would become itself an essential reality. The
transition from essence to existence is an original fact, but it is not possible to
derive existence from essence.  That is why it is not totally possible to125
demythologize the way we talk about it.126
The basic features of existence are freedom and finitude: “finite freedom is
the turning point from being to existence”.  Tillich explains the fall with the127
polarity of freedom and destiny: finite freedom makes possible the transition
63
 ”Man can say that nature is finite necessity, God is infinite freedom, man is finite128
freedom. It is finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to
existence.” ST II, 31.
 ”Finally, man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his129
essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is he can surrender his
humanity.” ST II, 32.
 ST II, 32-33.130
 ST II, 39-40.131
 Tillich describes the situation in a dialectical way as the structure of destruction,132
which shows that destruction does not have an independent position in reality, but it is
dependent on the structure where it works destructively. See ST II, 59-60.
 ST II, 59-62.133
 See e.g. ST II, 64.134
from essence to existence.  Man has freedom, unlike the rest of the nature,128
and man’s freedom means that he can contradict himself and his essential
nature; he has freedom even from his freedom, which means he can give up
his humanity.  However, freedom is limited by destiny, and even the129
freedom to contradict oneself is restricted by destiny; it is possible only with
the universal transition from essence to existence. There is not just one ancient
fall, but finite freedom is bound up with universal destiny. Symbolically
speaking, the image of God in man gives the possibility to fall.130
In the story of the fall, the snake represents the dynamics of nature in man
and around him. Alone it is, however, without power. In later interpretations,
rebelling angels were connected to the fall. In Tillich’s view, angels and
demons are mythological names for the creative and destructive forces of
being. They are not beings but powers of being which are dependent on the
whole structure of existence. However, man is responsible for the transition
from essence to existence because he has finite freedom.131
In the state of estrangement, man contradicts his essential nature. This leads
towards self-destruction. The polar elements of essential being are driven
against each other and try to destroy each other. The destruction is not caused
by some outside forces, divine or demonic. The structure of destruction can be
seen both in the basic structure of being and in the polar pairs.  The basic132
structure of finite being is the ego-world relationship. Existential
estrangement can lead to losing oneself or losing the world. To lose oneself
means to lose the determining center and the unity which belongs to a person.
In the same way, the world breaks into pieces. The finite ego can strive to be
the center of everything but ceases to be the center of anything.  The same133
thing that happens to the basic structure happens to all the polar pairs. Under
the conditions of existence the elements of the polar pairs are in tension with
each other or are driven apart from each other.  134
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 ST II, 64. For more details see ST II, 49-55.135
  ST II, 64. 136
 ST II, 64.137
Tillich gives examples where the balance of dynamics and form is
existentially disturbed:
Under the control of hubris and concupiscence, man is driven in all
directions without any definite aim and content. His dynamics are
distorted into a formless urge for self-transcendence. It is not the new
form which attracts the self-transcendence of the person; the
dynamics has become an aim in itself. One can speak of the
’temptation of the new,’ which in itself is a necessary element in all
creative self-actualization but which in distortion sacrifices the
creative for the new. Nothing real is created if the form is lacking, for
nothing is real without form.135
Hubris and concupiscence can control man so that he is driven to all
directions without aim and content. Tillich uses the phrase “temptation of the
new” to describe situations, where dynamics is distorted into a formless urge
to self-transcendence: dynamics is not directed towards new form (the modern
view of dynamics and form), but it has become an aim in itself. The necessary
element of creation is disrupted and creativity is threatened in its drive
towards the new. However, nothing real can be created without form.136
Hubris and concupiscence are examples of the situation where the dynamic
side of the polarity has become an aim in itself. It is equally destructive if
form is without dynamics:
Yet form without dynamics is equally destructive. If a form is
abstracted from the dynamics in which it is created and is imposed on
the dynamics to which it does not belong, it becomes external law. It
is oppressive and produces either legalism without creativity or the
rebellious outbreaks of dynamic forces leading to chaos and often, in
reaction, to stronger ways of suppression.137
In this description, form becomes negative and restrictive. It becomes an
outside law, if it is separated from the dynamics to which it belongs and
imposed on another one. The consequence is either legalism without creativity
or rebellious outbreaks of dynamics. This can lead to chaos or strong ways of
suppression. Tillich’s description is based on the situation where both sides of
the polarity are equally important. Any one-sided emphasis on either side is
distorted: it does not manifest the essential unity and balance of the elements.
Consequently, Tillich criticizes philosophical systems where the essential
unity of dynamics and form is not acknowledged. In those systems man is
described one-sidedly either from the point of view of dynamics or from the
point of view of form: 
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 ST II, 65. For more detail about Tillich’s criticism of Freud and Nietzsche see ST II,138
51-55.
 See Nature and Sacrament, 101 (MW 6, 177, 187).139
 Peeck 1991, 91. For connecting these thoughts to pastoral counselling, see Peeck140
1991, 91 and 103-105. For Tillich’s relation to Freud in general, see also John M. Perry,
Tillich's Response to Freud: A Christian Answer to the Freudian Critique of Religion
(1988) and Neville A.C. Heuer, Interpretative Theological Dynamics (1979). See also
Irwin’s article The Faces of Desire: Tillich on "essential libido", conscupiscence and the
Transcendence of Estrangement. (1990).
 In the English translation of Tillich’s German article Natur und Sakrament (1930)141
there is an addition where Tillich criticizes Nietzsche’s vitalistic philosophy of nature:
"The power of nature must be found in the sphere prior to the cleavage of our world into
subjectivity and objectivity. Life originates on a level which is 'deeper' than the Cartesian
duality of cogitatio and extensio ('thought' and 'extension'). It was the wish of the vitalistic
interpretation of nature to reach this level. But a philosophy of life that denies intellect and
spirit has deprived life of its strongest power and its ultimate meaning, as even Nietzsche
realized when he said: 'Spirit is life which itself cutteth into life.' The difficult problem for
all attempts to reach the uncleft level of reality is the necessity to penetrate into something
'nonsubjective' with categories of subjective mind and into something 'nonobjective' with
categories of objective reality. This necessarily falsifies the pictures, which can be
corrected only by a strict understanding of the indirect, symbolic character of terms used
for the description of the power and meaning of nature." Nature and Sacrament (1948),
102 (MW 6, 178).
If man is understood as essentially unlimited libido or unlimited will
to power, the basis for such understanding is not man’s essential
nature but his state of existential estrangement. The inability to reach
a form in which the dynamics of man’s nature are preliminarily or
lastingly satisfied is an expression of man’s estrangement from
himself and the essential unity of dynamics and form. The same
criticism must be applied to interpretations of human nature which
deprive him of the dynamics in his being by reducing his true being
to a system of logical, moral, and aesthetic forms to which he must
conform. Common-sense philosophies, as well as some rationalistic
and idealistic doctrines of man, eliminate the dynamics in man’s self-
realization. Creativity is replaced by subjection to law - a
characteristic of man in estrangement.138
In this context, Freud’s view of libido and Nietzsche’s view of will to
power can be seen to emphasize dynamics as vitality, but they describe man in
the state of existential estrangement and do not express man’s essential nature.
In another context, Tillich criticizes vitalistic philosophy in general for having
as its goal power without meaning (in the German text  “eine Mächtigkeit
ohne Form”).  Peeck uses expressions like “blind” or “aimless” to describe139
Tillich’s thought of libido in the state of estrangement;  its opposite is140
essential vitality which is orientated towards meaning and aim.  If ’libido’141
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 ST II, 64. Roberts 1952, 127 compares  Tillich with Freud: "Similarly, when the unity142
of vitality and intentionality is broken, the former becomes lawless desire and the latter
becomes a legalistic strait jacket. Where Tillich says that sin is simultaneously lawless
desire and bondage to the law, Freud speaks of conflict between the id and the superego.”
 See Ford 1975, 37 who quotes Tillich’s comment which is published in Sydney and143
Beatrice Rome (eds.), Philosphical Interrogations (1964), 358.
and ’will to power’ give too much weight to the dynamic side of the polarity,
some common-sense philosophies, rationalistic and idealistic views of man try
to eliminate dynamics from man’s self-realization. In that case creativity is
replaced by submission to law, which is also typical to man in the state of
estrangement. Both sides of the polarity are needed in the essential description
of man.
Experiences which originate from the tension of dynamics and form are a
part of man’s social life, religion, and culture. Law and chaos struggle with
each other in the same way as vitality and form. However, dynamics and form
need each other: without form dynamics, vitality, and form-breaking lead to
chaos and emptiness; without dynamics form, structure, and law lead to
rigidity and emptiness. Both disappear if they are separated from each other.
In Tillich’s own words:
There is a continuous flight from law to chaos and from chaos to law.
There is a continuous breaking of vitality by form and of form by
vitality. But, if the one side disappears, the other does also.
Dynamics, vitality, and the drive to form-breaking end in chaos and
emptiness. They lose themselves in their separation from form. And
form, structure, and law end in rigidity and emptiness. They lose
themselves in their separation from dynamics. 142
Tillich uses here quite loosely as parallel concepts, on one hand, dynamics,
vitality and chaos, and on the other hand, form, structure and law. This is
important to note, when we try to explain, not only the concepts of dynamics
and form, but also the idea Tillich expresses with them.
Dynamics and form are in unity and balance on the essential level but the
actualization of the polarity in existence is sometimes one-sided or
inappropriate to the situation. The emphasis on dynamics leads to chaos and
disorder, the emphasis on form leads to legalism and suppression of life. It is
not possible to describe life only with one side of the polarity; both are needed
and they complement each other. Here we can see that the elements of the
polarity “lie on the same level” and they are equally important. It is an
expression of Tillich’s thought that the  concept of complementary in physics
has had an effect on his doctrine of ontological polarities.  In this context,143
Tillich is not talking about dynamics and form as potentiality and actuality in
the classical sense but as two complementary elements that are both necessary
to describe actual life.
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 ST II, 21.144
 ST I, 178.145
 ST II, 64.146
 ST II, 64.147
 See See Morrison 1984, 59, 64. Randall 1952, 161 says that his doubts begin “when148
in the recent German fashion Tillich is inclined to leave ultimate matters to a final
’dialectic’”. 
The analysis of being brings forward the difference between potentiality
and actuality. In Tillich’s view, there are structures which have no existence,
and there are things that have existence because of structures:
Treehood does not exist, although it has being, namely, potential
being. But the tree in my back yard does exist. It stands out of the
mere potentiality of treehood. But it stands out and exists only
because it participates in that power of being which is treehood, that
power which makes every tree a tree and nothing else.144
In his ontological description of dynamics and form, Tillich uses the
example of the tree to explain form: “The form of a tree is what makes it a
tree, what gives it the general character of treehood as well as the special and
unique form of an individual tree.”  This is the classical view of form.145
Treehood does not exist but it has potential being. Treehood  is called ’the
power of being’.
Tillich says that ”every living being (and, in terms of analogy, every being)
drives beyond itself and beyond the given form through which it has being”.146
This indicates the idea of self-creativity or self-transcendence and the modern
view of dynamics and form. How is it possible to unite the idea that every
living being drives beyond itself and beyond the given form to the idea that
form is the essence of a thing and everything happens within the form? Tillich
says that “there are forms of the self-transcendence of form”:
In man’s essential nature, dynamics and form are united. Even if a
given form is transcended, this happens in terms of form. In essential
being there are forms of the self-transcendence of form. Their unity
with the dynamics of being is never disrupted.147
This is the way Tillich tries to unite the classical view and the modern view
of dynamics and form: even if the form is transcended, the form actualizes its
essence under the conditions of existence. There are forms of the self-
transcendence of form. If we are willing to accept Tillich’s system as
coherent, we will have to accept this kind of dialectical thinking.148
In this discussion, Tillich has moved from the ontological necessity of
dynamics and form to the idea of essential balance and existential disruption
of the polarity of dynamics and form. What is the right balance between the
elements and are we able to get any knowledge of it? This question takes us to
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 ”New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap149
between essence and existence.” ”The term ’New Being,’ as used here, points directly to
the cleavage between essential and existential being - and is the restorative principle of the
whole of this theological system.” ST II, 118-119. About the New Being, see e.g. Adam
Seigfried, Das Neue Sein: Der Zentralbegriff der "ontologischen" Theologie Paul Tillichs
in katholischer Sicht (1974).
 ”New Being... is new in two respects: it is new in contrast to the merely potential150
character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged character of
existential being. It is actual, conquering the estrangement of actual existence.” ST II, 118-
119.
 ”At this point it may be recalled that the term ’being,’ when applied to God as an151
initial statement about him, was interpreted as the ’power of being’ or, negatively
expressed, as the power to resist non-being. In an analogous way the term ’New Being,’
when applied to Jesus as the Christ, points to the power in him which conquers existential
estrangement or, negatively expressed, to the power of resisting the forces of
estrangement.” ST II, 125.
 ST I, 137. Gilkey 1990, 77 says about the symbol of “Jesus as the Christ”: “This final152
and decisive symbol, therefore, becomes the religious center, the ethical norm, as well as
the theological criterion, for all else: for the divine itself, for authentic humanity, for
church, for the religious substance of culture, for the process and goal of history...” Gilkey
1990, 153 concludes: “The picture of Jesus as the Christ in the New Testament is thus the
definitive picture of the New Being, the criterion or norm, as we have noted, of Christian
self-understanding, of religions generally, and expanded out into ecclesiology and
theonomy, of Tillich’s conceptions of church, of culture, and their interrelations.” See also
Gilkey 1990, 52, 139.
Tillich’s view of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Tillich says that the
gap between essence and existence has been conquered in the New Being in
Jesus as the Christ. New Being is essential being under the conditions of
existence. It is the restorative principle of his whole system and it can be used
in dealing with the essential nature and existential estrangement of life.  The149
New Being is new compared both to the potential nature of essential being
and the existential estrangement;  the New Being applied to Jesus Christ150
expresses power to conquer existential estrangement and power to resist
estrangement.151
Jesus as the Christ is the final revelation and universally valid, it includes
the criterion of every revelation which precedes or follows: 
It is the criterion of every religion and every culture, not only of the
culture and religion in and through which it has appeared. It is valid
for the social existence of every human group and for the personal
existence of every human individual. It is valid for mankind as such,
and, in an indescribable way, it has meaning for the universe also.152
The mystery of the divine is the presupposition of all theology, but it does
not exclude the logos of theos which must be expressed in reflective,
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 ST II, 92.153
 ST II, 95.154
 ST II, 111.155
 ST II, 98.156
 Clayton 1980, 232-233 says that Tillich has a tendency to treat esthetically or157
symbolically the biblical picture of Jesus: German expressionism had an influence upon
young Tillich, and “it should have come as no surprise to learn that he explicitly identified
the biblical picture of Jesus as an expressionistic portrait”. Clayton says that Tillich has
been influenced by his former professor Martin Kähler and his idea of analogia imaginis:
the biblical picture of Jesus is not just an idealized composite portrait of the highest hopes
of man, but in it we encounter the historical Christ within a tradition which possesses the
power to convince us of its divine authenticity. For more detail about the similarities and
differences of Tillich’s and Kähler’s views see Clayton 1980, 232-233. Clayton 1980, 234
says that, in Tillich’s view, the concrete material of the biblical picture is not guaranteed
by faith but the expression of the power of the New Being is guaranteed. And here is a
similarity to Tillich’s view of the religious meaning of art: it is not the content or subject
matter of a piece of art which makes it a medium of religious meaning; it is the power
(Gehalt) which comes through that gives it the religious meaning. It is not the historical
Jesus which is the foundation of the Christian faith but it is the symbol of Jesus as the
Christ. Clayton points to the characterization of Tillich’s view as the verbal icon. Clayton
1980, 233 gives an interpretation of the New Being with the help of  the concepts of Form,
Inhalt, and Gehalt.  He thinks that aspects of Tillich’s interpretation of the biblical picture
become more intelligible when seen in relation to the esthetic model: “... ’a personal life’
may be regarded as the form of the biblical picture; ’Jesus of Nazareth’ and specific
information about his life and teaching, that is, biographical material, supply its content in
the sense of Inhalt; and ’the power of New Being’ must I think be understood as the
portrait’s Gehalt. Those individuals who have been grasped by this power in and through
the biblical picture can certify the experience of the powerful Gehalt of new being,
although they cannot certify the objective factuality of the specific content of the picture...”
dialectical, and paradoxical terms.  The idea “Logos became flesh” means153
that God is manifest in a personal life-process as a saving participant in the
human predicament.  “The Logos” became the main tool for the154
Christological work of the church, and it can be called a conceptual symbol.
It unites rational structure and creative power.  Again, Tillich attaches155
himself to the traditional understanding of logos which is based on a positive
and active view of form.
It is crucial for Tillich that the New Being has appeared in a personal life:
“Only if the existence is conquered in one point - a personal life, representing
existence as a whole - it is conquered in principle...”  However, the search156
for the historical Jesus in order to discover a minimum of reliable facts to
provide a safe foundation for the Christian faith is a failure;  Christianity is157
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 ST II, 105.158
 Clayton 1980, 234 is critical towards Tillich: “... it is not sufficient to say that one can159
be certain that the power of new being became actualized in a ’personal life’ and then
express indifference as to whether his name was ’Jesus of Nazareth’. For, if one cannot
specify with some certainty the particular person in whom existential estrangement is
alleged to have been conquered, what warrant is there for the claim that it has been
conquered in an individual person?” Gilkey 1990, 150 says that both sides of the
revelatory event are important for Tillich’s Christology: the objective event and the
responding witness. It is important to emphasize this, because “Tillich has frequently been
interpreted as regarding that actual life as irrelevant to faith, as not only unknowable by us
but even more as unimportant in comparison with the picture of the New Being in the
Gospel records, a picture clearly created by the responding witness of the believing
community”. Gilkey thinks that the problem has been caused by Tillich’s novel view of the
roles of historical inquiry and faith in relation to this actual and personal existence. For
more detail see Gilkey 1990, 150-153. Both of these views find support in Tillich’s
thinking. The idea of the powerful Gehalt in the New Being has its roots in Tillich’s
theology of culture, the idea of the New Being actually conquering the existential
estrangement in the life of Jesus of Nazareth  is based on Tillich’s ontological ideas and
their development in the analysis of existence.
 Gilkey 1990, 149 emphasizes the actuality of the New Being in a historical person:160
“As the implications of our remarks to date indicate, the actuality of the historical person
(“Jesus”) is crucial to Tillich. To deny that actuality, to deny that essential humanity
entered existence and submitted to its conditions ... is to deny Tillich’s whole point, the
crux of the Gospel message. If this paradox is not real, if no essential humanity actually
entered existence, then nothing ultimately significant or new has happened, the New Being
remains merely a hope, religion merely a quest - and there is no message, no faith, and no
hope (ST II: 98).”
 ST II, 120.161
 See ST II, 125-126.162
based on the witness to the messianic character of Jesus.  This has evoked158
different interpretations of Tillich’s thinking.159
Tillich says that the New Being has become real in a personal life, and it
could not have happened otherwise:  the polarities of being become manifest160
only in a person. Only a person is totally individualized and only a person can
participate without limits. Only a person has unlimited power to self-
transcendence and full rational structure. And only a person has freedom and
destiny.  Tillich says that there are no traits of existential estrangement in161
Jesus, no hubris nor concupiscence, no separation from God,  but the polar162
elements do not get much attention. 
The ontological  polarities are the foundation and presupposition for the
manifestation of the New Being in a personal life, but Tillich does not explain
in detail, how the separation of the polarities from each other and the threat of
their disruption have been overcome in Jesus’ life. Tillich’s idea of the New
Being is based on his description of being with its polarities. When Tillich
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 See ST I, 180. Williams 1985, 170 says that the polar dialectic of vitality and form163
was restored in Jesus’ life. He is not referring directly to Tillich but his views have been
influenced by Tillich’s thinking. For more detail about the polarity of vitality and form in
Jesus see Williams 1985, 170-176, 190-199.
 ST II, 129.164
 ”The difference between the natural self-transcendence, which includes the desire for165
reunion with everything, and the distorted concupiscence, which does not want reunion
with anything but the exploitation of everything through power and pleasure, is one which
is decisive for the evaluation of desire in the state of temptation. Without desire, there is
no temptation, but the temptation is that desire will become changed into concupiscence.”
ST II, 128.
 See ST II, 64.166
deals with existential estrangement, he describes the disruption of the
polarities. This creates an expectation that he would talk about the New Being
as a reunion and new balance of the polar elements, but this idea is not under
consideration. Neither does he use the concepts of vitality and intentionality
which he has claimed to express the polarity of dynamics and form in man.163
However, if we follow the development of Tillich’s system from the
ontological starting-points, it is easy to be convinced that the existential
estrangement has been conquered by the actuality of the New Being under the
conditions of existence.
The polarity of dynamics and form is briefly under consideration when
Tillich talks about Christ’s temptations:
Positively expressed, this means that life in unity with God, like all
life, is determined by the polarity of dynamics and form and, as such,
is never without the risk implied in the tensions between dynamics
and form. The unity with God is not the negation of the desire for
reunion of the finite with the finite. But where there is unity with
God, there the finite is not desired alongside this unity but within it.
The temptation which is rooted in desire is that the finite is desired
alongside God or that desire becomes concupiscence.164
Tillich makes a difference between natural self-transcendence and
concupiscence: the former wants reunion with everything while the corrupt
concupiscence does not want reunion, but the exploitation of everything.
Temptation tries to turn desire into concupiscence. If Jesus had accepted that,
it would have meant the loss of his messianic nature.  Earlier, Tillich used165
the polarity of dynamics and form to explain concupiscence,  and so it166
becomes indirectly clear that the balance of dynamics and form was not
distorted in Jesus’ life in this respect.
Tillich asks how desire is possible at all, if unity with God is unbroken. The
answer is that under the conditions of existence temptation can rise from
desire to finite fulfilment. Desire and contact with God are not contradictory
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 ” If, however, man in essential unity with God (Adam) and man in actual unity with167
God under the conditions of existence (the Christ) are tempted on their desire for finite
fulfilment, then desire and unity with God cannot contradict each other (this would include
the statement that eros and agape cannot contradict each other).” ST II, 129.
 ”Obviously, the characteristics of the New Being are the opposite of those of168
estrangement, namely, faith instead of unbelief, surrender instead of hubris, love instead
of concupiscence.” ST II, 177.
in themselves.  Tillich explains this by saying that life in unity with God, in167
the same way as all life, is determined by the polarity of dynamics and form.
In that case, it cannot be without the risk, which is implied in the tension of
dynamics and form. Temptation is based on wanting finite things besides God
and not in unity with God; the desire can become concupiscence. Tillich
describes the features of the New Being as opposite to estrangement: there is
faith instead of unbelief, surrender instead of hubris and love instead of
concupiscence.168
We can see features of both the classical view and the modern view of
dynamics and form in Tillich’s description of the New Being in Jesus as the
Christ. In spite of their differences, there is one common feature in this
context: the emphasis on the unity and balance of dynamics and form. The
first two volumes of Systematic Theology share this idea.
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 ST III, 50.1
 Hartshorne 1952,166 emphazises Tillich’s similarity to process theology:  "I therefore2
(joyfully) acclaim him as one of the rapidly growing company of 'dipolar' theists or
'panentheists' to which some of us are proud to belong." "...in short, by what Tillich calls
the divine Life, which on the dipolar view is Process-itself, the definitive process." (188)
For more about Hartshorne’s view, see John P. Mahoney, Charles Hartshorne's Dipolar
Concept of God (1974). King 1955, 252 says that  "Wieman and Tillich have much more
in common than is ordinarily supposed”.
 ST III, 5. Dourley 1995, 139-140 compares the views of Tillich and Teilhard de3
Chardin in the following way: "...Tillich speaks with critical admiration of the work of
Teilhard de Chardin... Briefly put, Teilhard came to identify the very energy that worked
through evolution in the creation of the human brain and so of humanity and which now
works through humanity toward a final completion of deity in the Pleroma with the reality
of Christ taken in an extended or cosmic sense. Tillich drew back from the optimism and
progressivism he saw in Teilhard... No doubt Teilhard's identification of the underlying
energy empowering evolutionary creation as Christic is itself an imperial imposition on
universal natural energies. But such an extended vision would breed a sense of God active
in all cohesive or organic life and community, and make the various religions relative but
valuable servants of a universal energy working toward a hopefully emerging theonomous
human communion." See also Weigel 1964, 17: "The final chapter of his The Courage To
Be can have a depressing effect, for it seems to equate God with the basic energy at work
in the universe, but interpreted in terms of human concern."
3. SELF-CREATION: DYNAMICS BREAKS
THROUGH THE FORM
3.1. The self-creativity of life
In the third volume of the system, Tillich starts to deal with the processes of
life. When he explains the self-creativity of life, the emphasis is on the
modern view of dynamics and form: “Self-creation of life is always creation
of form... Every new form is made possible only by breaking through the
limits of an old form.”  His view of the self-creation of life resembles the1
ideas of process philosophy and the philosophy of life.  In the preface of the2
third volume of Systematic Theology Tillich gives a positive estimation of the
views of Teilhard de Chardin concerning the process of evolution. However,
he notes that he cannot share his optimistic view of the future. 3
Tillich defines life in the ontological sense as the actuality of being; in the
life process, potential becomes actual: “Potentiality is that kind of being which
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 ST III, 12.4
 ”This generic concept of life is the pattern after which the ontological concept of life5
has been formed. The observation of a particular potentiality of beings, whether it is that
of a species or of individuals actualizing themselves in time and space, has led to the
ontological concept of life-life as the ’actuality of being.’ This concept of life unites the
two main qualifications of being which underlie this whole system; these main
qualifications of being are the essential and the existential.... We use the word ’life’ in this
sense of a ’mixture’ of essential and existential elements.” ST III, 11-12. Cruz 1995,118-
124 thinks that Tillich’s ontological view of life is relevant also to modern science.
 ”The ontological concept of life and its universal application require two kinds of6
consideration, one of which we should call ’essentialist’ and the other ’existentialist’. The
first deals with the unity and diversity of life in its essential nature. It describes what I
venture to call ’the multidimensional unity of life’.  Only if this unity and the relation of
the dimensions and realms of life are understood, can we analyze the existential
ambiguities of all life processes correctly and express the quest for unambiguous or eternal
life adequately.” ST III, 12.
 Thatcher 1978, 154 says that Tillich has two concepts of existence in Systematic7
Theology: “In one, existence is actuality, the realm which has fallen from essence, the
realm of estrangement into which the Christ comes, and overcomes. In the other, existence
is non-actual, and only contributes to life. As Tillich says ’existential characteristics are
abstractions’. In this second concept, existence is only a contributory element to the one
concrete actuality, ’life’.” Thatcher thinks that the problem is a serious one: “The student
of Tillich is free to choose which concept of existence he prefers, but he cannot have them
both.” See Thatcher 1978, 156. Thatcher 1978, 156 says that “unfortunately Tillich’s
Christology can only make any sense if existence is actuality.” Thatcher prefers the view
of existence as actual, and thus wants to save Tillich’s Christology. Thatcher argues that
the definition of life as a mixture of essential and existential elements is an example of
Hegelian dialectic: life is the synthesis, essence and existence the thesis and antithesis.
With this mould, Tillich has tried to combine two-term Platonic (essence-existence) and
Aristotelian (potentiality-actuality) contrasts into a three-term (essence-existence-life)
Hegelian mould. As a result, existence is sometimes actual, sometimes non-actual. For
more details see Thatcher 1978, 153-157. Thatcher’s solution to the problem is, however,
too simple: “... we can take the Platonic contrast, essence-existence, at its face value,
without bothering about the third term ’life’. Christology is saved, and the existential and
the actual world are one and the same. If we take this option, what has to be abandoned?
has the power, the dynamic, to become actual”.  When potential becomes4
actual, it means that it becomes under the conditions of existence. It involves
finity, estrangement, and conflict. This does not mean losing the essential
nature in itself but it involves the possibility of growth, decay and death. Life
is a mixture of essential and existential elements, it is ambiguous.   On the5
essential level life is one whole, which is called the multidimensional unity of
life. In life, the essential features are mixed with existential ambiguities. This
raises the quest for unambiguous life.  Thatcher thinks that there are serious6
problems concerning the concepts of essence, existence, and life, but we
cannot deal with the questions in detail here.7
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Does the whole of Volume 3 have to be jettisoned? Again the answer is a simple one. All
that need be abandoned is the unnecessary dialectical mould which is largely responsible
for the present difficulty. What is at fault is the structure of the ST, its pattern of
development. The discussion in ST 3 about life has to be interpreted as a continuation of
the discussion about existence. Both existence and life are actual.” Thatcher 1978, 157.
Thatcher is looking at the problem from the point of view of Tillich’s ontology, and that
is why he does not see the problems that his suggestion would bring to Tillich’s theology
of culture, religion, and life.
 ”It can point to the fact that, even if certain dimensions of life do not appear, nontheless8
they are potentially real. The distinction of the potential from the actual implies that all
dimensions are always real, if not actually, at least potentially. A dimension’s actualization
is dependent on conditions which are not always present.” ST III, 15-16. In the question of
the organic species there are in Tillich’s view two opposing views: the Aristotelian view
emphazises the eternity of the species from the point of view of their dynamics or
potentiality, the evolutionary view emphasizes their manifestation from the point of view
of energeia or actuality. Tillich thinks that seen this way they do not have to be in conflict.
See ST III, 20.
 ST II, 22.9
Not all the dimensions of life are always actual but, nevertheless, they are
potentially real. In the life process, suitable conditions make possible the
actualization of what has always been potentially real. Tillich connects this,
for example, to the analysis of inorganic, organic and spiritual life. Life is a
multidimensional unity.  This kind of view of life designates potential as8
something inside the process of life: it is the dynamic vitality of life and thus
something immanent. The view is different compared to the view of life as
fallen or estranged from the essential in the Platonic sense. Thus, there is a
crossing of horizontal and vertical lines in Tillich’s thinking.
This problem can be seen in the account of potentiality and actuality. In the
second volume of the system, Tillich explains Plato’s account: “...man’s
existence, his standing out of potentiality, is judged as a fall from what he
essentially is. The potential is the essential, and to exist, i.e. to stand out of
potentiality, is the loss of true essentiality”.  He also says that Aristotle tried9
“to close the gap between essence and existence through his doctrine of
dynamic interdependence of form and matter in everything” but that his
protest could not succeed. In the second volume, Tillich uses the Platonic
distinction of essence and existence.
However, in the third volume, Tillich refers to Aristotle’s views:
In terms of the history of philosophy we can say that we envisage the
Aristotelian distinction between dynamis and energeia, between
potentiality and actuality, from an existentialist viewpoint. Certainly
this is not too different from Aristotle’s own view, which emphasizes
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 ST III, 12.10
 Thatcher 1978, 114 says that it is possible to see both Platonic and Aristotelian11
thoughts at work in Tillich’s thinking, but it is difficult to harmonize these two accounts.
Existence is falling from essence in the Platonic account and emerging out of potentiality
in the Aristotelian account. In the Platonic account, me on is the negative principle which
limits and conditions the eternal forms; in the Aristotelian account, me on is the created
potentiality and the source of existence. Tillich is trying to put these together, but they are
in tension with each other.
 Bayer 1994, 214-215 examines Tillich’s view in relation to Aristotle: "Tillich fasst12
seinen Begriff des Lebens als 'Bewegung' und bedient sich dabei des aristotelischen
Schemas von Potenz und Akt (dynamis und energeia). Was der Möglichkeit nach, was nur
Materie (hyle) ist, drängt zur Verwirklichung, in die Wirklichkeit; dies geschieht kraft der
Form (eidos). Im Blick auf das geschöpfliche Sein verknüpft nun Tillich die Möglichkeit
mit der Essenz und die Wirklichkeit mit der Existenz. Die geschaffene Essenz verwirklicht
sich erst in der Existenz, die als solche aber schon von der wahren Essenz entfremdet ist
(ST II, 51f.). Dies steht freilich in Spannung zu Aristoteles, für den die Wirklichkeit den
ontologischen Vorrang von der Möglichkeit hat. ... Das Wort 'Essenz' gebraucht Tillich
äquivok. Wendet er es auf Gott als das 'Sein-Selbst jenseits der Unterscheidung von
Essenz und Existenz' (ST I, 239) an, dann fände solche 'Essenz' bei Aristoteles ihre
Entsprechung im actus purus. Wendet er es auf das geschaffene Sein an, meint es nur
dynamis, nur potentia; die 'Schöpfung ist gut, aber sie ist reine Potentialität' (ST II, 52).
Die Aktualisierung geschieht erst mit der Entfremdung; die Sünde macht das Mögliche
erst wirklich. 'Verwirklichte Schöpfung und entfremdete Existenz sind materialiter
identisch.' (ST II, 52)"
 Ferrell says that in Tillich’s view the general form (e.g. treehood)  is potential being13
and as such it is a power of being; dynamics is also the potentiality of being, which as
sheer potentiality has no form, but which, in contrast to pure nonbeing, is the power of
being. “It is not at all clear, then, just how form in the sense of general form is to be
distinguished from dynamics if both are defined as the potentiality of being and the power
of being... it should be clear that Tillich's attempt to work out the distinction between
potential and actual being in terms of the dynamics-form polarity calls for further analysis
and clarification.” Ferrell 1992, 44.
the lasting ontological tension between matter and form in all
existence.  10
There is no explanation about the “existentialist viewpoint” in this
connection, but usually “existentialist” has a strong connotation of
estrangement and falling from essence in Tillich’s thinking.  We can ask does11
the actual correspond fully to the potential as it does in Aristotle’s thinking -
or does the “existentialist viewpoint” mean that there is “a fall” between the
potential and the actual. In that case the view is something very different
compared to Aristotle.  Tillich does not relate the concepts of dynamis and12
energeia or potentiality and actuality to the polarity of dynamics and form.
Ferrell raises questions regarding Tillich’s use of the concept of potentiality to
designate both dynamics and form.13
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 ST III, 30-32.14
 ST III, 31-32.15
 ST III, 50.16
 For more about the role of dynamics and form in the process of growth, see also17
Rolinck 1976, 150.
 ST III, 50.18
The classical view and the modern view of dynamics and form lead to
different accounts of potentiality and actuality: in the classical view, the form
element is active and gives shape to the deformed; the potential corresponds
fully to the actual and the actualization happens within the form. In the
modern view, dynamics as vitality is the active element; it breaks through the
static form and creates new forms. Because Tillich uses both of the views, he
can call either one of the elements the power of being or the potentiality of
being according to the situation. 
In any case, we have to ask, what does the essential unity and balance of
dynamics and form mean to potentiality and actuality and what does the fall
or the idea that dynamics and form are against each other mean to potentiality
and actuality: at what stage of the process does “the fall” happen? If we think
that there is a right essential way to actualize the potential, we need form
which makes a thing what it is: we are back in the classical view. In the
classical view, the actualization is distorted if it does not happen within the
form - in the modern view it is normal to break through the form. There is a
tension between the two views.
The actualization of the potential in life process is the movement  out of the
center and back again; the life process goes on through identity, change and
coming back.  There are three basic functions of life: self-integration, self-14
creation, and self-transcendence.  They are dependent on the three basic15
polarities of being. The polarity of dynamics and form is the basis of self-
creation:
The second polarity in the structure of being is that of dynamics and
form. It is effective in the function of life which we have called self-
creativity, and it is effective in the principle of growth.16
The polarity of dynamics and form is connected to the self-creation of life
and to the principle of growth. It is possible to examine them from the point of
view of dynamics and form.17
Tillich defines the role of dynamics in the following way:
Growth is dependent on the polar element of dynamics in so far as
growth is the process by which a formed reality goes beyond itself to
another form which both preserves and transforms the original
reality.18
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 ”This process is the way in which life creates itself. It does not create itself in terms of19
original creation. It is given to itself by the divine creativity which transcends and
underlies all processes of life. But on this basis, life creates itself through the dynamics of
growth.” ST III, 50.
 See ST III, 50.20
 ST III, 50.21
 Annala 1985, 80 n. 61 maintains that Tillich understands form in two ways: according22
to the classical Greek philosophy, in which case form is the same as essence, and as an
artistic form.
Here, dynamics is clearly understood in the modern sense as the vitality of
life which breaks through the old form to a new one. However, Tillich wants
to unite self-integration and self-creativity: the new form both preserves and
transforms the original reality. Life creates itself by growth. It is not the
original creation, which as the divine creativity is the basis of all life
processes. From this given basis, life creates itself, and this happens through
the dynamics of growth.  According to Tillich, growth is emphasized by the19
pragmatistic philosophers who reject all unconditional norms, and process
philosophers who emphasize becoming more than being.  20
Tillich emphasizes also the meaning of form in growth:
But dynamics is held in a polar interdependence with form. Self-
creation of life is always creation of form. Nothing that grows is
without form. The form makes a thing what it is: a poem or a
building or a law, and so on. However, a continuous series of forms
alone is not growth. Another element, coming from the pole of
dynamics, makes itself felt. Every new form is made possible only by
breaking through the limits of an old form.21
Again, there are features of the classical view and the modern view: the
form makes a thing what it is (the classical view), but self creation of life is
always creation of form and breaking through the old form (the modern view).
In the modern view, form is a static concept; in the classical view, it is the
active form-giving element what makes a thing what it is. Form is important
for growth: self-creation of life is creation of form. The concept of form has
a wide meaning in the quotation; form becomes manifest also in the artistic
form.22
Tillich has wanted to maintain the meaning of form: even if the form is
transcended, the self-transcendence takes place within a form. In this context,
Tillich goes one step further from the classical view: he says that there is a
“moment of chaos” between the old and the new form:
In other words, there is a moment of ’chaos’ between the old and the
new form, a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-form. This chaos
is never absolute; it cannot be absolute because, according to the
structure of the ontological polarities, being implies form. Even
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 ST III, 50-51.23
 See ST III, 51.24
 ”The chaotic element which appears here is already manifest in the creation myths,25
even in the creation stories of the Old Testament. Creation and chaos belong to each other,
and even the exclusive monotheism of biblical religion confirms this structure of life. It is
echoed in the symbolic descriptions of the divine life, of its abysmal depth, of its character
as burning fire, of its suffering over and with the creatures, of its destructive wrath. But in
the divine life the element of chaos does not endanger its eternal fulfilment, whereas in the
life of the creature, under the conditions of estrangement, it leads to the ambiguity of self-
creativity and destructiveness.” ST III, 51.
 ST III, 51.26
relative chaos has a relative form. But relative chaos with relative
form is transitional, and as such it is a danger to the self-creative
function of life. At this crisis life may fall back to its starting point
and resist creation, or it may destroy itself in the attempt to reach a
new form.  23
Tillich calls this chaos relative, but anyway there is a moment of not-
having-form which means that form has been suppressed by dynamics, even
if in a relative way. This is something that the classical view could not accept.
We could think that it is a symptom of estrangement but Tillich does not say
that. A relative chaos can resist creation or destroy life. An example of this
crisis is the birth of a human being or a new species or the development of a
new artistic style.24
The “moment of chaos” between the old and new form leads Tillich to
argue that creation and chaos belong together. The element of chaos appears
in the Old Testament and other creation myths. It is reflected in the idea of
divine depth or the anger of God, and also in the picture of God as the burning
fire. In God, the element of chaos does not endanger eternal fulfilment. In the
created world, under the conditions of existence, the element of chaos leads to
the ambiguity of self-creation and destruction.  Destruction is defined as25
follows: ”Destruction can then be described as the prevalence of the elements
of chaos over against the pole of form in the dynamics of life.”  In this26
definition, form has a positive value, and chaos leads to destruction. One
could relate the definition to the polarity of dynamics and form in the
following way: chaos is a state where dynamics is prevalent in such a way that
form cannot give meaningful structure to growth or the creation process. This
leads to destruction.
In the life process the powers of creation and the powers of destruction are
united in such a way that it is impossible to separate them unambiguously.
Mere negativity does not have being, and that is why there is no pure
destruction in any life process. It is also impossible to say with certainty,
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 ”But there is no pure destruction in any life process. The merely negative has no being.27
In every process of life structures of creation are mixed with powers of destruction in such
a way that they cannot be unambiguously separated. And in the actual processes of life,
one never can establish with certainty which process is dominated by one or the other of
these forces.” ST III, 51.
 ”Self-integration constitutes the individual being in its centeredness; self-creation28
gives the dynamic impulse which drives life from one centered state to another under the
principle of growth. Centeredness does not imply growth, but growth does presuppose
coming from and going to a state of centeredness. Likewise, disintegration is possibly, but
not necessarily, destruction. Disintegration takes place within a centered unity; destruction
can occur only in the encounter of centered unity with centered unity. Disintegration is
represented by disease, destruction by death.” ST III, 51.
 ST III, 51-53.29
 ST III, 54.30
 ”The three functions of life unite elements of self-identity with elements of self31
alteration. But this unity is threatened by existential estrangement, which drives life in one
or the other direction, thus disrupting the unity. To the degree in which this disruption is
real, self-integration is countered by disintegration, self-creation is countered by
destruction, self-transcendence is countered by profanization. Every life process has the
whether the creative or destructive forces are prevailing.  Tillich rejects the27
thought that integration could always be connected with creation and
disintegration with destruction; there are different ontological polarities
behind integration and creation: self-integration creates an individual being,
which has a center, and self-creation gives an impulse, which causes a change
from one state to another. Merely having a center is not growth and
disintegration does not necessarily lead to destruction. In Tillich’s view,
disease represents disintegration and death represents destruction.28
According to Tillich, growth is a common function of life, though it is
directly united with the organic dimension of life. It has to be applied
symbolically to other dimensions. The concepts of self-creation and
destruction as well as growth and decay are in their own area when they are
used to describe organic life. In every process of growth, the conditions of life
are at the same time conditions of death: the moment of birth is not just the
beginning of life but also the beginning of death.  One of the basic features of29
life is struggle. Life reaches a preliminary balance by the survival of the
strongest, but the balance is threatened by the dynamics of being and growth
in life. It is possible to maintain the balance only in such a way that nature
wastes seeds of generative power and individuals.30
The different elements of life process - identity, change and coming back -
are inseparably connected. Under the conditions of existence, the unity of the
process is in danger of breaking up. In this case, self-integration turns into
disintegration, self-creation into destruction and self-transcendence into
profanization.  The forces of disintegration resist the process of integration:31
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ambiguity that the positive and the negative elements are mixed in such a way that a
definite separation of the negative from the positive is impossible: life at every moment is
ambiguous.” ST III, 32.
 ”The ambiguities of self-integration and disintegration are effective in these processes,32
and they are effective simultaneously in the same process. Integrating and disintegrating
forces are struggling in every situation, and every situation is a compromise between these
forces. This gives a dynamic character to the inorganic realm, which cannot be described
in exclusively quantitative terms.” ST III, 34.
 ”Conscious of these limitations, one may say that the structure of health and disease,33
of successful or unsuccessful self-integration in the psychological sphere, is dependent on
the working of the same factors which work in the preceding dimensions: the forces
driving toward self-identity and those driving toward self-alteration. The psychological
self can be disrupted by its inability to assimilate (i.e., to take into the centered unity an
extensively or intensively overpowering number of impressions), or by its inability to
resist the destructive impact of impressions drawing the self in too many or too
contradictory directions...” ST III, 37.
 ST I, 181.34
 ST III, 54.35
 ST III, 51.36
 ST I, 181.37
every state is a compromise between these forces. This gives a dynamic
character to the inorganic realm.  However, Tillich does not explain these32
forces in more detail. Also, from the psychological point of view, successful
or unsuccessful integration is dependent on forces which lead either towards
self-identity or towards self-alteration. A disruption can occur, if the
psychological self cannot assimilate the new influences into the centered
unity, or if it is not able to resist the impacts drawing it to contradictory
directions.33
We have seen that Tillich sometimes combines self-creation and self-
transcendence, e.g. by saying that “the dynamic character of being implies the
tendency of everything to transcend itself and to create new forms”.  The34
ideas of self-creation and self-transcendence blend with each other once
again: “The individual life process transcends itself in two directions, by labor
and by propagation in the self creation of life”.  Tillich uses to some extent35
crosswise the concepts of self-creativity and self-transcendence. On one hand,
he says that “self-creation gives the dynamic impulse which drives life from
one centered state to another under the principle of growth”.  On the other36
hand, he says that “the growth of the individual is the most obvious example
of self-transcendence based on self-conservation”.  37
Self-transcendence is the main category when Tillich deals with life and the
Spirit but the ideas of self-creation and self-transcendence blend in Tillich’s
view of culture. In principal, self-creation transcends the form in the
horizontal direction and self-transcendence transcends the form in the vertical
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 ST III, 50.38
 Religionsphilosophie (1925), 809 (MW 4, 150): “Göttliches und Profanes stehen39
gemeinsam dem Dämonischen gegenüber. Sie bejahen gemeinsam die Form im Gegensatz
zum Dämonischen, das die Form zerbricht.”
 ST III, 57.40
 ST III, 64-65.41
direction but what is the difference between the two? If the dynamic side of
the polarity causes transcendence in self-creation, what causes transcendence
in self-transcendence? In other words, what is the difference between the
Spirit and the dynamic vitality of life? We shall return to the question.
The beginning of Tillich’s system has implied the self-integration of life. It
means that there is an essential unity and balance between dynamics and form.
Under the conditions of existence they can be separated and fall in conflict
with each other. Following this idea, the essential actualization obviously
maintains the unity and balance of dynamics and form. However, in the self-
creation of life there is “a moment of ’chaos’ between the old and new form,
a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-form”.  In the light of self-38
integration, this sounds as a distortion of the unity and balance of dynamics
and form. The moment of chaos includes another problem: in another context,
Tillich says that breaking the form is the symptom of the demonic;  it is not39
always easy to see the difference between breaking the form and breaking
through the form.
Tillich’s description of the self-creation of life shows a change of emphasis
compared to the self-integration of life in the beginning of the system: the
classical view of dynamics and form is in the background and Tillich is
moving toward the modern view of dynamics and form. In other words,
Tillich’s thinking is moving to a more dynamic direction.
3.2. Self-creation under the dimension of spirit: culture
Tillich’s view about the self-creativity of life leads to the notion that, in the
sphere of man’s spirit, the self-creation of life creates culture.  Tillich defines40
culture as taking care of, keeping something alive and growing. Man
cultivates or makes culture of everything. The self-creation of life acts in
many ways in the cultural sphere, and esthetic and cognitive functions are
present in everyday life.  The individual is the bearer of cultural self-creation41
and shares  the tensions of culture. A culturally creative person is one who
takes part in the creation and destruction of culture, but everybody is creative
to some degree, just because they are living in a culture and talk and use
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 ”Man produces tools as tools, and for this the conception of universals is presupposed,44
i.e., the power of language. The power of tools is dependent on the power of language.
Logos precedes everything. If man is called homo faber, he is implicitly called anthropos
logikos, i.e., man who is determined by the logos and who is able to use the meaningful
word.” ST III, 61.
 ”Nothing divine is irrational - if irrational means contradicting reason - for reason is45
the finite manifestation of the divine Logos.” ST III, 284.
 ST III, 63. Tillich corrects the definition of reason which he has given in the part46
dealing with reason and revelation, see ST I, 77-78.
 ST III, 119.47
tools.  Also the content of morality is the product of the cultural self-creation42
of life.
The cultural self-creation of life becomes manifest in the duality of theoria
and praxis which is based on the polarity of individualization and
participation:  theoria means receiving something and praxis means changing
something. Consequently, the basic functions of culture are language and
technical acts.  This leads to the notion that language and making tools43
belong together: the ability to free oneself from the limits of the environment
and to use concepts is the presupposition for the ability to make tools. 
Tillich says that logos is before everything else: the expression homo faber
includes implicitly the expression anthropos logikos.  Man’s reason is a finite44
manifestation of the divine Logos.  The concept of logos brings forward the45
meaning of form in the classical sense, and Tillich maintains that form is
necessary in the self-creation of life. Man receives parts of reality in esthetic
images and cognitive concepts. These are structural wholes. The structure of
reason is “the static element in the self-creation of life under the dimension of
spirit.” Reason is the structure of both mind and world, but it is only one
element  “in the dynamics of life and the functions of spirit.”  Thus, the46
dynamic side is also important. The artist’s work is his dynamic vision of the
world; Tillich speaks even of the “productive enthusiasm of cultural
dynamics”.47
Tillich does not relate these ideas to the polarity of dynamics and form, but
it is possible to see dynamics as the moving power that is needed to create
anything in culture, and form as the structure element of culture and its
phenomena. Creation takes place according to the polarity of individualisation
and participation, so that man receives impulses from the  world and at the
same time changes it.
Labour and propagation are especially the means of the self-creation of life.
The curse laid on Adam and Eve in the story of the Fall powerfully expresses
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 ”However, this leads to a tension from which many conflicts of our contemporary52
culture arise: the perversion of the relation of means and ends by the unlimited character
of the technical possibilities. Means become ends simply because they are possible. But if
possibilities become purposes only because they are possibilities, the genuine meaning of
purpose is lost. Every possibility may be actualized. No resistance is forthcoming in the
name of an ultimate end... Such distortion may affect a whole culture in which the
production of means becomes the end beyond which there is no end. This problem,
instrinsic in technical culture, does not deny the significance ot technology but shows its
ambiguity.” ST III, 61-62.
 ST III, 84.53
 ST III, 68. Peeck 1991, 118-119 examines the twofoldness of creation and destruction54
from the point of view of pastoral councelling.
the ambiguity of labor as a form of the self-creation of life.  All life has to48
give up resting in itself and struggle. Labour prevents an individual from
losing his dynamics and becoming empty, and propagation is the most
obvious form of self-creation of live. At the same time, it brings into
fulfilment and annihilates the meaning of individuals that represent the
species.  A healthy life works according to the principle of self-creation. It49
fulfils something towards which the inner dynamics of life is directed; the
classical name for this is eros.50
All technical acts of all times are at the same time creative and destructive.
The technical possibility can become social and individual temptation, an end
in itself. Man can choose goals, which are not necessary but optional. It is a
depravity of culture, if means become ends just because they are possible.
Tillich has called this “the temptation of the new”.  The meaning is lost, and51
so is the resistance coming from  the ultimate end. This is a typical feature of
technical culture and shows the ambiguity of technology. Also, many
contemporary problems of culture arise from this tension.52
Culture creates the universe of meaning as the actuality of what is potential
in man. The ultimate aim of the cultural self-creation of life is that the
universe of meaning is the fulfilment of the universe of being. In other words,
culture manifests that which has been potentially present in being.  The53
actualization of the potentialities takes place in man. The ambiguity of culture
can be seen in the fact  that the cultural act both creates and destroys the
meaning.  For example words free us from the limits of the environment and54
give possibilities to express universal meanings. At the same time they
separate meaning from the reality to which they point. The main reason for the
cultural ambiguities is the difference between subject and object; the
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 ”In this way the Spirit conquers the double anxiety which logically (but not62
temporally) precedes the transition from essence to existence, the anxiety of not
actualizing one’s essential being and the anxiety of losing oneself within one’s self-
actualization. Where there is Spirit, the actual manifests the potential and the potential
determines the actual. In the Spiritual Presence, man’s essential being appears under the
conditions of existence, conquering the distortions of existence in the reality of the New
Being.” ST III, 269.
understanding of an object opens a gap between the object and the meaning.
The same problem is connected with other cultural phenomena, for example
perception and argumentation.   Only parts of the potentialities connected to55
a thing actualize themselves.56
The ambiguity of culture is obvious in education: authoritarian discipline
threatens the personality of a human being, and liberalism prevents him from
gaining any form.  Here we can see the idea that rigid form (authoritarian57
discipline) and chaos (no form at all) are equally bad alternatives. The
humanistic view of man has to be combined with the ambiguities of man and
culture.  If humanism absolutizes the self-creation of life and rejects self-58
transcendence, it has to be rejected. Only self-transcending humanism can
answer the questions of the meaning of culture and the aim of education.59
Tillich gives an analysis of a moral personality and makes a distinction
between self-identity and self-alteration in a person. We can see that the
question is analogical to the problem of self-integration and self-creativity.
The centered self can be lost in an empty self-identity or in a chaotic self-
alteration;  both have to be united. The question is, how many potentialities
man can actualize without losing his power to actualize anything seriously,
and how many potentialities man must actualize  in order to avoid the state of
mutilated humanity.  “The Spiritual Presence maintains the identity of the60
self without impoverishing the self, and it drives toward the alteration of the
self without disrupting it”.  The Spirit can overcome the double anxiety of61
not actualizing one’s essential nature or losing oneself in self-actualization.
Tillich says that “where there is Spirit, the actual manifests the potential and
the potential determines the actual”.  This resembles the classical view of62
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 ”Every moral act is a responsible act, a response to a valid command, but man can63
refuse to respond. If he refuses, he gives way to the forces of moral disintegration; he acts
against the spirit in the power of the spirit.” ST III, 39.
 ST III, 79.64
 See Love, Power, and Justice (1954), 54.65
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potential and actual. Man can give way to the forces of moral disintegration
and act against the spirit in the power of spirit.63
In this context, Tillich does dot mention the polarity of dynamics and form
very often. However, when he deals with the social groups, he exceptionally
uses this polarity:
According to the polarity of dynamics and form, a social group could
not have being without form. And the social group’s form is
determined by the understanding of justice effective in the group.64
The polarity of dynamics and form is used to claim that all social groups
must have a form which is determined by the understanding of justice in the
group. This can be explained by the fact that, e.g. in Love, Power, and Justice,
justice is defined as the form of being . However, Tillich does not say what65
kind of form this would be. We can see that he is using the polarity of
dynamics and form in the meaning of ontological necessity (everything must
have form) and the idea of justice determining in principle the form of the
group; however,  he is not saying what kind of form would be the right one in
practice.
These theoretical principles have to be applied according to the situation. In
many social problems, the question is trying to find an adequate form in the
changing situations.  Efforts to remove the structure of leadership as in66
anarchy are not successful because it creates chaos, which in turn promotes
dictatorship; it is not possible to win the ambiguities of life by creating a
vacuum.  Also legal form is ambiguous because it is supposed to create67
justice, but it creates both justice and injustice.68
We can see that, occasionally, Tillich uses the polarity of dynamics and
form to explain phenomena of actual life, as in the case of social groups. This
indicates that it is not possible to solve the many questions of dynamics and
form by thinking that the polarities have their place only in ontology.  Adams69
says that Tillich sometimes uses the concepts of dynamics and form to provide
a conceptual apparatus for a typology of cultural creations of all sorts: “For
example, works of art can be identified in terms of the relative emphasis
placed upon dynamics and form. Thus neo-classicism so much stresses the
element of form that the dynamics is approaching the vanishing point; on the
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other hand, Expressionism so much stresses the dynamics that form
approaches dissolution.”70
Unfortunately, in his short comment, Adams does not give detailed
information about which Tillich’s texts he is referring to or consider the
problem he mentions last: the relation of dynamics and form to the concepts
of form and content (Inhalt) or import (Gehalt). The typology that he mentions
is not a common one in Tillich, even though it would be a logical one if the
polarity of dynamics and form is understood in a complementary way as the
two sides of all being (cf. Tillich’s idea of the modern physics). One
interesting point in Adam’s presentation is that in it Tillich is critical also
towards expressionism which he usually sees positively just because it breaks
the form and lets the substance come through; in the typology based on the
polarity of dynamics and form, expressionism is criticized for its
overemphasis of the dynamic element.
In his article Über gläubigen Realismus in 1928 Tillich says that
expressionism breaks the outside form and emphasizes the substance (Gehalt):
“der Expressionismus hatte die äussere Form zerbrochen, um den inneren
Gehalt auszudrücken”.  Here we can see Tillich’s changing attitude towards71
form: usually he says that revelation is breaking through the form and not
breaking form apart (“Durchbrechungen, keine Zerbrechungen der Form”);72
normally, breaking the form is demonic: “Göttliches und Profanes stehen
gemeinsam dem Dämonischen gegenüber. Sie bejahen gemeinsam die Form
im Gegensatz zum Dämonischen, das die Form zerbricht.” 73
We can understand these different ideas on the basis on self-integration and
self-transcendence: In self-integration the empasis is on the unity and balance
of dynamics and form; both sides of the polarity are equally important and too
much emphasis on either side means disruption. In self-transcendence, the
spiritual substance breaks through the form. This means that when Tillich
talks about ontological matters, the classical view of form is also present;
when Tillich talks about culture and art, the form only manifests the deeper
substance. The distinction of form and substance alone does not give enough
tools to build a typology or to create a criterion to evaluate culture; it can only
lead to the question, whether the cultural form is empty or manifests the
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religious substance, but it gives no answer to the question, how to separate
these two.
Tillich’s different views of form in the ontological and in the artistic sphere
can be seen in his discussion with Dr. Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, a distinguished
Zen master.  At first, Tillich strongly emphasizes the meaning of logos74
against the idea of the formless self as the only ontological principle: “The
logos is a very active principle, because it is the principle of love, or agape.
But, in any case, it is not the formless self. The formless self is the divine
abyss out of which we come. But everything that happens in our world is
mediated through the logos, which is the form in which the formless comes to
form.”  Tillich describes this logos - or spark or seed - as the potentiality; it75
is different from the potentiality in Zen because logos is not formless.
However, when they are discussing art as an expression of the basic
principles,  Tillich and Hisamatsu suddenly agree.  A quotation of the
conversation shows the change:
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Hence, things with form are really without
form. Whatever has form has its authentic import in having no form.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Consequently, a form expresses its
genuine nature in transcending or negating its form - in other words,
as a ’form-without-form’, or again, as a ’formless-form’.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The mark of Zen aesthetic appreciation,
accordingly, is to see within form what is formless - which means to
see in things with form the Self-Without-Form.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: The key to appreciation of Zen art,
therefore, is to appreciate in the artistic form the Self-Without-Form
that is being expressed... (Tillich: In it?)... yes, or through it.
Tillich: That is quite similar to my own thinking. The ’depth of being
in it’, I would call it.
Here, the meaning of art is to mediate the “depth of being”, or the “formless
self” or “formless-form”. In this context, it is enough for Tillich to describe
the ultimate reality with the depth of being without the need for logos,  and76
he is willing to see the religious meaning of the deformed, expressive art.77
Tillich’s identification of the depth of being with Self-Without-Form shows
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 See e.g. ST II, 65. See also The World Situation (1945), 13 (MW 2, 173).78
 See e.g. ST III, 60.  See also Annala 1985, 78-94; Clayton 1980, 191-197;79
Scharlemann 1985, 161. Etymologically substance means something that is below or as
basis. It is especially a term of traditional metaphysics, which means the ultimate being,
that what really is. See Lotz 1975, 1648-1650. About Plato’s view, see  Jones 1970, 124-
146; about Aristotles view, see Jones 1970, 218-222.
 Clayton 1980, 191 describes their study as “the plunge into those dark depths of80
Tillich’s thought where, if not all, certainly most of the cows are black”.
 Tillich uses them to describe different aspects of culture, life, and religion. See for81
example Kairos (1922), 344 (MW 4, 66); Die Überwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der
Religionsphilosophie (1922), 466 (MW 4, 88); Religionsphilosophie (1925), 785 (MW 4,
130),  799-834 (MW 4, 141-169); Über gläubigen Realismus (1928), 109-110 (MW 4,
194). Still, in the late period of his life Tillich called the concepts of Form and Gehalt the
basic categories of his philosophy of religion and culture. See  Auf der Grenze (4. Vorlage
1962), 23. See also Religionsphilosophie (1962), 36.
 Bandy 1984, 12 says that the original description of the polarity of dynamics and form82
is the polarity of form and import (which is another modification of form and substance).
He refers to a description of import by James Luther Adams as “the meaningfulness giving
every particular meaning its reality and power; it is the ground for an inner infinity of
meaningfulness”. Import conveys the fullness of spirit and gives an entity reality and
power. Scharlemann 1969, 123 sees in the concepts of Form and  Gehalt a pattern for the
that when Tillich uses the depth of being to talk about God, it is only the first
element of Tillich’s polar view of God which combines dynamics and form in
balance and in unity in God.
Tillich does not develop very much a typological view of culture based on
the polarity of dynamics and form. He can criticize views that give too much
emphasis on dynamics or form,  but he does not consider very much what is78
their right balance in culture. When Tillich deals with the questions of culture,
he seldom mentions the polarity of dynamics and form directly. Instead, he
uses the concepts of form and substance.  The concepts of Form and Gehalt,79
sometimes supplemented by the concept of Inhalt,  have been central since80
Tillich’s early German texts,  and the English version form and substance has81
an important role again in the third volume of Systematic Theology. The
distinction of form and substance can express the deeper (“religious”)
meaning of culture and art, and it can be used to explain how the Spirit
transcends finite forms. Usually, when the polarity of dynamics and form is
present, the distinction of form and substance is in the background and vice
versa.
Tillich uses the polarity of dynamics and form mainly in the context of self-
integration and self-creation; the distinction of form and substance is used
mainly in the context of self-transcendence. The distinction of form and
substance is older than the polarity of dynamics and form, but the latter is not
just a simple development of  the former,  since both are used in Systematic82
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ideas that Tillich later on expresses with the other polarities, even though he speaks of
other than the polarities of Tillich’s ontology: "The elements in this basic structure are
three polarities - the autonomous and heterenomous, the relative and absolute, and the
formal and emotional elements. These are three specifications of what Tillich, in his early
writings, called the form and Gehalt..." For the concept of Gehalt, see also Scharlemann
1985, 167-168.
 For more detail see Clayton 1980, 193. Scharf 1995, 71-72 examines the concepts of83
Inhalt, Form and Gehalt in Tillich’s Dogmatik from 1925 but the polarity of dynamics and
form is not apparent.
  Glaubiger Realismus, GW IV. 88-106, translated in The Protestant Era, 66-82;84
Clayton uses the original version which was published in ThBlätter, VII (1928), cols.
109-18. See Clayton 1980, 203. Jahr 1989b, 109 says that, in Tillich’s early texts, form is
the rational side of being and Gehalt the irrational; compared to the limited form, Gehalt
is unlimited as “the principle of life” (principium vitae). According to Jahr, Gehalt and
Form reflect the two basic principles of Schelling’s philosophy, so she interprets Gehalt
and Form in a similar way to that used by many scholars to interpret the polarity of
dynamics and form. See Jahr 1989b, 115. Schüssler 1986, 36 says that “Tillich die
Begriffe Form und Gehalt nicht eindeutig verwendet”. Form can mean “Einzelform” or
“Sinnform”, and Gehalt can mean  “Sinngehalt” or “Eigengehalt”. He makes  complicated
distinctions between “ontologischen Prinzipien” which are “Einzelform” and
“Einzelgehalt”, and “metalogischen Prinzipien” which are “Sinnform bzw. Form” and
“Sinngehalt”. When “Sinnform”, which is another of the “metalogischen Prinzipien” with
“Sinngehalt”, is said to have “einen Eigengehalt” or “einen Gehalt”, it leads to very
difficult thought patterns. See also Steinacker 1989, 96: "Was heisst 'Gehalt', wenn damit
ausdrücklich jeder 'Inhalt' nicht gemeint ist? Vor der Gewalt des Durchbruches des
Gehaltes zerbricht die Form, und der Inhalt schwindet dahin, ja die ganze Beziehung von
Form und Inhalt löst sich auf. Die Form wird unmittelbar zum Gehalt, weil in ihr 'die
religiöse Realität mit ihrem Ja und Nein über die Dinge zum Vorschein' kommt. Was aber
Theology. The identification of substance and dynamics would lead to great
problems, because then the impact of the divine could be found on the
dynamic side, and in self-integration, both sides of the polarity are equally
important. Tillich also emphasizes the meaning of the form element (Logos)
in God. Tillich usually does not talk about polarity in connection with form
and substance, so the whole polar view is something different compared to
form and substance: here, we can recollect Tillich’s denial of the influence of
Schelling on his ontological polarities.
Tillich claimed to have formulated the triad of Form-Inhalt-Gehalt under
the impact of certain paintings done in an expressionistic style.  Thus,83
Tillich’s use of these concepts is comparable to the way the separation is made
in esthetics between the outside form and  the content or message of an artistic
creation.  Tillich was interested in expressionistic art, so it is understandable
that it is not always easy to define what Gehalt is: it is something that is
experienced and that makes an effect. Sometimes Tillich connects Gehalt and
power: "The empirical reality of the object was searched for anew, not for its
own sake, but as an expression of objective Gehalt, of its inner power."84
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keinen Inhalt hat, ja sogar formlos wird, das ist - nichts!"
  Clayton 1980, 91 gives a dynamic interpretation to the concept of Gehalt: "He calls it85
Gehalt, which he contrasts sharply with Inhalt as well as with Form. (GW. IX. 236ff) For
the moment, let us call it ’meaning-giving substance’ which is thought by Tillich to be the
life-force not only of all 'concrete religions' but every cultural act as well." Clayton 1980,
215 explains Tillich’s development at the end of the 1920's.
 Clayton gives many examples where Gehalt means different things, see Clayton 1980,86
197. See also Clayton 1987,21; Ringleben 1989, 166-167. Annala 1985, 94-95 points to
Clayton’s finding that Gehalt is a very diffuse concept in Tillich’s texts. He wants to give
a coherent interpretation of Gehalt. See also Annala 1985, 81-85. Annala has studied the
basic thoughts of Tillich’s theology of culture in his book  Autonomian tragiikka ja
kulttuurin kriisi, but the polarity of dynamics and form is not under consideration.
Annala’s  book Transparency of Time: The Structure of Time-Consciousness in the
Theology of Paul Tillich (1982) deals with the concepts of form and substance for
example on pages 13-14, 15-16, 55, 73-77.
 Scharlemann 1969, 36.87
 Natur und Sakrament (1930), 154 (MW 6, 162): "Erreichbar ist die Sachmächtigkeit88
nur in derjenigen Schicht des Seins, die vor der Spaltung in Gegenständlichkeit und
Geistigkeit liegt, im ungespaltenen, vorgegenständlichen Sein. Dieses Sein aber darf wider
nicht gedeutet werden nach Art der vitalen Naturauffassung, also als formlose Dynamik,
vielmehr muss es aufgefasst werden als sinnhafter Gehalt, als Mächtigkeit, die zugleich
Sachligkeit ist. Hätten wir die Möglichkeit, diese sachgetragene Mächtigkeit der
Naturdinge zu schauen, so hätten wir zugleich die Möglichkeit, ihre Bedeutung als
sakramentales Element zu verstehen."
Clayton says that in Tillich’s earlier writings the presence of powerful Gehalt
was regarded as that which makes an object or event 'religious'.  He mentions85
that almost all scholars agree about the fact that Gehalt is one of the most
diffuse concepts that Tillich uses.86
The German word Gehalt cannot be translated by a single English word.
Scharlemann uses three different translations depending on the context:87
Sometimes Gehalt is equivalent to Inhalt and is contrasted with form, then the
English translation is ’content’; sometimes Gehalt is contrasted with content
as well as with form, then the translation is ’depth’ or ’substance’ (some
commentators use ’import’ for this meaning); in still other cases Gehalt refers
to the aspect of objectival which cannot be grasped, then the translation is
’power’ or ’presence’. The translation problems give a good illustration of the
problems of Tillich’s thinking as well.
Tillich does not consider separately the relationship of the pairs dynamics-
form  and form-substance, but the article Natur und Sakrament has as
opposites  “formlose Dynamik” and “sinnhafter Gehalt”.  Dynamik is88
connected to the vitality of nature and is without Form while Gehalt is
connected to meaningfulness. Mostly substance (Gehalt) can be seen as
dynamic; this is emphasized by the fact that form is a separate element in the
distinction between form and substance.
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 ”Out of the inexhaustible manifoldness of encountered objects, language chooses some91
which are of significance in the universe of means and ends or in the religious, poetic or
scientific universe of expression. They constitute the subject matter in cultural activities
although differently in each.” ST III, 60.
 ST III, 60.92
 ST III, 60.93
 ”This makes style a key to understanding the way in which a particular group or period94
encounters reality, although it is also a source of conflicts between the demands of form-
creation and of the expression of the substance.” ST III, 60-61.
Sometimes “subject matter” is the third element with form and substance,
and this view has its basis in Tillich’s theology of art. The variation between
form-substance and form-substance-subject matter makes Tillich’s thinking
ambiguous. In the beginning, he used the scheme of Form and Gehalt, and the
scheme of  Form-Inhalt-Gehalt developed after the First World War, in
Tillich’s own words as a consequence of artistic experience. Following
Clayton, we can say that Inhalt is the 'stuff' which has meaning (Gehalt) and
which is structured and shaped in a particular way (Form); Gehalt is that
which formed stuff signifies or means.  However, Tillich brings back the89
distinction of Form and Gehalt to which he assimilates Inhalt  thus reducing
its meaning, if not eliminating it totally.
According to the scheme of form-substance-subject matter, we can
distinguish three elements in cultural creativity.  For example, language90
chooses among all the possible objects the ones that have meaning to religious
or scientific language. They form the subject matter of cultural activity. The
same matter is used differently  in different contexts.  In Tillich’s view, the91
difference is caused by the form:
The form makes a cultural creation what it is - a philosophical essay,
a painting, a law, a prayer. In this sense form is the essence of a
cultural creation... 92
The third element in this distinction is the substance:
Whereas its subject matter is chosen and its form is intended, its
substance is so to speak, the soil out of which it grows. Substance
cannot be intended. It is unconsciously present in a culture, a group,
an individual, giving the passion and driving power to him who
creates and the significance and power of meaning to his creations.93
Substance is the spiritual impact manifested in a culture or in an individual
phenomenon of culture. Substance points to the deeper meaning, while form
is connected to the visible side. There can be conflicts between the demands
of form creation and substance.94
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How can we put together the polarity of dynamics and form and the scheme
of form-substance-subject matter? When Tillich explained the meaning of
form in the self-creation of life, he said that “the form makes a thing what it
is: a poem or a building or a law, and so on”.  It sounds the same as the95
description of form above: “The form makes a cultural creation what it is - a
philosophical essay, a painting, a law, a prayer.” . But the idea of substance96
is not present in the polarity of dynamics and form, and the polarity of
dynamics and form is not present in the scheme of form-substance-subject
matter. It is best to accept that Tillich is using two different views that cannot
be totally harmonized.
When we compare these two views, the important question is the relation of
substance to form. In the classical sense, form is the essence of thing, it makes
a thing what it is. This explains the concept of form in the polarity of
dynamics and form. In his ontology, which is heavily existentially loaded,
Tillich connects meaning and significance also to to the element of form. In
the previous quotation he says that substance gives the significance and
meaning to a thing. Consequently, substance is separated from form which is
connected to the visible object. Tillich’s description of form in his ontology
has a strong Aristotelian strain, his view of substance (Gehalt) in his cultural
theology can be interpreted in the Neo-Platonic way.  This explains the97
tension between the views and concepts. The classical view of form indicates
self-integration, the view of form and substance indicates self-transcendence;
self-creation is the bridge between them.
When Tillich uses the concepts of form and substance, he looks at the
questions from the human, existential position and wants to maintain the
dimension of “depth” or substance that can be encountered in life; when
Tillich uses the concepts of dynamics and form, he starts with the ontological
analysis as a “metaphysical spectator”. When these two ideas meet, there is a
tension between them.
3.3. Morality, culture, and religion
The three functions of life, self-integration, self-creation, and self-
transcendence,  are based on the three ontological polarities: individualization
and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. In turn, the
three functions  are the basis for morality, culture, and religion.  Tillich’s98
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 ”These two principles are rooted in a third, that of the ’essential belongingness of101
religion and culture to each other.’ I have expressed this principle frequently in the
statement that religion is the substance of culture and culture the form of religion.” ST III,
248. See also Annala 1985, 99; Smith 1985, 255-258. Clayton 1987, 21 notes that the
concepts of form and substance (Gehalt) are central also when Tillich deals with the
relation of philosophy and theology.
 Gilkey 1990, 164.102
basic view in Systematic Theology is that morality, culture, and religion
belong together: ”In accordance with their essential nature, morality, culture,
and religion interpenetrate one another. They constitute the unity of spirit,
wherein the elements are distinguishable but not separable.”  99
Usually, the relation of religion to morality and culture can be explained
with form and substance. Culture provides the contents of morality, and
religion gives to morality the unconditional character of the moral imperative
and the ultimate moral aim, it reunites the separated and gives the motivating
power of grace. Religion is essentially related to morality and culture: 
The religious element in culture is the inexhaustible depth of genuine
creation. One may call it substance or the ground from which culture
lives. It is the element of ultimacy which culture lacks in itself but to
which it points. Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the
dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and culture.
There is no self-transcendence under the dimension of the spirit
without the constitution of the moral self by the unconditional
imperative, and this self-transcendence cannot take form except
within the universe of meaning created in the cultural act.100
This description connects depth, substance, ground, and the element of
ultimacy to each other.
Often, Tillich deals with the relation between religion and culture without
the third element of morality. Religion is the substance of culture and culture
is the form of religion.  The religious substance of culture is that which101
opens up the possibility of “depth” or divine, gives the deeper meaning to
culture, and also is the manifestation of the divine or the Spirit or the Spiritual
Presence. Religion cannot express itself without culture, and culture needs
religion as the source of depth and unconditional meaning. There is a two-way
connection between religion and culture, as Gilkey says: “... he establishes the
presence and significance of the religious dimension of life of the human
spirit, or, put in the reverse way, the modes in which the divine Spiritual
Presence makes itself known in human experience...”102
If we think of Tillich’s idea of the essential unity and balance of dynamics
and form, can we say that the unity and balance is achieved when the religious
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substance is expressed in culture? According to Tillich, the separation of
dynamics and form from each other is the threat of existential estrangement.
Can we say that apart from the religious substance culture is threatened either
by the overemphasis of form or the overemphasis of dynamics? Tillich does
not combine these ideas this way: he has moved from self-integration, through
self-creation, to self-transcendence, and the unity and balance of dynamics
and form does not have direct bearing on the religious substance and its
manifestation in culture.
The Spiritual Presence in culture creates theonomy.  Theonomous works103
of cultural creation express the ultimacy of meaning: “The first quality of a
theonomous culture is that it communicates the experience of holiness, of
something ultimate in being and meaning, in all its creations.”  There is no104
outside law in theonomy, it is directed and determined by the Spirit. It takes
into fulfilment the human spirit and does not break it. Theonomy is in a
constant struggle against independent heteronomy and independent autonomy.
Theonomy is the basis of autonomy and heteronomy, and the factor uniting
them: “Theonomy is prior to both; they are elements within it. But theonomy,
at the same time, is posterior to both; they tend to be reunited in the theonomy
from which they come. In the polar view, theonomy both precedes and
follows the contrasting elements it contains.”  It fights against both the105
independent autonomy and independent heteronomy.106
Theonomous culture means culture which is created under the impact of the
Spirit. The law (nomos) which is effective in it, directs the self-creation of life
towards the ultimate in being and meaning.  It is unfortunate that theonomy107
is sometimes understood as the submission of culture under divine laws. It is
possible to use the term heteronomy in those situations where an outside law
(heteros nomos) destroys the autonomy of cultural creativity.108
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Clayton has noticed that Tillich’s description of autonomy and heteronomy
seems to vary:  sometimes, heteronomy is totally negative, sometimes, it has
also a positive meaning; in some cases, theonomy is self-transcending
autonomy which is not compatible with heteronomy, in other cases, both
autonomy and heteronomy are united in theonomy.  Sometimes Tillich109
connects heteronomy to an outside law which he in turn has connected  to the
element of form; sometimes he says "the more the form, the more the
autonomy, the more the Gehalt, the more the theonomy”,  thus connecting110
form to autonomy. These differences can be explained by the three functions
of life, but it is not possible to do this in detail here.
Tillich emphasizes that the forms of creative process are autonomous, and
it is not possible to interfere from the outside with the justified actions and
views of culture. Only after culture had released itself from theonomy which
was based on mythology, could a culture develop its potentialities. However,
this should not lead to independent autonomy. The reaction of religion against
autonomy  easily takes the form of rejecting creativity and even the justified
demands of culture. The religious substance, however, gives dynamic
creativity to culture:
 With the loss of its religious substance, culture is left with an
increasingly empty form. Meaning cannot live without the
inexhaustible source of meaning to which religion points.111
 The religious element in culture is the inexhaustible depth of a
genuine creation.112
The Spiritual Presence creates theonomous forms in the different areas of
cultural self-creation, and this leads to the conquest of cultural ambiguities.113
Under the influence of the Spiritual Presence, the difference between subject
and object disappears: “Philosophers, mystics, lovers, seekers of intoxication -
even of death - have tried to conquer this cleavage.”  Once again, Tillich114
gives a positive estimation of expressionistic art. It is possible to distinguish
between stylistic elements of naturalism, idealism and expressionism, and
expressionism breaks into the vertical reality. That is why there is a genuine
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 Also Baumgarten 1995, 149-157 criticizes Tillich for identifying the expressive or116
religious element with the emotional element: Tillich looks too much from the point of
view of theology or substance, and the evaluation of art is not adequate. Palmer 1984, 176-
212 and Palmer 1990, 22-23 present the same kind of criticism.
 ”The institutional way is not restricted to so-called institutionalized religion, for, as117
psychology has shown, there are institutions in the inner life of the individual... The
relentless attacks on ’organized religion’ are mostly based on a deeply rooted confusion,
for life is organized in all its self-actualizations; without form it could not even have
dynamics, and this is true of the personal as well as the communal life.” ST III, 99.
theonomous element in expressionism.  But how do we know, when an115
artistic creation or a cultural product is theonomous: is it a subjective
matter?116
In his cultural theology, Tillich does not relate theonomy to the polarity of
dynamics and form, though according to his ontology and analysis of
existence it is just the imbalance of the polarity which expresses existential
estrangement. It would be logical to say that in theonomous culture, dynamics
and form are united in balance. The element of form would also give a
possibility to estimate the contents of culture. However, this is one of the
basic dilemmas of Tillich, because he does not want to do this: the outward
defining of culture leads to heteronomy in his view. Tillich wants to give
culture an independent status, and because of this he has to remove almost all
features concerning content and form from his views of culture. Then the
question arises, what is the meaning of the unity and balance of dynamics and
form, if it has no bearing on how things happen in actual life and culture. 
Tillich mentions exceptionally the polarity of dynamics and form when he
deals with institutionalized religion: he says that it cannot be criticized for
having a form because everything that has being has a form; without form
there is no dynamics. This resembles the ontological necessity of dynamics
and form but Tillich does not make any conclusions concerning the actual
forms of religion. These thoughts are similar to the thoughts about social
groups in the previous chapter. The criticism towards religion is adequate if
institutionalized religion does not transcend finite reality but becomes a part
of it.  Religion expresses the self-transcendence of life.117
The essential unity of morality, culture, and religion is destroyed under the
conditions of existence. An ambiguous reunion is possible under the impact of
the divine Spirit. The Spiritual Presence creates a theonomous culture and a
theonomous morality. This unites the three functions of life: “Religion, the
self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit, gives self-
transcendence to both the self-creation and the self-integration of life under
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  Irwin 1991, 13-15 says that sometimes Tillich makes distinctions between the122
different types of love but sometimes “eros seems capable of absorbing all human forms
of love into itself”; sometimes Tillich explicitly says that eros can be used as a global
term. Irwin says that the relation of agape and the other types of love remains problematic:
“Agape reshapes and elevates the other forms of love. Yet Tillich maintains that this
relationship does not imply that the other forms of love are somehow ’inferior.’ What,
then, does agape contribute? How does it elevate human love without denying the original
character of that love?”
 ST III, 137. For more information see ST III, 136-138. See also ST III, 240.123
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 ”All this is said of agape as Spiritual power, prior to any personal or social125
actualization. In this, it is the equal of sin and faith as powers controlling life.” ST III, 138.
the dimension of spirit”.  In this way, Tillich unites self-integration, self-118
creativity, and self-transcendence: religion as the self-transcendence of life
gives self-transcendence to the self-creation and the self-integration of life.
Morality gives seriousness to culture and the moral imperative gets its
concrete content from culture. In this way it is possible to avoid a cultural
attitude that seeks pleasure and lacks eros towards creation. Where this
seriousness is found, there is also the force of the moral imperative.  When119
Tillich deals with the theonomous ground of the moral law, he says that agape
affirms and transcends the moral law at the same time: “It is accepted as the
expression of what man essentially or by creation is. It is transcended in its
form as love...”  This indicates the idea of self-transcendence. Agape is an120
ecstatic manifestation of the Spiritual Presence  and it can be understood as121
the dynamic substance which manifests itself in the form of the moral law but
at the same time transcends its content.
Tillich’s analysis of love combines the different types of love (agape, eros,
philia, epithymia).  Love unites the separated and it is the inner dynamics of122
life:123
Love is the drive toward the reunion of the separated; this is
ontologically and therefore universally true. It is effective in all three
life processes; it unites in a center, it creates the new, and it drives
beyond everything given to its ground and aim... Agape is
unambiguous love and therefore impossible for the human spirit by
itself.124
Tillich describes agape often in very dynamic terms: it is a spiritual power
and it is possible to speak about it even before its actualization in life. It is
comparable to sin and faith, which are all powers controlling life.125
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Agape is called “the ultimate norm” and connected to man’s essential
nature: 
Man’s essential nature and the ultimate norm of agape in which it is
expressed are both hidden and manifest in the processes of life. We
have no unambiguous approach to the created nature of man and its
dynamic potentialities.  126
The expressions are dynamic: there is no unambiguous approach to the
“dynamic potentialities” of man’s created nature.  There is no law in the state
of potentiality, because man is still in unity with the divine ground where he
belongs essentially. Under the conditions of existence this unity is broken, and
moral law has the power to motivate to partial fulfilment, even though, at the
same time, it resists fulfilment.  The motivating power of the moral principle127
is not law but the Spiritual Presence which is grace.128
Tillich emphasizes also the absoluteness of the moral imperative by saying
that it expresses the essential being of man: "The moral imperative is the
demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore
potentially."  In another context, Tillich says that “the logos is a very active129
principle, because it is the principle of love, or agape”.  We have seen that130
the meaning of logos indicates the classical view of form. These ideas can be
understood in connection to self-integration: morality indicates the self-
integration of life. Thus, Tillich sometimes deals with the moral law in the
context of self-integration, sometimes in the context of self-transcendence,
and this leads to different notions.
Consequently, Tillich gives different definitions about the criterion of
ethical judgments. On the one hand, he says that “the principle of agape
expresses the unconditional validity of the moral imperative, and it gives the
ultimate norm for all ethical content”:  131
This oscillation makes every ethical judgment ambiguous and leads
to the question of an unambiguous criterion for ethical judgments.
Love, in the sense of agape, is the unambiguous criterion of all
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 In Love, Power, and Justice (1954), Tillich deals with the ontological foundation of134
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to dynamics, justice to form, and love to being-itself. However, Tillich does not develop
the ideas to this direction. See also The Protestant Era, XXV (MW 6, 299).
ethical judgments. It is unambiguous but, like every creation of the
Spiritual Presence in time and space, remains fragmentary.132
So, agape is “the unambiguous criterion of all ethical judgements” but it
remains “fragmentary” because every creation of the Spiritual Presence in
time and space remains frangmentary.
 On the other hand, he says that the New Being is the manifestation of the
essential being under the conditions of existence and is the criterion for
everything: “It is the criterion of every religion and every culture... It is valid
for the social existence of every human group and for the personal existence
of every human individual.”  The New Being in Jesus as the Christ133
expresses the unity and balance of dynamics and form and is the criterion for
everything else.
The difference can be understood on the basis of self-integration and self-
transcendence: in self-integration, essence is described as the unity and
balance of dynamics and form, and this gives us the possibily to use it as a
criterion. In self-transcendence, essence is the dynamic substance which is
described in dynamic terms; it is difficult to define its content because the
form element appears only in finite forms. In the context of self-integration,
the moral law expresses the created state of essence; in self-transcendence,
love fulfils and transcends the moral law.134
As we have seen, Tillich’s system develops from self-integration throught
self-creation to self-transcendence. When we were discussing Tillich’s view
of existence, we noticed that hubris and concupiscence were expressions of
estrangement: the balance of dynamics and form was distorted under the
conditions of existence, and the New Being in Jesus as the Christ could resist
this disruption. It is not surprising that in his cultural theology, Tillich defines
these concepts anew. We can explain this by the fact that the ideal in the
ontological description and in the analysis of existence is the unity and
balance of dynamics and form; in the self-creativity of life, dynamics as
vitality breaks through the form by nature and it is not estrangement in itself;
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 ”We have used the term hubris to describe one element in man’s estrangement; the135
other element is ’concupiscence’. In the description of existence (in Part III of Systematic
Theology), hubris and concupiscence appear merely as negative elements. In the present
part, dealing with life processes, they appear in their ambiguity - hubris ambiguously
united with greatness and concupiscence with eros. Hubris in this sense is not pride - the
compulsive overcompensation of actual smallness - but the self-elevation of the great
beyond the limits of its finitude. The result is both the destruction of others and self-
destruction.” ST III, 93.
 ”If one asks what the guilt of the tragic hero is, the answer must be that he perverts the136
function of self-transcendence by identifying himself with that to which self-transcendence
is directed-the great itself. He does not resist self-transcendence, but he resists the demand
to transcend his own greatness. He is caught by his own power of representing the self-
transcendence of life.” ST III, 94.
 ”All beings affirm themselves in their finite power of being; they affirm their137
greatness (and dignity) without being aware of it. They do it in their relation to other
beings and, in doing so, bring upon themselves the reaction of the logos-determined laws,
which push back anything that trespasses the limits given to it. This is the tragic
explanation of suffering in nature...” ST III, 93.
in self-transcendence, the dynamic substance gets its manifestation in finite
forms that can also restrict the manifestation of the substance.
Hubris and concupiscence that previously only had negative definitions
now get a twofold meaning: hubris can be attached to real greatness and
concupiscence to eros; however these are trying to surpass the limits of
finitude and thus cause destruction to themselves and to others.  Typical to135
this kind of hubris is that the tragic hero identifies himself with the great to
which his self-transcendence is directing; he is captured by his own power of
self-transcendence.136
In this context, self-transcendence  gets the tone of being freed from the
bondage of form: the greatness of hubris and concupiscence is not that they
seek form and try to get in balance with it, but that they try to get free from
the limitations of life. Their tragic fate is that during life, it is not possible
without destroying life and oneself. In the modern definition of dynamics and
form, dynamics as vitality breaks through the static form; it is only one step
further to think that the static form is restrictive and prevents the substance
from manifesting its vitality.
Tillich describes the laws of life as a necessity which cannot be passed. He
says that the laws of life, determined by logos, react against that which goes
over its own limits: there is something, which is forced to be in the limits of
the law of life, even though it tries to surpass these limits.  But trying to137
surpass logos and the laws of life in self-transcendence is not estrangement,
but greatness connected with tragedy. This is a different view than the idea of
the balance and unity of dynamics and form.
Tillich describes the self-transcendence of life as follows:
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well. Eros is the drive towards the reunion of the separated. This gives eros a mystical
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used as a tool for gaining pleasure and not as an object of reunion. Irwin 1991, 19-42 sees
Tillich’s thinking as an opposition to Anders Nygren, and as a more positive contribution
to the thinking of Freud. The main influence for Tillich has been Plato. See Irwin 1991,
39-45.
The vertical transcends both the circular line of centeredness and the
horizontal line of growth. In the words of Paul (Romans 8:19-22),
the longing of all creation for the liberation from the ’subjection to
futility’ (R.S.V.) and ’the shackles of mortality’ (N.E.B.) is described
with a profound poetic empathy. These words are a classical
expression of the self-transcendence of life under all dimensions.
One can also think of Aristotle’s doctrine that the movements of all
things are caused by their eros toward the ’unmoved mover’.138
Self-transcendence is explained with Paul’s words as the longing of all
creation for liberation. It is movement away from life and not the fulfilment of
the essential unity and balance of dynamics and form under the conditions of
existence.
In the previous quotation, self-transcendence is connected to Aristotle’s
doctrine of eros which is mentioned with Paul’s longing for the liberation of
all creation. In Love, Power, and Justice, Tillich says about eros: “In Aristotle
we find the doctrine of the universal eros which drives everything towards the
highest form, the pure actuality which moves the world not as a cause
(kinoumenon) but as the object of love (eromenon).”  In another place in the139
same book Tillich defines eros referring to Plato: “We have, following Plato,
defined eros as the driving force in all cultural creativity and in all mysticism.
As such eros has the greatness of a divine-human power.”  Thus, Tillich140
sometimes defines eros referring to Aristotle, sometimes to Plato and this
creates tensions in his thinking.
Tillich’s thinking has moved from the unity and balance of dynamics and
form to the idea that dynamics breaks through the form in a way that there is
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a moment of chaos between the forms. Gradually, dynamics as vitality drives
toward self-transcendence which is prohibited by the forms: the conflict of the
elements that was described as the threat of existential estrangement becomes
the natural way of life. We have seen that the ideas of self-creation and self-
transcendence blend. This leads us to ask, what is the difference between
them. On the one hand, “the growth of the individual is the most obvious
example of self-transcendence based on self-conservation”.  The agent of141
self-transcendence in this idea is the dynamic vitality of life which creates
new forms in the self-creativity and self-transcendence of life. On the other
hand, the Spirit is the agent of self-transcendence. How can we unite Tillich’s
accounts about self-transcendence? Even though the Spirit is dynamic, it
cannot be equated with the dynamic vitality of life, at least not in the light of
the unity and balance of dynamics and form in Tillich’s ontology. 
In his ontology, Tillich defines the Spirit using both sides of the polarity:
the element of form is as important as the dynamic side of the polarity. The
Spirit is the unity of power and meaning which is based on the polarity of
dynamics and form along with the other polarities. This indicates self-
integration. Tillich criticizes the views of process philosophy for being too
one-sided in the light of the polarity of dynamics and form. In self-creation,
Tillich seems to move to the same direction himself. In self-transcendence, he
takes even one step farther. If our analysis about the Aristotelian strain in
Tillich’s ontology and the Neo-Platonic emphasis in the cultural theology is
correct, this explains the difference: in self-integration, the Spirit combines
dynamics and form in unity and balance, in self-transcendence, the Spirit is
dynamic and transcends the forms.
This is one of the collision points of Tillich’s system; as we recall, he wrote
the third volume of the system starting from the end and moving backwards.
He said that part IV of the system cointained a philosophy of life for which
Schelling was the teacher and he merely the student. However, he denied the
influence of Schelling on the ontological polarities. Tillich’s cultural
theological views in the third volume of the system resemble his early cultural
theological notions and he was not able to unite them seamlessly to the
ontological ideas of the system. As a consequence, the difference between
self-creation and self-transcendence and the view of the Spirit remain
ambiguous.
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4. SELF-TRANSCENDENCE: THE SPIRIT
TRANSCENDS THE FORMS
4.1. The Spiritual Presence and its manifestation
In the third volume of Systematic Theology, the idea of self-transcendence is
combined to the Spirit or the Spiritual Presence.  Tillich says that when we1
talk about God’s Spirit, we apply symbolically features of the human spirit.2
The relation between Spirit and spirit is answered by the statement that the
divine Spirit works and dwells in the human spirit. This idea implies all the
problems of the relation of the divine to the human. Tillich explains this
relation as follows:
If the divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit, this does not mean
that it rests there, but that it drives the human spirit out of itself. The
“in” of the divine Spirit is an “out” for the human spirit. The spirit, a
dimension of finite life, is driven into a successful self-
transcendence; it is grasped by something ultimate and unconditional.
It is still the human spirit; it remains what it is, but at the same time,
it goes out of itself under the impact of the divine Spirit. “Ecstasy” is
the classical term for this state of being grasped by the Spiritual
Presence. It describes the human situation under the Spiritual
Presence exactly.3
Revelation is always a subjective and an objective event, and it appears
subjectively in terms of ecstasy; ecstasy is the receiving side of revelation.
Ecstasy points to a state of mind where mind transcends its ordinary situation.4
When Tillich deals explicitly with ecstasy and structure, he says that the
Spiritual Presence creates an ecstasy which drives the spirit of man beyond
itself; however, this does not destroy the rational structure of man:
 The Spiritual Presence creates an ecstasy ...  which drives the spirit
of man beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e. rational,
structure. Ecstasy does not destroy the centeredness of the integrated
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 ST III, 112.5
 ST III, 112-113.6
 Cooper says in his study The "Spiritual Presence" in the Theology of Paul Tillich:7
Tillich's Use of St. Paul (1997) that Tillich has used St. Paul’s thoughts quite a lot when he
has developed his Christology and pneumatology and made ontological conclusions about
the thoughts that are implicit in Paul’s writings, for example, in the phrase “to be in
Christ”. Cooper thinks that in this sense, Tillich is more faithful to Paul than the so-called
neo-orthodox theologians.
self. Should it do so, demonic possession would replace the creative
presence of the Spirit... When it grasps man, it creates unambiguous
life. Man in his self-transcendence can reach for it, but man cannot
grasp it, unless he is first grasped by it.5
The Spiritual Presence creates unambiguous life. Man can reach for it in his
self-transcendence, but he cannot grasp it, unless he is grasped by it. Man is
driven to ask the question of unambiguous life by his self-transcendence, but
the answer comes through the Spiritual Presence. Man must use finite material
and the language of symbols to express any relation to the divine ground of
being. One expression that Tillich uses is the “dimension of depth” which
means something different than the other dimensions of life: it is “the ground
of being of them all and the aim toward which they are self-transcendent”.6
We have seen that  the idea of depth can be connected to substance or import
or ground of being.
The view of ecstasy and structure resembles the idea of the depth of reason
and the structure of reason and can be expressed with form and substance: the
ecstasy-creating Spiritual Presence is the dynamic substance the impact of
which is received through the rational form. Ecstasy does not break the form,
but the dynamic substance is more than the manifestation it gets in and
through the form.  The idea indicates self-transcendence. Even though Tillich
calls the rational structure essential, this view does not emphasize the unity
and balance of dynamics and form as in self-integration. Thus, the idea can be
connected to the idea of the ontological necessity of dynamics and form:
everything has to have a form. Tillich insists that there is some structure in the
experiences of the Spirit, but he does not define any specific forms where the
impact of the Spirit is to be experienced.
In Tillich’s view, Paul’s teaching about the Spirit clearly shows that ecstasy
does not destroy structure.  Paul emphasizes the ecstatic element for example7
in the phrase “to be in Christ”. At the same time Paul resists tendencies that
could lead to a situation where ecstasy would break the structure. Paul’s
teaching about the gifts of the Spirit in the first letter to the Corinthians is an
example of this. Paul rejects speaking with tongues if it causes chaos,
emphasis of the personal spiritual experiences if it causes hybris, and bringing
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 ST III, 116-117.8
 ”The relation to the divine ground of being through the divine Spirit is not agnostic (as9
it is not amoral); rather it includes the knowledge of the ’depth’ of the divine... In ecstatic
language Paul points to agape and gnosis-forms of morality and knowledge in which
ecstasy and structure are united.” ST III, 117.
 ST III, 117. See also Realism and Faith (1948), 80-81 (MW 4, 354).10
 ST III, 117-118.11
 For more detail see ST III, 148-149. It can be concluded from Tillich’s thoughts that12
the east emphasizes more the dynamic side, while the west emphasizes the formal side.
 ”Ecstasy, in its transcendence of the subject-object structure, is the great liberating13
power under the dimension of self-awareness. But this liberating power creates the
possibility of confusing that which is ’less’ than the subject-object structure of the mind
with that which is ’more’ than this structure. Whether it takes biological or emotional
forward the other gifts of the Spirit if they are not submitted to love.  There is8
a unity of the moral imperative and ecstasy in Paul’s thinking. In the same
way, the experience of the Spirit does not oppose knowledge but it is
knowledge about the divine depth. The words gnosis and agape mean such
forms of knowledge and morality that unite ecstasy and structure.9
The church has a constant problem in following these thoughts of Paul. On
one hand, ecstasy must not be mixed up with chaos, and thus structure has to
be defended; on the other hand, the church has to avoid the institutionalized
profanization that took place in the early Catholic church where kharisma was
substituted by the office. In addition, also secular profanization in
Protestantism where ecstasy is replaced by doctrinal and moral structure has
to be rejected.  Paul’s ideas that emphasize the unity of ecstasy and structure10
are a constant obligation and risk to the churches. If the institutional forms are
emphasized too much leaving aside the ecstatic, it opens the possibility of
chaotic and disordered ecstasy; taking seriously the ecstatic movements
includes the danger of confusing the impact of the Spirit with psychological
overexcitement.11
The stories of the Synoptic Gospels show that the earliest Christian
tradition was spirit Christology: they constantly express ecstatic experiences,
and the Spiritual Presence gave Jesus divine power towards man making him
the conqueror of the demonic powers. Tillich says that Logos Christology
replaced spirit Christology since the Gospel of John. In Tillich’s view, this is
one of the questions behind the separation of the churches of east and west.12
Tillich makes a difference between ecstasy and intoxication: ecstasy
transcends the subject and object structure, and it is more than this structure.
Intoxication does not actualize consciousness, so it is less than the subject and
object structure. Intoxication is an effort to escape from the burdens of the
spirit. It can give momentary relief but in the long run it is destructive: it lacks
the productivity and creativity of the spirit. It is falling back to subjectivity.13
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form, intoxication does not reach the actuality of self-awarness... In the long run, however,
it is destructive, heightening the tension it wants to avoid. Its main distinguishing feature
is that it lacks both spiritual productivity and Spiritual creativity. It returns to an empty
subjectivity which extinguishes these contents coming from the objective world. It makes
the self a vacuum.” ST III, 119. See also ST III, 192.
 ST III, 119-120.14
 ST III, 120.15
 ST III, 143-144.16
 For more detail see ST III, 150-152.17
 ”Although created by the Spiritual Presence, faith occurs within the structure,18
functions, and dynamics of man’s spirit. Certainly, it is not from man, but it is in man.” ST
III, 133.
 ST III, 114. See also ST I, 111-114.19
 For more detail see ST III, 114-115.20
 ST III, 115-116.21
In Tillich’s view, ecstasy can be compared to the enthusiasm of cultural
productivity, because it has the richness of the objective world. The preacher,
meditator or prayer know the structure of the world but they see it under the
impact of the Spirit. This creates unity between subject and object.14
How can we separate ecstasy from intoxication? Tillich says that creativity
is the only criterion to decide whether an extraordinary state is ecstasy created
by the Spirit or subjective intoxication; ecstasy is united with creativity but
intoxication is not. It is difficult to separate the two, and Tillich calls it with
the biblical expression “judging the Spirit”.  An example about the difference15
between ecstasy and intoxication can be seen in the Old Testament: it is the
struggle of the prophet Elia with the priests of Baal; the ecstasy of Elia was a
contact of persons through prayer while the priests of Baal were intoxicated.16
The basic feature of the first Pentecost was ecstasy which united faith, love,
communion, and universality. There was the unity of ecstasy and structure.17
The influence of the Spirit can be seen in man as faith and love, “within the
structure, functions, and dynamics of man’s spirit”.18
Tillich rejects miracles in a supranaturalistic sense of the word because God
does not need to destroy the world he has created.  The stories that tell about19
the bodily or psychological effects of the Spirit  express the universal and
unique nature of the impact of the Spirit. He mentions the historical problems
of the stories but does not deal with them more precisely.20
Tillich argues that Protestantism has avoided using the word ’infusion’
because it has a magical-materialistic secondary meaning in which Spirit is
like some matter being transmitted by the sacraments. However, this rejection
is not totally justified because the story of Pentecost speaks about the infusion
of the spirit and because the psychological views about man’s subconscious
have given new insights into the meaning of the sacraments and symbols.21
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 ”In the discussion of revelation, we sharply rejected the distortion which occurs when22
the experience of inspiration is turned into an informative lesson about God and divine
matters. The Spiritual Presence is not that of a teacher but of a meaning-bearing power
which grasps the human spirit in an ecstatic experience. After the experience, the teacher
can analyse and formulate the element of meaning in the ecstasy of inspiration (as the
systematic theologian does), but when the analysis of the teacher begins, the inspirational
experience has already passed.” ST III, 115.
 ST III, 196. See also ST III, 220.23
 ”However, because of the multidimensional unity of life, all dimensions, as they are24
effective in man, participate in the Spirit-created ecstasy. This refers directly to the
dimension of self-awareness and indirectly to the organic and inorganic dimensions. It is
a reductionist profanization of self-transcendence to attempt to derive religion, especially
in its ecstatic side, from psychological dynamics.” ST III, 118.
 See ST III, 118.25
 ST III, 126.26
 Lai 1994, 124-126 says that Tillich’s attitude is reserved and negative towards the27
enthusiasts and firmly on the side of Luther in the first volume of Systematic Theology; in
the third volume, he expresses his appreciation of the positive results of the Spirit-
movements and sees them as an embodiment of the Protestant principle in the sense of a
rejection of heteronomy. Tillich’s position in the third volume seems to be, in Lai’s view,
more sympathetic to the Spirit-movements than to the Reformers.
 ST III, 126.28
Tillich defines ’inspiration’ as the influence of the meaning-bearing power to
man in an ecstatic experience. It is not a lesson giving information about
divine things, and the analysis of the experience takes place only afterwards.22
We must not confuse the subjective impact of the gospel preaching to the
spiritual impact that transcends the subjective and the objective. The influence
of the emotional outburst is only temporal and it does not create a connection
to the Spiritual Community. The church must not confuse overexcitement
with ecstasy,  but it is also not possible to reduce ecstasy to psychological23
dynamics; sometimes this is done, when the church tries to remove unwanted
experiences and emotions.  Tillich says that the whole part of his system that24
deals with the Spirit is a defence of ecstasy towards its critics in the church;25
the criticism towards the established churches by the spiritual movements has
its place in connection to this.  26
This kind of emphasis sounds different compared to the beginning of
Tillich’s system. Lai has noticed a change in Tillich’s view of the Spirit-
movements between the first and the third volumes of Systematic Theology.27
Tillich appears to place much more emphasis on the freedom of the Spirit in
the end of the system than in the beginning: ”When regarded in light of the
doctrine of the Spirit, as we have developed it, the truth in these ideas is their
emphasis on the Spirit’s freedom from any of the ambiguous forms in which
it is received in religion.”  28
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 ST III, 254.29
 Lai 1994, 141. "The dilemma which Tillich faces is that on the one hand, if the30
teaching of the Spirit transcends the teaching of Christ in the way that Christ is not
In the third volume of Systematic Theology Tillich emphasizes the freedom
of the Spirit in a way that seems to contradict what he says about revelation in
the beginning of the system: 
Word of God is the Spirit determined human word. As such it is not
bound to a particular revelatory event, Christian or non-Christian; it
is not bound to religion in the narrower sense of the term; it is not
tied up with a special content or a special form. It appears wherever
the Spiritual Presence imposes itself on an individual or a group.  29
This idea that the Spirit is not bound to a particular revelatory event wants
to give the Spirit freedom to manifest itself in all forms of life. The idea that
the Word of God is “not bound to a particular revelatory event, Christian or
non-Christian” and that it is “not tied up with a special content or a special
form”  leads us to ask, is it not bound to the Logos manifested in the life of
Jesus? Tillich does not say this, but there is a tension between what he says
about the revelation in Jesus as the Christ and the freedom of the Spirit to
transcend all forms. The Spirit is not bound to any forms: all forms can be and
have to be transcended. However, Tillich has not drawn these conclusions
when he deals with Christology and the Trinity:  the form element as logos is
based on the classical understanding of form, and the unity and balance of
dynamics and form is Tillich’s ideal. This is the place where the tension in
Tillich’s thinking can be seen most clearly.
The idea of self-transcendence can be interpreted with the concepts of form
and substance: the dynamic substance transcends all the forms. In Tillich’s
cultural theology, the dynamic Spirit transcends all the forms. The forms are
often called “finite forms”, which shows the difference compared to the
classical view of form. Tillich’s ontology emphasizes the unity and balance of
dynamics and form: the Spirit is the unity of power and meaning and includes
dynamics and form in unity and balance. In Tillich’s cultural theology, the
Spirit can be interpreted with the concept of substance or depth which can
manifest itself in different forms. The dynamic Spirit and the idea of finite
forms (in the plural!) indicates that Tillich’s thinking moves to an even more
dynamic direction.
Tillich’s emphasis of the freedom of the Spirit contributes a positive
attitude towards other religions and cultures. However, the centrality of the
Christ event and the freedom of the Spirit contradict each other. Lai says that
“though a pneumatocentric approach can contribute to a more positive and
open attitude towards other religions, it will have difficulties in affirming the
centrality of Christ.”  Reisz emphasizes the symbol of the Spirit in Tillich’s30
110
ultimately important and becomes only a preparatory revelation, this contradicts Tillich’s
basic idea of the centrality and finality of the Christ event. On the other hand, if the
teaching of the Spirit in no way transcends the teaching of Christ, the Christian openness
is restricted and the freedom of the Spirit is limited.” Lai finds a Logos Christology in the
first two volumes of Systematic Theology, and a Spirit-Christology in the third volume.
See Lai 1994, 131-146. In Lai’s view, this problem shakes the foundations of Tillich’s
system. Lai 1994, 146: “In short, Tillich's emphasis on the freedom and universal presence
of the Spirit will create tensions with his former Chistocentric approach and will shake the
very foundation of his theological system and the method of correlation.”
 Reisz 1977, 1: “We will develop the thesis that ’Spirit’ is the most adequate and31
appropriate theological symbol for God in Tillich’s theology. Such an approach will
enhance an understanding of the dynamic nature of God in Tillich’s thought.”
 ”This calls for a category to be used in interpreting reality which is neither realistic nor32
idealistic nor supranaturalistic but essentialistic - a category pointing to the power of the
essential behind and within the existential. This analysis holds true of every life process:
everywhere, the essential is one of the determining powers. Its power is not causal but
directive.” ST III, 164. About essentialization as the aim of life and history, see ST III,
400-401, 405-409.
thinking and asks “is ’Being-itself’ the most adequate theological symbol for
God in Tillich’s theology”; he says that the Spirit is the central symbol for
God.  31
The three phases of Tillich’s thinking give ground for different
interpretations. Our analysis indicates that there are three main symbols that
Tillich uses to talk about God, and we can interpret them in the light of the
three functions of life. God as “Being-Itself” corresponds to the unity and
balance of dynamics and form and to the self-integration of life. God as “the
Power of Being” becomes understandable on the basis of the self-creation of
life where dynamics breaks through the form. God as “the Spirit” corresponds
to the self-transcendence of life where the dynamic Spirit transcends the
forms.
Tillich’s views of the church and Christian life can be expressed with the
help of self-transcendence. When Tillich describes the impact of the Spirit
upon man and community, he uses the phrase dynamic essence; in Tillich’s
ontology, essence combines the elements of dynamics and form in unity and
balance, here essence is dynamic. Tillich defines a new category,
essentialistic, which he separates from realistic, idealistic and
supranaturalistic; the essentialistic is one of the determining powers behind
every life process and becomes expressed in the existential.32
The Spiritual Presence creates the Spiritual Community. It is not identical
with the Christian churches but their dynamic essence. Tillich mostly uses this
phrase, and only when he starts to examine the matter does he speak in a
balanced way about the essential power and structure: ”In so far as they are
determined by an ultimate concern, the Spiritual Community is effective in its
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 The expression dynamic essence is found for example in the following places: ST III,33
162, 165, 168, 169, 172, 173, 177, 178, 182, 185, 217, 221, 244. For the meaning of the
phrase, see e.g. Schepers 1964, 240-242.
 ST III, 181.34
 “They are involved in the ambiguities of life - above all, of religious life - and their35
aim is to conquer these ambiguities through the power of the Spiritual Presence.” ST III,
183.
 ST III, 217. See also ST III, 218, 221.36
 ST III, 161.37
 ”The phrase ’in principle’ does not mean in abstracto but means (as do the Latin and38
Greek words principium and arche) the power of beginning, which remains the controlling
power in a whole process.” ST III, 172-173.
 ”But at the same time, there is a power of resistance against the manifold distortions of39
faith - the divine Spirit and its embodiment, the Spiritual Community.” ST III, 173. ”And
in the power of the Spiritual Presence the church must fight against the ambiguities of the
threefold manifestation of love through Spirit-determined individuals and movements.” ST
III, 180.
 ST III, 179.40
hidden power and structure  in all such groups.”  The Spiritual Presence33
gives the churches a regenerative power and the power to fight against the
ambiguities of religion and churches. The ambiguities of religion resist the
dynamics of the Spirit  but the aim of the churches is to conquer these34
ambiguities through the power of the Spiritual Presence.35
The Spiritual Community is the dynamic essence of the churches. In the
same way, the dynamic essence of every member of the Spiritual Community
is the Spiritual personality, because of which man is holy in spite of the lack
of holiness.  Man’s relation to the church is, in a visible stage, an individual’s36
relation to a social community, but on the deeper level, it is the relation of a
man, whose dynamic essence is the Spiritual personality,  to a group, whose
dynamic essence is the Spiritual Community. This idea can be interpreted with
form and substance: the Spiritual personality represents the substance of a
man and the Spiritual Community represents the substance of a group; the
substance gets its actual form in man and community.
The morality of the Spiritual Community is theonomous. The power of the
Spirit struggles against the ambiguities that are caused by the separation of
culture from morals.  In like manner, the Spiritual Community makes37
churches the community of love and faith in principle. This means, in the
original meaning of the word, the power of the beginning which remains the
controlling power of the process.  The Spirit and its embodiment, theSpiritual38
Community, also resist the disruption of love and faith.  In this way the39
church becomes involved in the ambiguities of authority and power.40
As the dynamic essence of the churches, the Spiritual Presence works
through the churches toward the self-transcendence of culture. We can see
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 ”In so far as the Spiritual Community is the dynamic essence of the churches, their41
existence is a medium through which the Spiritual Presence works toward the self-
transcendence of culture. In so far as the churches represent the Spiritual Community in
the ambiguous way of religion, their influence on the culture is itself ambiguous. This
situation stands against all theocratic attempts to subject the culture  to a church in the
name of the Spiritual Community, and it also stands against all profanizing attempts to
keep the churches in seclusion from the general cultural life.” ST III, 246.
 ST III, 245-246.42
 ST III, 246.43
 ST III, 153.44
 ST III, 153.45
 ”This implies that the divine Spirit is not bound to the media it has created, the46
churches (and their media, word and sacrament), but that the free impact of the divine
Spirit on a culture prepares for a religious community or is received because such a
community has prepared human beings for the reception of the Spiritual impact.” ST III,
246.
that the Spiritual Presence is the dynamic substance which transcends the
forms in the processes of life. Because the relation of the churches to the
Spiritual Community is ambiguous, also their relation to culture is ambiguous.
This prevents both the subjection of culture to the churches and the seclusion
of the churches from the culture.  The relation between religion and culture41
is not the same as the relation between the churches to culture. The churches
are at the same time representatives of the Spiritual Community and its
distortions, and their relation to culture is itself culture. They are not any
direct answers to the questions of culture. The examination of the relation of
the churches to culture presupposes a dual treatment, which is based on the
duality that exists in the relation of the churches to the Spiritual Community.42
The Spiritual Community expresses itself in a latent and in a manifest way:
the impact of the Spiritual Presence on cultural creativity presupposes its
representation in the churches, but the cultural groups and movements can
express it in a latent way. It can mean the preparation of the full manifestation,
or the consequence of an earlier manifestation which has lost its power in the
churches but still keeps the self-transcendence of culture alive.  Latency is a43
state which is partly actual, partly potential.  In a latent way, the Spiritual44
Community can become manifest both within the churches and outside the
organized churches. These can be, for example, youth groups, artistic,
educational and political movements.  Here we can see clearly that Tillich45
wants to keep the work of the Spirit and the Spiritual Community free from all
form that is given beforehand; the Spiritual Community is the dynamic
essence and there is no form to direct how it becomes manifest in life.
Tillich maintains that the Spirit is free from the media it has created, and
this includes the churches and their media, word and sacraments.  Once again46
this can be seen to emphasize the freedom of the Spirit from all forms. The
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 ST III, 187.47
 ST III, 193.48
 ST III, 248.49
 ”The institutions are dependent on the functions they serve, but the functions may exist50
even where no institutions serve them, and this is often the case... If an institution becomes
obsolete, other ways of exercising the same function may grow up spontaneously and take
shape in a new institutional form. This agrees with what we have said before about
freedom of the Spirit; it liberates the church from any kind of ritual legalism, in the power
of the Spiritual Community. No institution, not even a priesthood or ministry, special
sacraments or devotional services, follow necessarily from the nature of the church, but the
functions for the sake of which these institutions have come into being do follow from it.
examination of the constructive functions of the church leads to the polarity of
form-transcendence and form-affirmation. This duality has its place in the
context of self-transcendence but it is different compared to the classical view
of form in the context of self-integration. In self-transcendence, it is normal to
transcend the forms; why is it suddenly important to affirm the forms? Tillich
does not give any ontological reasons for this, but by this division he finds
some grounds for the forms and practices of the church. For example, the
churches use styles and methods created by culture in a way that both affirms
and transcends their cultural forms. As creations of the Spiritual Presence, the
churches have an ecstatic, form-transcending character,  but they become47
demonic-repressive, if the form-transcendence is emphasized over form-
preservation. In this context, the relation of the Spirit to the finite forms is
thus twofold: on one hand, the Spirit transcends the forms but on the other
hand, it does not break them.
The church manifests itself as a church only if the Spirit breaks into the
finite forms and uses them as a media of esthetic, cognitive, personal or social
self-expression or action. Here, there is no direct connection between the
Spirit and the forms: the Spirit as the dynamic substance can manifest itself or
not. In all this, the form has to be preserved: religious art or knowledge cannot
injure the artistic or cognitive  rules, and religion cannot demand culture to
obey its cultural forms in the name of the New Being.  The relation of the48
holy and the finite forms is equal to the relation of the Spirit to the forms: the
holy fills forms that are empty in themselves. The holy and the secular belong
together; the holy has to use all the forms of the secular to manifest itself. If
the holy tries to reject the secular form, it has to become silent and empty of
all finite content.49
The institutions of the church are based on certain functions which can lead
to different institutions in different situations. Not one of the institutions of
the church, including priesthood, ministry or sacraments, follows directly
from the nature of the church, even though the functions that are their basis do
follow. The argument behind this view is the freedom of the Spirit.  The50
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They never are completely missing.” ST III, 188-189.
 For more information see ST III, 207-209.51
 Der Protestantismus (1950), in  Auf der Grenze (1962), 89-92.52
 Der Protestantismus (1950), in  Auf der Grenze (1962),101.53
 The Recovery of the Prophetic Tradition in the Reformation (1950), 30 (MW 6, 352-54
353). See also Der Protestantismus als kritisches und gestaltendes Prinzip (1929), 35 (MW
6, 147).
same view is in the treatment of the legal forms of the church: they are not
based on the order given by God’s Spirit but are based on human wisdom and
social suitability for the purpose. However, every community needs some kind
of form, and the endeavours of sects to live in an anarchic state have not been
successful.  Here we can see Tillich’s idea that every social group must have51
a form because of the polarity of dynamics and form; he uses the idea of the
ontological necessity of dynamics and form but he does not say what kind of
form is the right one.
These general ideas about religion and the Spirit can be seen in Tillich’s
appreciation of Protestantism. Sometimes he defines Protestantism as the
protest against form, as in the article Der Protestantismus - Prinzip und
Wirklichkeit:
Gestaltung ist die Macht, Form zu schaffen. Der Protestantismus ist
Protest gegen Form. Wie ist beides vereinbar? ... Es soll gefragt
werden, wie Gestaltung der Form und Protest gegen die Form
zusammen in einer Kirche leben können, wie Form und der Protest
gegen Form eine neue, sich darüber spannende Form schaffen
können.52
The answer to the question, how can protest and form live in the same
church, is that also the protest is dependent on form; in a dialectical way “no”
is based on “yes”. Here, we can see Tillich’s dialectical thinking again.
Protestantism rejects all the absolutizing of the forms of church activities:
Der Protestantismus verneint die Sicherheit sakramentaler Systeme
mit ihren unverlezlichen Formen, heiligen Gesetzen, ewigen
Strukturen. Für ihn ist jeder Anspruch auf Absolutheit fragwürdig. Er
bleibt dynamisch, auch wenn er konservativ zu verden versucht... Sie
überschreitet jede Form, die sie gestaltet, aber sie überschreitet nicht
die Wirklichkeit der Gnade, die sich in diesen Formen ausdrückt.53
Protestantism is the strongest inner power in the history of Christianity and
religion, regardless of how weak it is externally. Tillich combines the
influence of the Protestant spirit to Protestantism; the less its influence, the
more features of the law.  Tillich has connected law to the form element, thus54
the Protestant spirit can be attached to the dynamic substance.
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 Cooper 1997, 196 says that Tillich’s idea of Catholic substance and Protestant55
principle expresses also his dual attitude toward the Christian faith: “The third
hermeneutical principle which we may identify as an interpretative symbol in Tillich’s
thought is a genuine polarity between the mutually dependent and complementary
elements of Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle. This principle sums up Tillich’s
dual attitude towards the Christian faith. On the one hand, he is deeply committed to the
ancient Christian symbols, and on the other, he stands as a self-conscious modern man,
critical of the distortions and misunderstandings of these symbols that have so
characterized the history of the Church.” For the Catholic substance, see also O’Meara
1985, 290-306.
 ”The Protestant principle (which is the manifestation of the prophetic Spirit) is not56
restricted to the churches of the Reformation or to any other church; it transcends every
particular church, being an expression of the Spiritual Community. It has been betrayed by
every church, including the churches of the Reformation, but it is also effective in every
church as the power which prevents profanization and demonization from destroying the
Christian churches completely. It alone is not enough; it needs the ’Catholic substance,’
the concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence; but it is the criterion of the
demonization (and profanization) of such embodiment. It is the expression of the victory
of the Spirit over religion.” ST III, 245. See also ST III, 247. Tillich spoke also in the
plural about the protestant principles,  see Our Protestant Principles (1942), 8-14 (MW 6,
247-254).
However, this creates a conceptual problem, because Tillich usually makes
a distinction between the Catholic substance and the Protestant principle: does
the Catholic substance express the traditional side of Christianity?  Tillich55
says that no church can claim to represent the Spiritual Community in a full
and unambiguous way. This is Tillich’s Protestant principle according to
which every concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Community is to be
criticized. As its pair, it needs  the Catholic substance, which can be seen in
the concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence. The Protestant principle is
the self-critical power in every church. No church can claim that it is the only
one who represents the Spiritual Presence, and the Protestant principle
expresses the victory of the Spirit over religion.  56
In this description, the Protestant principle is connected to the freedom and
victory of the Spirit over religion: the description of the Protestant spirit
resembles the description of the Spirit in general. The Catholic substance is
connected to the concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence, and this
creates a dilemma concerning the use of ’substance’ in this expression: either
the Catholic substance points to the same substance which transcends all the
concrete embodiments and forms and, in the end, is equal to the Protestant
spirit; or the Catholic substance should be called the Catholic form of the
Spiritual Presence according to Tillich’s normal vocabulary. In both cases, the
Protestant spirit indicates the dynamic substance of religion.
In this context, we can ask, how Tillich’s view would change if he always
used the phrase  dynamic and structural essence instead of the one-sided
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 Reimer 1991, 56 puts forward a critical question, if Tillich has an adequate57
ecclesiology at all: "If I have a critical question of Tillich's eschatology, it would be along
the lines identified by Schmidt; namely, does Tillich have an adequate ecclesiology, and
how does his eschatology relate to his doctrine of the church?"
 ST III, 144. Gilkey 1985, 309 expresses the relation of the New Being and the Spirit in58
the following way: "To repeat, the category of the Spirit is the symbol for the divine forces
of redemption and healing (1:251); correspondingly, the category of the New Being
represents the way in which the creative and redemptive work of God is experienced in
human history---."
 ST III, 158.59
 ST III, 150.60
dynamic essence. The idea of ’dynamic and structural essence’ would be in
accordance with the unity and balance of dynamics and form where both sides
of the polarity are equally important. This shows once again the change from
self-integration to self-transcendence: Tillich’s ontology is based on self-
integration, his ecclesiology is based on self-transcendence.  Based on the57
unity and balance of dynamics and form, Tillich developed the idea of the
New Being in Jesus as the Christ: “The divine Spirit was present in Jesus as
the Christ without distortion. In him the New Being appeared as the criterion
of all Spiritual experiences in past and future.”  Now he says that ”the58
unambiguous, though fragmentary, union of religion and culture in the
Spiritual Community is the criterion of the religious and cultural communities
and the hidden power within them which struggles against separation and
ambiguity”.   In this context, also the New Being gets a new tone: Tillich59
speaks of “New Being’s hidden presence in Jesus”.60
There is a difference of emphasis between “the New Being in Jesus as the
Christ” and “the Spiritual Presence”. Tillich’s idea of the New Being is based
on the unity and balance of dynamics and form. The element of form is
expressed by the concept of logos which is based on the classical
understanding of form. The New Being can be used as a criterion for
everything else just because of this form element. The Spiritual Presence
transcends all forms and, as a consequence, every embodiment of the Spiritual
Presence is only transitory. They cannot be used as a criterion for the other
embodiments of the Spirit. In this way, the Spiritual Presence remains vague
and abstract and cannot be used as a criterion for anything real.
4.2. The divine-demonic vitality
Dynamic themes are important in Tillich’s early writings and again in the
third volume of Systematic Theology which, as Gilkey mentions, is “only a
mild reappearance of fundamental motifs of Tillich’s process or historical
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 See Gilkey 1990, 13. Fox 1968, 175-182 gives a characterization of Tillich’s thinking61
using Plato’s distinction between eros and logos where eros is seen as a feminine and
logos  as a masculine principle. Fox thinks that the masculine and rational logos principle
has dominated the Christian and, more general, the Western view. Fox says that “Tillich’s
work may be regarded as a useful corrective to the undue masculinity of much Western
theology, but it is doubtful whether it does not fall itself into the opposite error”.
 Irwin 1991, 101-102 says that Tillich rejects the tendency of popular language to use62
erotic as a synonym for sexual or libidinal; he affirms that libidinal drives are present in
every form of eros but he insists that eros transcends pure physical desire. However, Irwin
notes that in “the preserved traces of Tillich’s private speaking and writing... ’eros’ takes
on a much more explicitly sexual character than is the case in most of Tillich’s published
treatments of the eros theme”. Irwin thinks that Tillich was unwilling to draw attention to
this subject because of his private life. He sees that the “erotic solution” of Tillich is highly
problematic because of the problems it caused to the persons closest to him. See Irwin
1991, 113-119. Ulanov 1989, 133 mentions that even though Tillich was a man of
boundaries there is one boundary missing in his writings: the boundary between masculine
and feminine, between man and woman. Anyway, it was a boundary that he lived, and he
struggled “to receive the feminine within himself, which accounted in part for his great
appeal to women”. See also May 1973, 29, 52-55. About Tillich and feminist theology in
general, see Mary Ann Stenger, The Limits and Possibilities of Tillich's Ontology for
Cross-Cultural and Feminist Theology (1989) and A Critical Analysis of the Influence of
Paul Tillich on Mary Daly's Feminist Theology (1984); Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin and
Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich
(1980);  Ann Belford Ulanov,  Between Anxiety and Faith: the Role of the Feminine in
Tillich's Theological Thought (1989).
 Irwin 1991, 46-47.63
view of being”.  Here, we shall analyze the divine-demonic vitality in the61
third volume of Systematic Theology and in Tillich’s early thinking. There are
many similarities but also differences. In Tillich’s ontology, the polarity of
dynamics and form is expressed in man as the polarity of vitality and
intentionality of which vitality is examined in more detail. He combines
vitality with the fight of the divine and the demonic in man. This can be
understood in the light of self-transcendence and it is in harmony with the
dynamic emphasis of Tillich’s theology of culture. Because the form element
is inferior, the dynamic forces obtain a twofold divine-demonic nature.
In his early writings, Tillich talks about “the primal powers of existence”
and the “vital original forces”. Especially in the early German texts Tillich
connects erotic with the deep, nonrational life-drives that are described in the
philosophy of Nietzsche and in the literature of psychoanalysis.  The other62
elemental forces are “soil”, “blood”, and the primitive “social group”. These
connect man to the earth, to the cosmos, to the life-death cycle, to the
structures of the primal community.  This aspect of human being is the63
source or ground of our vitality. 
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 Gilkey 1990, 14. Lounibos 1976, 330 says that manifold elements of nature can64
become bearers of transcendent power in ritual acts in Tillich’s thinking. He mentions
“numbers, earth, air, fire, water, stones, light, color, plants, animals, stars, seasons and the
life cycle, the human body where nature enters history and spirit is experienced, an finally
the power of words”. All these can be bearers of transcendental, sacramental power.
 Gilkey 1990, 14. For more detail see Gilkey 1990, 4, 6-7, 10, 14-18.65
 The article has been published in the fifth volume of the Main Works, 99-123. A new66
English translation by  Garrett E. Paul has been published in Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley
(ed.), Paul Tillich on Creativity (1989). The translation has an unfortunate error: the Greek
expression me on (written in Greek letters in the original German text) has been translated
as ouk on (compare pages 79 and 83 of the translation to pages 59 and 63 of the original).
The translation has usually used the English word ’form’ for both German words ’Form’
and ’Gestalt’, and this makes it difficult to see in the English text if Tillich has wanted to
make some kind of difference between the two. See e.g. page 89 of the translation and
page 70 of the original: “schöpferisch-zerstörerischen Gestalt” has been translated as
“creative-destructive form”. Jahr 1989a, 58 makes a difference between ’Form’ and
’Gestalt’: “Die jeweilige individuell-schöpferische Integration von Form und Gehalt nennt
Tillich ’Gestalt’.”
Tillich distinguishes in his early thinking  the sacramental attitude from
rational or prophetic criticism. Gilkey says that “the sacramental attitude is
clearly the spiritual or psychological equivalent to the powers of origin”  and64
that “this presence of the sacred through symbols (soil, blood, and
community) and through social relations (the status, ranks, and privileges of
rulers and owners) sanctifies and empowers these realities.”  The sacramental65
attitude is the consciousness of the presence of the divine within a finite
object, and here lies the root of sacred symbols and forms. Tillich says that all
authority is founded cultically and sacramentally by participation in the
powers of origin.
Tillich’s early thinking is expressed in the article Das Dämonische: Ein
Beitrag zur Sinndeutung der Geschichte (1926).  It does not use the concept66
of dynamics or an explicit idea of the polairity of dynamics and form, but,
instead, speaks about the form-creating (Formschöpfung) and form-destroying
(Formzerstörung) functions of the demonic. It is interesting to see these
thoughts of early Tillich in the light of the polarity of dynamics and form.
Tillich starts his early analysis of the demonic with examples of primitive
and Asian art which express depths that, he thinks, may have vanished from
our consciousness but not from our unconscious. They express vital powers
(“die vitalen Kräfte”) and principles of destruction (“die Prinzipien des
Zerstörerischen”) which seem to be a positive antithesis of form, the demonic
(“die menschheitliche Kunst die Tatsache des positiv Formwidrigen, des
Dämonischen offenbart”). In this definition, demonic has a positive
evaluation, it is a “positive antithesis of form”. It is possible, on other
grounds, to define “demonic as the form-destroying power of the
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 See Gilkey 1990, 8.67
 Das Dämonische (1926), 42-44; MW 5, 100-101.68
 Das Dämonische (1926), 46; MW 5, 102.69
 Das Dämonische (1926), 46-47; MW 5, 103-104.70
 Das Dämonische (1926), 49, MW 5, 105.71
 Das Dämonische (1926), 49; MW 5, 105.72
unconditional” and divine as “the form-creative power of the unconditional”,
as Gilkey does,  but the example shows that Tillich is not consistent in this67
division; rather, he operates with an idea of dynamic divine-demonic which
has either positive or negative effects according to the situation.  In this
context, Tillich says that the basis of the demonic is a tension between form-
creating (“Formschöpfung”) and form-destroying (“Formzerstörung”); the
demonic is to be distinguished from the satanic which does not have any
creativity.68
Tillich points to the depth (“die Tiefe”) of things which is an expression of
the unconditional, transcendent mystery beyond which thought cannot go. He
describes it as the pure existence of things (“reine Existentialität der Dinge”),
the presence of the Ground of Being (“Getragensein vom Seinsgrund”), or
their  participation in the fullness of being (“Teilhaben an der Seinsfülle”).69
This depth is also the abyss (“Abrund”). It is inexhaustible and cannot be fully
emptied to any subject, form, or world. As the productive inner infinity of
being, it is the consuming fire and the abyss of every form. Tillich clearly
emphasizes the depth or abyss - or in the light of the polarity of dynamics and
form, the dynamic element - over the form element: it is the difference
between self-integration and self-transcendence. Tillich mentions only briefly
that the form of being and the inexhaustibility of being belong together; their
depth and unity in essence are divine and their separation in existence is
demonic.  70
Tillich is trying to find a combination between a dynamic and a more
balanced view, but his basic emphasis is clearly dynamic. At points, he
expresses this directly, as in the comparison of possession and grace:
“Besessenheit und Begnadetheit entsprechen sich, dämonisches und göttliches
Überwältigtsein, Inspiriertesein, Durchbrochensein sind Korrelate. In beiden
Erscheinungen sind es die schöpferischen Urkräfte, die formzersprengend in
das Bewusstsein einbrechen.”  Possession and grace use the same powers,71
but grace unites these powers to the highest form (“der höchsten Form”) while
possession uses them to contradict the highest form.  This brings in72
unexpectedly the concept of “highest form” without explaining it any further.
It seems to imply that the effect of grace is in accordance with this highest
form while possession is against it, and that naturally raises the question of the
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 Das Dämonische (1926), 49-51; MW 5, 104-106.73
 Mallow 1983, 118 makes the conclusion that “in the human personality, the74
foundational structure of the demonic is in the subconscious level of the human soul.”
 “Die dritte Dimension nach oben und unten, die göttlich-dämonische,75
formdurchbrechende.” Das Dämonische (1926), 62; MW 5, 116.
 Das Dämonische (1926), 65; MW 5, 118.76
meaning of this highest form to life in general; it could be used also as a
criterion to separate the effects of grace and possession.
As examples in his analysis of the demonic, Tillich uses the unconscious,
will to power, chaos, libido, the vital powers, the ecstatic, overwhelming and
creative ability of the abyss to shatter the limits of personality - and yet he
hastens to say that it is not necessarily bound to the unconscious - without
giving grounds or examples to convince us of this conclusion.  It seems that73
Tillich is not willing to draw the conclusions that his analysis grants him: the
divine-demonic is to be found in the unconscious and in the dynamic forces of
life.  Many of the examples Tillich uses are the same that he later uses to74
explain the element of dynamics. Tillich wants to see a third dimension
besides form and matter, both divine and demonic, above and beneath,
breaking through form  but often it is difficult to see how it is different from75
the dynamic forces of life - or at least it seems that it is to be found in the
“depths” of the dynamic side.
Tillich says that there is a form of antiform (“eine Form der
Formwidrigkeit”); here we can see Tillich’s dialectical thinking again. He
emphasizes that also the demonic has to have a form, but in his analysis it
remains quite unclear what the forms in themselves are and where they come
from. He says that secularisation realizes pure rational form, and that the
forms can grow empty or be filled with finite and mundane dynamic. So the
forms just seem to be “there”, either filled with the divine-demonic or
remaining empty. Again the emphasis is on the dynamic side: if the forms
have grown empty, the subhuman demons replace the superhuman ones
because the vital, primal powers cannot be banned, and they return in erotic
symbolism, brutal gestures and franzied forms (“Die vitalen Urkräfte können
ja nicht gebannt werden... So kehrt die erotische Symbolik, die Geste brutalen
Machtwillens, die Darstellung aller Rauschformen in naturalistischem
Gewande wieder.”)  76
At times, however, Tillich gives totally opposite claims about forms, as if
they represented the divine; in connection with Greek philosophy, he calls me
on or the matter principle which resists rational form as the element of the
demonic (“dämonisches Element”), and when he talks about the unconditional
being which is beyond the sensible forms, he says: “Insofern nun die
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 Das Dämonische (1926), 59; MW 5, 113.77
 Das Dämonische (1926), 64; MW 5, 117.78
 Das Dämonische (1926), 56; MW 5, 110.79
 Reisz 1984, 150 also finds a dilemma in Tillich’s thinking: “The forms that the80
demonic creates are forms that contain evacuated, superficial, essence-destructive, or
perverse meaning. How is it possible that the power of Being is at once the ground of the
demonic and that which overcomes the demonic?” See also Meitzen 1989, 10-13 about
“the question of demonic creativity”.
 “Die Tiefe des Dämonischen ist gerade die, dass das Sinnhafte und Sinnwidrige in ihm81
unlöslich verbunden sind.” Das Dämonische (1926), 70; MW 5, 122.
 Reisz 1984, 144-145 says that “for Tillich, non-Being, the meonic, is an intradivine82
reality” and a positive element. Also “abyss” and “ground of Being” are used to refer to
God, or an element in God. In Reisz’s view, the influence of Böhme and Schelling is clear.
Zerstörung dieser Formen Merkmal des Dämonischen ist...”  Again, he77
writes: “Insofern im Göttlichen die Forderung enthalten ist, dass die reine
Form verwirklicht werde, ist Profanisierung Bejahung der Göttlichen.”78
However, the divine demands transcending every form: “Insofern im
Göttlichen die unbedingte Transzendenz gegenüber jeder Form enthalten ist,
bedeutet Profanität Entgöttlichung.” This indicates the idea of self-
transcendence that can be seen again in the third volume of Systematic
Theology.
The problems of Tillich’s thinking can be seen when he uses the idea of
“depths” to explain the sacred history: the sacred character lies hidden in the
depths of history; if it is brought up to surface, it loses its unconditional,
meaning-giving significance (“unbedingt sinngebende Bedeutung”).79
Usually, the depths contain the divine-demonic forces, now, all of a sudden,
they carry the meaning-giving significance. Tillich connects meaning to form
in the context of self-integration but in the context of self-transcendence
meaning can be connected to substance. Thus, on one hand, the depths contain
the dual divine-demonic forces, on the other hand, the depths contain the
unconditional, meaning-giving significance. This leads to accidental
statements: there is no general way to say when the depths have a dynamic,
form-destroying effect, and when they have an unconditional, meaning-giving
effect.80
Without any definite content, the form-creating and form-destroying
divine-demonic and the idea of form-affirmation and form-transcendence can
be used in accidental and contradictory ways. There is no objective or even
formal way to say when something is demonic and when it is divine: Tillich’s
analyses of culture and society have a highly prophetic character. Tillich says
that the demonic unites both the rational and the anti-rational within itself
inseparably.  Tillich wants to keep the divine and the demonic together - or81
even the demonic inside the divine  -, and this gives irrational features also to82
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King 1955, 308-309 says that  there is a great problem in Tillich’s view of God as abyss
and as logos: "By attributing evils in the world to some nonrational aspect in God's nature,
Tillich introduces a dualism into the divine nature that can hardly be regarded as
satisfactory either religiously or intellectually. This conception suffers from all of the
inadequacies of any ultimate metaphysical dualism. Tillich leaves such a tremendous gap
between God as abyss and God as logos that there hardly appears to be a point of contact
between the two. Nowhere does Tillich adequately explain the relationship of these two
aspects of God's nature. So great is the mystery between the abyss and the logos that one
is compelled to wonder why the two should be called God."
 “Der einfache Formmangel freilich, die Schwäche eines sozialen Gebildes, ist nicht83
dämonisch. Wohl aber die Herrschaft einer übergreifenden, unantasbaren, das Leben
tragenden Form, die in sich das Bild des Zerstörerischen hat und zwar so hat, dass es
wesensmässig mit ihrer tragenden, schöpferischen Kraft verbunden ist.” Das Dämonische
(1926), 51-52; MW 5, 107.
 Reisz gives a good description of Tillich’s view of the demonic. He shows that the84
roots of Tillich’s concept of the demonic are in the thoughts of Böhme and Schelling. See
The Demonic as a Principle in Tillich’s Doctrine of God: Tillich and Beyond (1984), 136-
143. See also Vernon R. Mallow, The Demonic: An Examination into the Theology of
Edwin Lewis, Karl Barth, and Paul Tillich (1983).
the divine. The influence of Böhme and Schelling is clear. This kind of view
gives also a tragic and irrational strain to life.
In connection to the social demons, Tillich says a bit unexpectedly that the
truly demonic is a majestic, overwhelming, unassailable, life-bearing form
that holds in itself the image of destruction and the power of creativity.  This83
could be understood on the basis of the polarity of dynamics and form and the
two modes of the demonic, as over-emphasis of either side - thus also of the
form side of the polarity; or on the basis of the demonic as the elevation of the
conditional to the unconditional, but it is not well grounded in the context of
the article. However, the idea that the social demon has the image of
destruction and the power of creativity is in accordance with Tillich’s
description of the demonic.
Tillich’s attitude towards the dynamic forces seems to differ: in the polar
thinking of Systematic Theology, dynamics needs the element of form as its
polar counterpart, and the one-sided expressions of dynamics are described as
consequences of estrangement; in the early texts Tillich seems to make a
much more positive evaluation of the dynamic forces, the powers of origin.
They are, true, divine-demonic and can have also a negative effect but on the
whole the meaning of form is secondary compared to the dynamic side. These
ideas are closely connected to Tillich’s view of the demonic.
Reisz develops a view of the demonic “that grows out of Tillich’s own
work but is not explicit in his writings”.  It is based on Tillich’s postulation84
of two elements in God: “Life-power” and “Life-in-meanings”; both of these
involve both elements of dynamics and form, although dynamics might
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 Reisz 1984, 155.85
 ST I, 141.86
 ”It seems that the original mana religion places strong emphasis on the Spiritual87
Presence in the ’depth’ of everything that is. This divine power in all things is invisible,
mysterious, approachable only through definite rituals, and known to a particular group of
men, the priests.” ST III, 141-142.
 ST III, 240.88
 ST III, 241.89
dominate in the first and form in the latter. The two major modes of the
demonic are: (1) a mode that primarily emphasizes meaning, and (2) one that
primarily emphasizes power.  85
These two modes are in accordance with Tillich’s polar thinking where the
balance of the polar elements expresses the essential being, and one-sidedness
to either direction is an expression of the existential estrangement. However,
it can be seen that the main emphasis of the demonic in Tillich’s early
thinking is on the dynamic side, even though many of the thoughts seem to
imply the later polar thinking and become more understandable in the light of
it. In Systematic Theology, there is also another definition of the demonic as
“the elevation of something conditional to unconditional significance”,  and86
also glimpses of it can be seen in the early thinking of Tillich.
Some of the dynamic themes can be found also in Systematic Theology.
Tillich says that the primitive mana religions emphasize the Spiritual Presence
in the depth of everything: the divine power is invisible and hidden, and
accessible only by certain rituals. This connects the Spiritual Presence clearly
on the dynamic side of the polarity. He says that “this early substantial vision
of the Spiritual Presence survives with many variations in almost all the so-
called high religions”.  The psychoanalytic movement has shown that even87
the spiritual actions of man have their roots in the vitalistic tendencies of
human nature. It is not possible to reject vitality as the Christian and
humanistic moralism try to do, but it is not always possible to express
everything, and that is why discipline  is needed, supported by creative eros
and wisdom.88
Seeking harmless pleasure and depreciating vitalistic forces is, however,
dangerous: it leads to repeated outbursts of the rejected or only partly
approved forces. The acceptance of the vitalistic forces includes the
acceptance of life in its divine-demonic ambiguity. The victory of the Spirit is
to take control over these forces and not to substitute them with some
harmless things. Tillich says: “He who tries to avoid the demonic side of the
holy also misses its divine side and gains but a deceptive security between
them.”  In this description, the holy has a demonic and a divine side, and it89
becomes also divine-demonic. Tillich uses a picture of a battle field, where
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 ”The demonic self-elevation of particular forces in the centered personality and the91
claim of their absolute superiority leads to the reaction of other forces and to a split
consciousness... A consequence of these splits, connected with the nature of the demonic,
is the state of being ’possessed’ by the power which produces the split.” ST III, 103.
 ”Demonic structures in the personal and communal life cannot be broken by acts of92
freedom and good will. They are strengthened by such acts-except when the changing
power is a divine structure, that is, a structure of grace.” ST III, 103. See also ST III, 173.
 See ST III, 95.93
 Randall 1952, 154 claims that there is “a basic unclarity” in Tillich’s thinking: “At94
times he follows Heidegger in looking for the structure of being ’in man.’ This is the
characteristic method of idealism, as Heidegger has more explicitly recognized since his
Sein und Zeit. But at other times Tillich, following his own insights rather than another’s
thought, holds that the structure of being is found by man in his encounter with the world-
that it is not the structure of man, but of man’s cooperation with the world, a cooperation
of which man is but one pole. This is a quite different ontology, not that of idealism, but
of what I should call empirical naturalism, and accept.”
one is in the middle of the divine and the demonic, fighting against the
demonic and anticipating the victory of the divine.
When Tillich examines the threat of the demonic, the context often
connects it to the vitalistic forces, even though it is not always directly
mentioned. Because the form principle is in the background, also the divine
has a vitalistic nature - and not the nature of uniting dynamics and form - and
this makes the view complex: there are no criteria of content to make the
difference between the divine and the demonic; subjective evaluation becomes
important.
In this context, Tillich’s language is dynamic: he rejects the view that the
demonic could be defined as the influence of the demonic forces to individual
and community;  the claim of the absoluteness of some forces creates a90
reaction from other forces, concluding in a split of consciousness, which leads
to a state of being possessed by the power producing the split.  Tillich tries to91
balance his view in a dialectical way by calling it the demonic structure; the
change is possible only by the divine structure, which is also a structure of
grace.  The concepts are used crosswise: to be under the powers shows the92
demonic structure, and the divine structure is grace, which he also calls the
motivating power.  Tillich wants to keep both the dynamic and the structural93
elements and uses dialectical statements, but when the polarity is not clearly
expressed, the picture becomes confused.
The progress of Tillich’s system opens a very interesting perspective to his
view of the self: what happens to the self in the development of Tillich’s
thoughts? The basic question is whether the ontological polarities and their
unity and balance are found also in the self or is the self only one (dynamic)
pole of the polarity.  In Tillich’s description of the ontological polarities, the94
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 Anderson 1990, 66-70 makes a distinction between the existential self and the faithful95
self which transcends the human condition. Anderson describes Tillich’s view of the
human condition as one permeated with estrangement, much in line with the humanistic
psychology. This state threatens the essential nature of the self as a whole, integrated
being, and is experienced in anxiety and fear. The human condition is that of finitude, and
it is experienced in the awareness of having to die. Anderson says that to be finite means
for Tillich to be limited by time and space. The human being exists as a person in a
particular body and place, and experiences himself as an individual self in the world. This
causes the self to make the distinction between self and world.The reason for this is that
the self in its estranged condition cannot see the structure of reality in its wholeness. The
self creates the self-world correlation, and attempts to create meaning. “Thus, we must
look through the eyes of the self in order to see the world. The self is not the center of
everything that exists, but it is the center of its world.” This is a description of the
existential self. Anderson says that the essential nature of the self is found in the union of
the self-world correlation. The polar ontological elements are in unity in the essential self.
The estrangement and the separation of the polar elements is derived from the self’s
separation from the ground and source of being. Anderson 1990, 128 says that the faithful
self transcends the human situation: “Paradoxically, the faithful self accepts its estranged
condition as acceptable because it is only through its estrangement that the self can exist.
For Tillich, the faithful self transcends the human condition of estrangement by accepting
its position in relation to the ultimate which transcends the human condition. By
participating in the dynamic power of being, Tillich sees that the faithful self can transcend
the human condition in which the self exists. For Tillich, the self is dynamic since it can
participate in the ultimate which transcends the human condition while at the same time
the human condition is the only one in which the self can exist.”
 ST III, 105-106.96
first elements (individualisation, dynamics, and freedom) are connected more
to the self than to the world, which in turn is on the same side with
participation, form and destiny. The self is placed on the dynamic side of the
polarity even though Tillich’s ontology emphasizes self-integration and the
balance of the polarities;  it is easy to turn from the ontological balance of95
self and world to a view where the dynamic self is restricted by the forms or
possessed by some powers that cause a split; this indicates the idea of self-
transcendence.
What kind of view of the self emphasizes dynamics at the expense of form?
It leads to an appreciation of the subconscious and prerational in man: the
dynamic vitality. In self-integration and still in self-creativity, Tillich
maintains the importance of form, but in self-transcendence, form is more
suppressed. Tillich has emphasized the dynamic vitality especially in his early
texts but the idea of the divine-demonic vitality reappears in the third volume
of the system.
Occasionally, Tillich combines  the overemphasis of the finite forms to the
demonic: religion can become demonic if it claims a superb position for itself
and for the finite forms with which it points to the infinite.  It is a demonic96
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 ”Divine power lies behind religious doctrines and religious art. But the demonic97
distortion begins when new insight presses toward the surface and is trodden down in the
name of the dogma, the consecrated truth, or when new styles seek to express the drives of
a period and are prevented from doing so in the name of religiously approved forms of
expression.” ST III, 106.
 ”The conflict arising here is one between the consecrated truth of the dogma and the98
truth which unites dynamic change and creative form.” ST III, 106.
 See ST III, 142.99
 ST III, 234.100
 ST III, 238.101
 ST III, 239.102
 ST III, 231.103
 ST III, 232.104
disruption, when, for example, in the name of a consecrated art form,  the
effort of new styles to express their period is rejected;  the overemphasis of97
the finite form is demonic in suppressing life. The truth should unite dynamic
change and creative form.  The ontological polarity of dynamics and form98
gives both an equally important foundation, so it is logical to connect the
threat of the demonic to the overemphasis of one or the other. The idea of
uniting dynamic change and creative form would give a good basis to develop
Tillich’s views further.
Tillich’s view of the divine and the demonic raises the question of divine
and demonic potentiality: in another context he calls dualism the attempt to
concentrate all the demonic potentiality into one feature and to liberate the
opposite divine feature from all demonic contamination.  Are there both good99
and bad potentialities (which leads to a dualistic view of God and Satan) or is
the demonic the actualization of the dynamic potentiality apart from the form
with which  it is essentially united  (in which case the demonic is the
disruption of essential being and the divine)? Because the essential form
element is mostly lacking in Tillich’s theology of culture, there are no clear
criteria of content to make the difference between the divine and the demonic.
The expression ’demoninc potentiality’ is interesting but unfortunately Tillich
does not explain in more detail what he means by it.
Tillich uses dynamic expressions also with other central concepts: the
divine Spirit is the power of breaking through the walls of self-seclusion,100
representatives of the power of the New Being can be found in the religious as
well as in the secular realm,  and its saving power drives away doubt.  In101 102
connection with sanctification, Tillich says that man has to be aware of the
powers that struggle around him. The consciousness of both the divine and the
demonic gives power to affirm life and its vital dynamics.  It is a matter of103
growing in the power of the spirit.104
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In the polarity of dynamics and form, the elements belong together and
their imbalance and separation is the expression of the estrangement. Without
this explicit polar thought Tillich has to make dialectical divisions inside the
elements: the dynamic side is both form-creating and form-destroying, and
there is a form of antiform - both highly problematic statements which cannot
explain how the dynamic divine-demonic element can be form-creating and
how form can include a form against form. At least these questions are better
answered with the polarity of dynamics and form. In Tillich’s early thinking,
the divine-demonic is more often to be found in the “depths” of the dynamic
forces, in his polar thinking, both elements are equally important and too
much emphasis on either side could be called demonic.
Tillich’s early thinking is existential by nature and it indicates the idea of
self-transcendence. The idea of self-integration and the unity and balance of
dynamics and form can be used to explain the basic thoughts in the beginning
of Systematic Theology. However, the idea of self-transcendence and many of
the early views come back in the third volume of the system. In the frames of
the system, this means moving to a more dynamic direction compared to the
starting points of the system. From the historical point of view, it is obvious
that the classical strain in the beginning of Systematic Theology is “static”
compared to the rest of his writings.
In the third volume, Tillich emphasizes that the Spiritual Presence does not
destroy the rational structure of man; otherwise, it would be demonic. This is
a point where it is possible to see a change of emphasis between Tillich’s
early and later dynamic views: in the early thinking, Tillich says that the
divine-demonic both creates and breaks the form; in the third volume of
Systematic Theology - at least in the part dealing directly with the question -
he emphasizes that the Spiritual Presence does not break the form which
would be demonic. In a more general way, the change can be seen in the
replacement of the divine-demonic depth by the idea of Spiritual Presence or
the Spirit. In Tillich’s polar view, the divine-demonic is the first element of
God which is balanced by the form or logos principle. This view has its effect
on Tillich’s view of the Spirit and the Spiritual Presence, even though the
emphasis is again on the dynamic side.
4.3. Self-transcending history and the Kingdom of God
The fifth part of Tillich’s system is “History and the Kingdom of God”. This
part of the system is an extension of the fourth, separated from it for
“traditional and practical reasons”. Tillich says that “in the analysis of the
dimensions of life given in the fourth part of the system, the historical
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dimension was put in brackets”.  The historical dimension of life demands105
its own treatment in the theological system, because it is the most all-
exclusive dimension; it preconceives the others and adds a new dimension to
them. It is possible only after the dimension of life has actualized itself. The
Hegelian and Neo-Platonic strains of Tillich’s thinking can be seen in his
view of history.106
Tillich describes the liveliness and movement of history with the expression
’dynamics of history’, which emphasizes the change and development of
history.  Life creates itself and can destroy itself when the dynamics of history
drive toward the new.  Tillich explains that he chose the expression107
’dynamics of history’ to remind philosophy that it is necessary to deal with
history also from the point of view of its dynamics, and not only from the
point of view of its logical and classifying structure.  History is a dynamic108
force:  ”History does not move in an equal rhythm but is a dynamic force
moving through cataracts and quiet stretches.”  This indicates a dynamic109
view of life. 
When Tillich deals with life and history, he uses the concepts of potentiality
and actuality, and the emphasis is on self-transcendence. The historical
dimension is potentially present in all dimensions of life in an anticipatory
way, partly potential, partly actual.  The historical dimension combines all the
other dimensions, and the potentialities of the inorganic become actual in
history.  These thoughts show that the term potential points to a state110
somewhere in history. As we have seen, along with this horizontal line of
thought there is a vertical line of thought that sees and explains  life under the
conditions of existence as the estrangement from the essential state of things.
There is a tension between these two ways to explain life.
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History means most of all man’s history, though the historical dimension
attaches itself to all processes of life.  The treatment of life includes the111
treatment of history, and the description of the ambiguities of life must
include the ambiguities of history. Life actualizes itself fully in the history of
man.  Man is free and can transcend the given environment:112
Man, in so far as he sets and pursues purposes, is free. He transcends
the given situation, leaving the real for the sake of the possible. He is
not bound to the situation in which he finds himself, and it is just this
self-transcendence that is the first and basic quality of freedom.113
Man can also lose his potential freedom and interest to transcend the
environment. The continuous effort to actualize the unforseen potentialities
can lead to the destruction of life.  Prehistory became history when the114
potentiality of the prehistorical man turned from potentiality to actuality;  it115
is also possible that the history of mankind will end. The future is open to
possibilities that arise from the present. It is possible that the self-destructive
forces of mankind will get power and lead us to destruction. 
Man can leave the real in order to gain the potential. As a consequence, one
basic feature of man’s history is to create the new; as an act of the spirit
“creating means transcending the given in the horizontal direction without a
priori limits, and it means bringing something into a definite, concrete
existence.”  There is a duality in creation: it means transcending the given116
and bringing something into existence. In the light of self-transcendence, the
concrete form at the same time manifests and hides; the reality behind the
visible form is more than the form it gets in life. The relation of the potential
and the actual is the same: actuality expresses and hides the possibilities of the
potential; all potentialities do not actualize themselves. The potential includes
more than the actual, the invisible includes more than the visible, dynamic
substance is more than the form it gets in life.
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In self-transcendence, the form at the same time manifests and limits the
vitality of life or the dynamic substance. The view of form is different
compared to the classical view of form which is important in the self-
integration of life. In the classical view, the potential fully corresponds to the
actual. In self-transcendence, the dynamic substance is free from the
limitations of form: substance can manifest itself in different forms but it is
not tied to any form; forms can express the deeper substance but forms can
also remain empty. In the development of Tillich’s system, we can see the
change of emphasis from the balance and unity of dynamics and form to the
breaking through the form by dynamics, and, finally, to the transcendence of
the forms by the dynamic substance.
In Tillich’s view, the processes of life are united in history to one big
process directed towards an aim. Tillich uses all three processes of life to
describe the movement toward an aim:
There is still self-integration, but not as an end in itself; self-
integration under the historical dimension serves the drive toward
universal and total integration. There is still self-creativity, but not
for the sake of particular creations; self-creativity under the historical
dimension serves the drive toward that which is universally and
totally new. And there is still self-transcendence, but not toward a
particular sublimity; self-transcendence under the historical
dimension serves the drive toward the universally and totally
transcendent.117
What gives meaning and aim to history? In his ontology, Tillich has
connected meaning and value to the element of form. Tillich’s view of history
is based on the idea of self-transcendence where forms are transcended by the
dynamic substance: in self-transcendence, form is static and substance
contains meaning and aim. In Gilkey’s words: “...vitality, élan, ’life,’ which
’is the creative drive of the living substance,’ represents a drive ’towards new
forms’ (ST I:180). As the eros or drive toward the new form, vitality
represents, therefore, the secret essence of intentionality or purpose, and it is
the latter that propels the living self beyond itself into the next moment, into
’transcending itself.’”118
Tillich says that ”the horizontal direction under the dimension of the spirit
has the character of intention and purpose”.  In a historical event, human119
purposes are the decisive factor. The new that history creates can be defined
as new actualizations of value in centered persons.  A deed which makes120
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man a person, a cultural creation which has meaning, and a religious
experience where infinite meaning breaks into the world of finite meanings
are examples of events that have infinite meaning. In the dimension of the
spirit, life can experience the ultimate and create symbols and embodiments of
the ultimate.121
The events that express the human potentiality in a unique way can become
historically meaningful. These potentialities must actualize themselves and
express the directedness of history towards the aim.  Also nature creates122
new, as new species in evolution, but if the dimension of the spirit is not
actual, the events do not have absolute meaning and uniqueness; not even the
creation of species in evolution has this meaning.   The new that history123
creates is combined with meanings and values.124
The ambiguities of the self-creation of life are expressed in the tension of
old and new. In history, this leads to the tension of revolution and reaction.
Tillich has defined self-creation on the basis of dynamics and form, and from
the point of view of the polarity, this duality is unexpected: the duality of
revolution and tradition would express the dynamic and the formal elements
of the polarity. Tillich’s view of history is dynamic. The emphasis on
development can lead to progressivism, but it is not justified to believe in an
endless development.  The tension between revolution and reaction is most125
destructive, if one or the other claims  ultimate position for itself;  it can lead126
to demonization. This is the basis for the struggle of the sacred old and
prophetic new in religion.127
The ambiguities of the historical self-creation lead to the questions of social
growth. The relation of the old and the new leads to conflicts between
tradition and revolution; now Tillich uses this pair of opposites. It is wrong to
oppose revolution in principle, because the chaos that follows revolution can
be creative. Here we can hear an echo of Tillich’s thought that there is a
“moment of chaos” between the old and the new form in the self-creation of
life. The destructive effects of social growth are conquered in the Kingdom of
God.  However, it is not the victory of the Kingdom of God if the128
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revolutionary groups try to break cultural and political structures.  This can129
be explained by Tillich’s thought that every group has to have a form because
of the polarity of dynamics and form.
The Kingdom of God conquers the ambiguities of historical growth when
revolution is built upon tradition and every problem finds a creative solution
aiming at the ultimate end of history.  Religion, including Christianity, has130
been mainly in the conservative-traditional side. Those times when the
prophetic spirit has challenged the doctrinal and ritual traditions of the priests
are exceptions. These occasions are rare because slow growth is normal. This
explains the majority of religious tradition over religious revolution.131
When Tillich deals with the life-processes in connection with the Kingdom
of God, he says that it is important to examine the ambiguities of power.132
Power is essentially divine, because God as power is the source of particular
powers. Power is the possibility to resist non-being. The Kingdom of God
conquers  the disintegrating forces.  Tillich thinks that from the point of133
view of history, groups are more important than individuals, and groups must
have a power centre that can keep the individuals together and preserve the
group’s power to deal with other such groups. Groups must have ways to
preserve their power and an authority which makes laws. These conditions are
best fulfilled in a state.  The potential and actual endeavours of individuals134
become manifest in groups.135
The feeling of belonging to a group and the acceptance of its laws and
authorities are behind the organised structures of the groups.  If this136
acceptance comes to an end, it takes away the basis of the power structure.
The group is destroyed, if the feeling of belonging to it is replaced by
compulsion. The vocational consciousness of the group is dependent on its
goal, and if the goal disappears or is not developed, the element of power
becomes determining. Germany and  Italy in the 20th century are examples of
this.  Here we can see the need for the unity of power and meaning which137
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Tillich has developed on the basis of dynamics and form and the other
polarities.
Tillich warns that the churches should not forget eschatological dynamics.
The power of the New Being effective in them conquers the demonic powers
and the forces of profanization. The churches should feel that they are leading
forces striving towards the fulfilment of history.  The demonic forces can be138
seen also in the church, but Christ is the conqueror of them.  Tillich speaks139
of the New Being, demonization and profanization as forces. At the side of the
New Being he places also bad forces or powers. In Tillich’s ontology, being
is a polar concept combining in balance dynamics and form and the other
polarities; compared to that, these definitions are much more dynamic.
The idea of kairos expresses the self-transcending nature of history: there
was a moment at which “history... had matured to the point of being able to
receive the breakthrough of the central manifestation of the Kingdom of
God”.  The New Testament calls it “the fulfilment of time”, kairos.  Tillich140
says that this must be contrasted with chronos, measured time. The great
kairos is the appearance of the center of history, and it is re-experienced
through relative kairoi in which the Kingdom of God manifests itself in a
particular breakthrough. Awareness of a kairos is a matter of vision and
involved experience.  141
Tillich says: “The Kingdom of God is always present, but the experience of
its history-shaking power is not. Kairoi are rare and the great kairos is unique,
but together they determine the dynamics of history in its self-
transcendence.”  He also uses the phrase ’self-transcending dynamics of142
history’  which shows that the emphasis is on self-transcendence as it is in143
the theology of culture in general. The idea that the Spirit breaks through the
forms is obvious: “For although the prophetic Spirit is latent or even repressed
134
 ST III, 370.144
 ST III, 371.145
 ST III, 297-298.146
 ST III, 356-359.147
 See ST III, 373.148
 ST III, 402.149
 ST III, 402-403.150
 ”Beyond this, culture as spiritual creativity becomes, at the same time, Spiritual151
creativity. The human spirit’s creativity in Eternal Life is revelation by the divine Spirit -
as it is fragmentarily already in the Spiritual Community. Man’s creativity and divine self-
manifestation are one in the fulfilled Kingdom of God. In so far as culture is an
independent human enterprise, it comes to an end in the end of history. It becomes eternal
divine self-manifestation through the finite bearers of the Spirit.” ST III, 403.
over long stretches of history, it is never absent and breaks through the
barriers of the law in a kairos.”  144
The idea of kairos indicates the self-transcendence of history:
A last question arises as to whether there are periods in history in
which no kairos is experienced. Obviously the Kingdom of God and
the Spiritual Presence are never absent in any moment of time, and
by the very nature of the historical process, history is always self-
transcendent.145
The search for unambiguous life leads to the symbols of Spiritual Presence,
Kingdom of God, and Eternal Life.  The symbol of the Kingdom of God is146
both inner historical and trans-historical. It participates in the dynamics of
history, and as trans-historical gives the answers to the questions involved in
the ambiguities of history. History comes to end when biblically speaking
“God is all in all”.  The demonic powers cannot prevent history from147
reaching its aim.  In Eternal Life,  morality, culture, and religion come to an148
end as separate functions. There is “no ought-to-be in it which, at the same
time, is not”, “there is no law where there is essentialization, because what the
law demands is nothing but the essence, creatively enriched in existence”.
Eternal Life can be called the life of eternal and perfect love.149
Eternal Life is also the end of culture. In Eternal Life, culture is united with
the creativity of the Spirit, and there is no separate culture based on the self-
creation of life.  In the fulfilled Kingdom of God, the human spirit’s150
creativity is revelation by the divine Spirit, and man’s creativity and divine
self-manifestation are one. Culture comes to an end as an independent human
enterprise.  The aim, telos of the individual is determined by the choices he151
has made by the potentialities that destiny has given him; man can waste his
potentialities or fulfill them. In either case it does not happen completely. 
In Eternal Life there is no religion. Religion is the consequence of man’s
estrangement from the ground of being and the attempt to return to it; in
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 Gelder 1991, 165 emphazises that the Kingdom of God as a symbol means the157
manifestation of the unity of the polar pairs here and now, in the historical existence.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the essential and the existential features are
mixed in life and the complete unity and balance of the polar pairs is not possible before
the final fulfilment of the Kingdom of God.
Eternal Life this return has taken place. Also, the gap between the secular and
religious is overcome. Tillich says that in biblical terminology, “Heavenly
Jerusalem” is “a city  in which there is no temple because God lives there”.152
Tillich uses the phrase essentialization  in this context to describe, how153
negative is verified as negative and remains in non-being, while the positive
is preserved in Eternal Life.  In Tillich’s view, God is not separated from the154
world, and the system reaches its climax in the theocentric vision where the
meaning of all existence opens up from the divine life.155
The Kingdom of God has ontological implications, and Tillich brings up
ontological considerations more than in the other parts dealing with life and
history. He wants to combine the starting point and the conclusion of his
system, and in the end he is again “a methaphysical spectator”. Tillich refers
to the polarity of dynamics and form when he deals with the meaning of the
unambiguous self-creation as a feature of Eternal Life:
The second question is: What is the meaning of unambiguous self-
creativity as a characteristic of Eternal Life? The answer points to the
second pair of polar elements in the structure of being: dynamics and
form. In Eternal Life these two poles are also in perfect balance.
They are united in that which transcends their polar contrast: the
divine creativity, which includes the finite creativity without making
it into a technical tool of itself. The self in self-creativity is preserved
in the fulfilled Kingdom of God.156
Thus, Tillich wants to unite the beginning and the end: the perfect balance
of dynamics and form, which was the ideal of Tillich’s ontology, is achieved
in the Kingdom of God; in life, the polar elements are in tension and in
conflict, but in the end, they are in perfect balance.  They are united in the157
divine creativity which transcends their polar tension. The divine creativity
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includes the finite creativity in itself. In Eternal Life, all the ontological
polarities are in perfect balance.
Creation is creation for the end. The new is created between the beginning
and the end but the aim is  already within the foundation. Thus, creation has
its potential roots in the foundation and in this sense it is not new.  This158
sounds again as the classical view of dynamics and form with which Tillich
combines the end with the beginning. Tillich’s system develops from self-
integration through self-creation to self-transcendence. Tillich wants to
combine the three functions of life in his system, and this creates the basic
tension and the conceptual problems of the system.
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5. CONCLUSION
The subject of this study is the polarity of dynamics and form in Tillich’s
thinking. The analysis shows that Tillich’s thinking can be interpreted with
the three functions of life: self-integration, self-creation, and self-
transcendence. These are based on the three ontological polarities:
individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and
destiny; in turn, they are the basis for morality, culture, and religion.
Explicitly, the polarity of dynamics and form is the basis for the self-creation
of life. 
The tension between dynamics and form is the starting point for Tillich’s
system, and the tension is ultimately grounded in God. That means that the
tension between the classical and the modern view of dynamics and form is
also the starting point for Tillich’s system. Tillich’s ontology and description
of the New Being are based on the idea of self-integration: the ideal is the
unity and balance of dynamics and form, and both of the elements are equally
important. Form remains unbroken and form is the essence of a thing. There
are forms of the self-transcendence of form. This is the way Tillich unites the
classical view and the modern view of dynamics and form: even if the form is
transcended, it happens within the form. If we are willing to accept Tillich’s
system as coherent, we will have to accept this kind of dialectical thinking.
In self-creation, dynamics as vitality breaks through the form and creates
new forms, and this indicates the modern view of dynamics and form. There
is a moment of chaos between the old and the new form, and this gives a
possibility for creation or destruction. This view is different compared to self-
integration and to the classical view of form. In the self-transcendence of life,
the Spirit or the Spiritual Presence transcends the finite forms and manifests
itself in different forms: the ideas can be expressed with form and substance.
Tillich wants to include the three functions of life in one system, and this
creates the basic tension and the conceptual problems in his thinking.
At first, Tillich gives a classical definition of form: form makes a thing
what it is, it is its essence; this indicates self-integration. In the self-creation of
life, creation is always creation of form, and every new form is made possible
only by breaking through the old form. The element of form becomes static
compared to the classical view of form. In self-transcendence, the Spirit
transcends the finite forms and manifests itself in different forms: the
connection between dynamics and form loosens, and the form element is
expressed in “finite forms”. In the classical view of dynamics and form, the
potential corresponds to the actual, and this indicates self-integration. In self-
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creation, dynamics as the vitality of life breaks through the form. In self-
transcendence, the dynamic substance transcends the forms.
Tillich’s thinking combines different influences.  There is a strong
Aristotelian strain in the classical definition of form and in the idea of self-
integration. The description of the essential and existential state of things
indicates the Platonic scheme of essence and existence and the views of
existentialism. The idea of self-creation and the modern view of dynamics and
form has been influenced by Schelling and the philosophy of life, and it is
near the views of process philosophy. The dynamic substance in self-
transcendence is influenced by the idea of dynamis panton in Neo-Platonism,
and Tillich’s view of history also mirrors Hegelian views.
Tillich uses the polarity of dynamics and form in a symbolic way to explain
God. In the ontological context, the ideal is the unity and balance of the
elements. The power of being or the abyss or the ground of being express the
dynamic side of the polarity.The element of meaning and structure is logos,
which unites meaningful structure with creativity. God’s Spirit combines the
ontological elements and the telos of life: the Spirit is the unity of power and
meaning. God’s potentiality, vitality and self-transcendence are based on
dynamics,  God’s actuality, intentionality and self-preservation are based on
form. Tillich rejects the view of process theology and the idea of God as actus
purus because they disrupt the balance between dynamics and form.
There are three main symbols that Tillich uses to talk about God and they
can be interpreted with the three functions of life: God as “Being-Itself”
corresponds to the unity and balance of dynamics and form and to the self-
integration of life. God as “the Power of Being” corresponds to the self-
creation of life where dynamics breaks through the form. God as “the Spirit”
corresponds to the self-transcendence of life where the dynamic substance
transcends the forms. It is also possible to interpret the three functions of life
in a Trinitarian way: self-creation can be connected to “the Father”, the first
person of the Trinity; self-integration to “the Son”, the second person of the
Trinity; and self-transcendence to “the Spirit”, the third person of the Trinity.
The first two volumes of Systematic Theology emphasize the unity and
balance of dynamics and form. This means there is more emphasis on form
than in the subsequent parts. In Tillich’s ontology, the elements of the
ontological polarities belong essentially together in an unbroken unity, but in
finitude, polarity becomes tension where the elements draw away from one
another. Existential estrangement means the possibility to lose one’s
ontological structure and with it oneself. Dynamics and form are necessary
ontological elements of everything, but the unity and balance of dynamics and
form is also a basis for value judgements. The relation of dynamics and form
can be existentially disturbed: either dynamics is distorted into a formless urge
to self-transcendence or form becomes negative and restrictive. The polarity
of dynamics and form becomes known in man’s experience as the polarity of
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vitality and intentionality, and there is a possibility of tension also between
them.
The New Being in Jesus as the Christ is essential being under the
conditions of existence. The idea that “Logos became flesh” means that God
is manifest in a personal life-process as a saving participant in the human
predicament. The polarities of being become manifest only in a person. There
are no traits of existential estrangement in Jesus, and it becomes indirectly
clear that the balance of dynamics and form was not distorted in Jesus’ life.
However, Tillich does not deal separately with the questions of dynamics and
form. He does not use the concepts of vitality and intentionality. We can see
features of both the classical view and the modern view of dynamics and
form, but the emphasis is on the unity and balance of the elements.
When Tillich explains the self-creativity of life, he uses mainly the modern
view of dynamics and form: self-creation of life is always creation of form,
and every new form is made possible only by breaking through the old form.
However, he wants to combine self-integration and self-creation also in this
context; in man, there is a corresponding tension between self-conservation
and self-transcendence, but in self-transcendence man has even more freedom
from the forms. The polarity of dynamics and form is the basis for the self-
creation of life. The new form both preserves and transforms the original
reality. In self-creativity and growth, Tillich maintains the meaning of form,
even though dynamics as vitality breaks through the form. Tillich goes one
step further away from the classical view when he says that there is a moment
of chaos between the old and the new form. Creation and chaos belong
together. Tillich’s thinking moves to a more dynamic direction.
In the life process, the powers of creation and the powers of destruction are
united in such a way that it is impossible to separate them unambiguously.
Growth is a common function of life. The ideas of self-creation and self-
transcendence blend with each other. Under the conditions of existence, the
unity of the life process is in danger of breaking up. In this case, self-
integration turns into disintegration, self-creation into destruction and self-
transcendence into profanization.
In the life process, potential becomes actual. This kind of view of life
designates potential as something inside the process of life: it is the dynamic
vitality of life. The view is different compared to the view of life as fallen or
estranged from the essential in the Platonic sense. Thus, there is a crossing of
horizontal and vertical lines in Tillich’s thinking. Tillich does not relate the
concepts of dynamis and energeia or potentiality and actuality to the polarity
of dynamics and form. In the classical view, the form element is active and
gives shape to the deformed; the potential corresponds fully to the actual and
the actualization happens within the form. In the modern view, dynamics as
vitality is the active element; it breaks through the static form and creates new
forms.
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In the sphere of man’s spirit, the self-creation of life creates culture.  In
Tillich’s system, this part is the bridge toward the third phase: self-
transcendence. Self-transcendence is the main category when Tillich deals
with life and the Spirit but the ideas of self-creativity and self-transcendence
blend in Tillich’s view of culture. In his interpretation of culture, Tillich does
not use  the polarity of dynamics and form very much. The ultimate aim of the
cultural self-creation of life is that the universe of meaning is the fulfilment of
the universe of being. The ambiguity of culture can be seen in the fact  that the
cultural act both creates and destroys meaning. Only parts of the potentialities
connected to a thing actualize themselves.
All social groups must have a form which is determined by the
understanding of justice in the group. Tillich is using the polarity of dynamics
and form in the meaning of ontological necessity. He does not very much
develop a typological view of culture based on the polarity of dynamics and
form. Sometimes Tillich uses the distinction of form and substance,
sometimes he has  a distinction of form-substance-subject matter. It is difficult
to combine them to the polarity of dynamics and form: the polarity of
dynamics and form has a strong Aristotelian strain while the distinction of
form and substance can be understood in the light of the Neo-Platonic ideas of
Tillich’s cultural theology.
Morality, culture, and religion belong together. Culture provides the
contents of morality, and religion gives to morality the unconditional
character of the moral imperative and the ultimate moral aim. Religion is the
substance of culture and culture is the form of religion. The Spiritual Presence
in culture creates theonomy. There are variations in Tillich’s view of
autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy which correspond to the variations of
his thinking in general. In this context, expressionism breaks into the vertical
reality and has a genuine theonomous element. 
The Spiritual Presence creates theonomous forms in cultural self-creation,
and that leads to the conquest of cultural ambiguities. The forms of creative
process are autonomous, but this should not lead to independent autonomy.
The reaction of religion easily takes the form of rejecting creativity and even
the justified demands of culture. The religious substance gives dynamic
creativity to culture. Tillich wants to give culture an independent status, and
because of this the idea of the essential form is in the background in his views
of culture. Tillich mentions exceptionally the polarity of dynamics and form
when he deals with institutionalized religion: he says that everything that has
being has a form.
An ambiguous reunion of morality, culture, and religion is possible under
the impact of the divine Spirit. The Spiritual Presence creates a theonomous
culture and a theonomous morality. The centered self can be lost in an empty
self-identity or in a chaotic self-alteration. The Spirit can overcome the double
anxiety of not actualizing one’s essential nature or losing oneself in self-
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actualization. Where there is Spirit, the actual manifests the potential and the
potential determines the actual. Man can give way to the forces of moral
disintegration and act against the spirit in the power of spirit.
Tillich connects agape to all three life processes. On one hand, agape
manifests itself in the form of the moral law but at the same time transcends
its content. On the other hand, Tillich maintains the absoluteness of the moral
imperative by saying that it expresses the essential being of man. The view
changes between the polar view of dynamics and form and the view of form
and substance. Sometimes essence is  the unity and balance of dynamics and
form, sometimes it is the dynamic substance; in those cases form and structure
are connected only to existence as finite forms.
In his cultural theology, Tillich defines hubris and concupiscence anew:
self-transcendence is associated with being freed from the bondage of form. In
the modern definition of dynamics and form, dynamics as vitality breaks
through and transcends the static form; it is only one step further to think that
the static form is restrictive and preventing vitality from manifesting its
vitality. Gradually, dynamics as vitality drives toward self-transcendence
which is prohibited by the forms: the conflict of the elements that was
described as the threat of existential estrangement becomes the natural way of
life.
The Spiritual Presence creates an ecstasy which drives the spirit of man
beyond itself; this does not destroy the rational structure of man.  The impact
of the Spiritual Presence is received through the rational form. Tillich insists
that there is some structure in the experiences of the Spirit, but he does not
define any specific forms where the impact of the Spirit is to be experienced.
Ecstasy transcends the subject and object structure; intoxication does not
actualize consciousness, so it is less than the subject and object structure.
Creativity is the only criterion which can be used to decide between ecstasy
and intoxication. Tillich warns us not to confuse the subjective impact of the
gospel preaching to the spiritual impact that transcends the subjective and the
objective.
Tillich emphasizes the freedom of the Spirit in the end of the system more
than in the beginning. He says that the Word of God is not bound to a
particular revelatory event, Christian or non-Christian and that it is not tied up
with a special content or a special form. This is understandable on the basis of
self-transcendence where the Spirit transcends all the forms. The Spirit can
manifest itself in different forms but it remains free from all the forms. 
The Spiritual Presence creates the Spiritual Community which is the
dynamic essence of Christian churches. The dynamic essence of every
member of the Spiritual Community is the Spiritual personality.  The Spiritual
Presence works through the churches toward the self-transcendence of culture,
and cultural groups and movements can express it in a latent way. The
constructive functions of the church lead to form-transcendence and form-
142
affirmation; the churches have an ecstatic, form-transcending character.
Religion cannot demand culture to obey any specific cultural forms. The
church manifests itself as a church only if the Spirit breaks into the finite
forms. Religious art or knowledge cannot injure the artistic or cognitive  rules.
The churches become demonic-repressive, if form-transcendence is
emphasized over form-preservation. In the opposite case, the danger is
profanization and emptying of the form. The holy fills forms that are empty in
themselves.
The institutions of the church are based on certain functions. The legal
forms of the church are not based on the order given by God’s Spirit but are
based on the human wisdom and social suitability to the purpose. Every
community needs some kind of form, and the endeavours of sects to live in an
anarchic state have never been successful. Protestantism rejects all the
absolutizing of the forms of church activities. The Protestant principle needs
as its pair the Catholic substance, which can be seen in the concrete
embodiment of the Spiritual Presence. The Protestant principle expresses the
victory of the Spirit over religion, and the Protestant spirit indicates the
dynamic substance of religion.
Tillich’s view of self-transcendence is problematic. On the one hand, the
agent of self-transcendence is the dynamic vitality of life which creates new
forms in the self-creativity and self-transcendence of life. On the other hand,
the Spirit is the agent of self-transcendence. What is the difference between
the dynamic vitality of life and the Spirit? This is one of the collision points of
Tillich’s system: he started to write the third volume of the system from the
end and, as a consequence, Tillich was not able to unite seamlessly the idea of
self-trascendence coming from his older cultural theological views to the idea
of self-transcendence coming from the ontological starting-points of the
system.
Tillich combines vitality with the fight of the divine and the demonic in
man. The dynamic forces obtain a twofold divine-demonic nature. In the early
texts, Tillich seems to make a much more positive evaluation of the dynamic
forces, the powers of origin. The meaning of form is secondary compared to
the dynamic side. In the third volume of Systematic Theology, the acceptance
of the vitalistic forces includes the acceptance of life in its divine-demonic
ambiguity. Also, the holy has a demonic and a divine side. Tillich talks in a
dialectical way about the demonic structure. Occasionally, Tillich combines
the overemphasis of the finite forms to the demonic. In Tillich’s early
thinking, the dynamic side is both form-creating and form-destroying, and
there is a form of antiform.  The divine-demonic is more often to be found in
the “depths” of the dynamic forces. 
In his early thinking Tillich says that the divine-demonic both creates and
breaks the form; in the third volume of Systematic Theology he maintains that
the Spiritual Presence does not break a form which would be demonic. The
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change in Tillich’s thinking can be seen in the replacement of the divine-
demonic depth by the idea of Spiritual Presence or the Spirit. In Tillich’s polar
view, the divine-demonic is the first element of God which is balanced by the
form or logos principle.
When Tillich deals with life and history, he uses the concepts of potentiality
and actuality, and the emphasis is on self-transcendence. The term potential
points to a state somewhere in history.  Life creates itself and can destroy
itself when the dynamics of history drive toward the new. History is a
dynamic force. Man is free and can transcend the given environment. One
basic feature of man’s history is to create the new; as an act of the spirit,
creating means transcending the given in the horizontal direction without a
priori limits, and it means bringing something into existence. In the light of
self-transcendence, the concrete form at the same time manifests and hides.
The processes of life are united in history to one big process directed
towards an aim. The new that history creates is combined with meanings and
values. Tillich’s view of history is based on the idea of self-transcendence
where the static forms are transcended by the dynamic substance. The
breakthrough of the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God is  kairos,
the appearance of the center of history; it is re-experienced through relative
kairoi. The idea that the Spirit breaks through the forms is obvious. The idea
of kairos indicates the self-transcendence of history. The Kingdom of God
participates in the dynamics of history and as trans-historical gives answers to
the questions involved in the ambiguities of history. The demonic powers
cannot prevent history from reaching its aim.
Tillich wants to unite the beginning and the end: the perfect balance of
dynamics and form is achieved in the Kingdom of God. They are united in the
divine creativity which transcends their polar tension. In Eternal Life, all the
ontological polarities are in perfect balance, and the three functions of life
come to an end as separate functions. Tillich says that creation is creation for
the end. The new is created between the beginning and the end but the aim is
already within the foundation. This resembles the classical view of dynamics
and form with which Tillich combines the end with the beginning. Tillich’s
intention was to keep the essential and the existential sides of his thinking in
balance, but we can argue that in the beginning and again in the very end of
the system, he is more a “metaphysical spectator” than in the other places.
Tillich’s thinking develops from self-integration through self-creativity to
self-transcendence, and this creates the basic tension and the conceptual
problems in his thinking.
Some of the main results of our examination have been gathered in the
following table. In the table we have to move to lower levels to follow the
development of thoughts. It is also possible to sketch back the corresponding
views that are implicit in the different views; in the table this means also
moving from the right edge to the left in the lower levels.
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(ST 2) (ST 3)
Ontological Being/ Trinity New Being Life Life and
structure God processes culture
SELF- Essence: unity God is Ground New Being Dynamics and
INTEGRATION and balance of Being (dynamics) - dynamics form are both
Classical view of dynamics and Itself + Logos and form in essential and
dynamics and form form (form) = unity and equally important
Greek thought --- Spirit balance - critique of one-
Plato and Aristotle Existence: in balance - essential sided phenomena
Neo-orthodox dynamics-form Unity of being under -> New Being as a
Church theology - separation power and the conditions criterion
Catholic substance - conflict meaning of existence Purpose, aim, and
Western Estrangement - Western appeared in meaning of culture
Essential Tillich view Jesus’ life






SELF-CREATION Dynamics as God is the Dynamics as Self-creativity of
Modern view of vitality breaks Power of vitality breaks life creates culture
dynamics and form through the Being throught the form Form element is
Lebensphilosophie form and creates new also important
Process philosophy forms = self- Unity of morality,
Schelling creativity of life culture, and





SELF- The Spirit God as Spiritual - “New Being Form- Dynamic view of
TRANSCENDENCE transcends the Spirit (ST Presence or dwells in transcendence and life and Spirit
Form and substance forms 3) or the Spirit Jesus” form-affirmation Manifestation of
Cultural theology Divine- - Dynamic Powerful (ST 3) or form- the Spiritual
Hegel Demonic element Gehalt shines creation and form- Presence
Neo-Platonism depth or more through the destroying (early Spirit is free and
Protestant Principle ground or important historical writings) takes different
Existential Tillich abyss Spirit person forms in religion,
(early Christology life, and history
writings) - finite forms, form





The table is, naturally, an abstraction because the elements are combined
with each other and Tillich does not jump from one position to another.
Tillich’s thinking is like a kaleidoscope that shows the same particles in a
different order. 
The extremes are the classical view of dynamics and form in self-
integration and the idea of dynamic substance which transcends the finite
forms (plural). The modern view of dynamics and form is in the middle
building a bridge between them, and sometimes  the idea of form and
substance comes close to that: when Tillich deals with culture, he talks about
form and substance in the singular and maintains the meaning of form. The
self-creation of life has common features with the other ones making it
possible to move from one position to another but if the extremes are taken
alone, it is difficult to combine them without contradiction.
Tillich’s endeavour to unite the three functions of life creates conceptual
problems. It is not possible to unite without tension Tillich’s ontological and
cultural theological views. In self-transcendence, the Spirit transcends the
forms: the view of form is static. Following this kind of definition of form in
the Trinity would lead to the emphasis of the dynamic side in God: the form
principle of the Trinity would be submitted to dynamics. However, in the
view of the Trinity, Tillich uses the concept of logos which is based on the
classical view of form. Following this kind of view of form througout cultural
theology would lead to the emphasis of the meaning of form in a different
way than Tillich has done.
Tillich’s ontological and Trinitarian views are based on the unity and
balance of dynamics and form: when the balance and unity is maintained, the
difference between the polarity of dynamics and form and the view of form
and substance is not very apparent. However, cultural theological views
indicate the Protestant view of the Spirit which transcends the forms and is
free to manifest itself in all religions and cultures; the dynamic substance is
accompanied with finite forms. Tillich wants to appreciate all the
manifestations of the Spirit without losing basic Christian insights, but this
creates the tension in his system.
When we evaluate Tillich’s system, the basic question is, how do we see
the need for the three functions of life: is it possible to create an adequate
system only from one point of view or is it necessary to involve all the three
in one system in spite of the problems? If it is correct to unite the three
functions of life to the three persons of the Trinity, this is a common question
for all Trinitarian theology: is it inevitable that there are logical and
conceptual problems always when we want to say something in a Trinitarian
way? Tillich maintains the dialectical nature of theology, but this is a major
parting of the ways in theological and philosophical thinking: the dialectical
thinking can be seen also as a contradiction of ideas and incoherence of the
system.
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We have seen that the dynamic view and the idea of self-transcendence
express Tillich’s lifelong thinking. Why did he not create his ontology and his
whole system in accordance with these views? Why did he want to combine
the three functions of life and take a new starting point for his system? We do
not know what would be Tillich’s own answer to the questions that his system
raises: would he have kept the three functions of life in spite of the problems
for logical consistency or would he have developed his views and found better
ways to express them? Would he have been willing to go on with the
correlation of the Christian message with the situation or would he have taken
a new “non-provincial” approach, as some of his latest texts indicate? 
Tillich was aware of the problems of his system: it can be seen in his
difficulties to complete the system and in his dissatisfaction with the third
volume. However, he has made one of the outstanding efforts of the last
century to interpret the Christian message in a new cultural situation. He
shared the basic Christian views but at the same time maintained that the
Spirit is free to transcend all the forms and manifest itself in different forms.
He wanted to be a ”church theologian” and a “cultural theologian” at the same
time, and that caused the tension in his thinking.
If the analysis of the three functions of life in Tillich’s thinking is correct,
it gives different possibilities to develop a theological system from Tillich’s
foundation:
1. The first possibility is to accept Tillich’s idea of the three functions of
life and to look for better conceptual ways to express the idea. The approval or
disapproval of the dialectical thinking is crucial.
2. The second possibility is to take one of the three functions of life and the
corresponding view of dynamics and form and to create a theological system
based on it.
3. The third possibility is to give up the idea of one coherent system and to
create a system of different modes which are developed as well as possible in
order to see the points of contact and conflict. This kind of system would be
in line with the ideas of the postmodern age.
Tillich saw clearly that theological work is a continuing one. He leaves us
with many questions and many possibilities: we are in a station with many
intersecting paths, the choice is ours.
Yet a system should be not only a point of arrival but a point of
departure as well. It should be like a station at which preliminary
truth is crystallized on the endless road toward truth.159
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